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ABSTRACT
CONTESTED GROUNDS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN UPPER
OHIO VALLEY AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN EASTERN CAPE, 1770-1850
MAY 2005
CHRISTOPH STROBEL, B.A., HIRAM COLLEGE
M..A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Neal Salisbury
This dissertation examines the circumstances created by colonial encroachments
in the American Upper Ohio Valley and the South African Eastern Cape. Beginning in
the second half of the eighteenth and lasting well into the mid-nineteenth century,
American Indians and Africans in the two areas faced increasing intrusions by people of
European origin. Colonialism, the encounter between alien cultures, infringements on
homelands, violence, dispossession, decimation, cultural invasion, removal,
accommodation, revitalization, and survival led to rapidly changing worlds for local
populations and white colonizers. My comparative study highlights the similarities and
differences between historical developments in the two regions, with a particular focus on
the creations of colonial racial orders in the United States and South Africa. Comparative
history is a valuable method for examining phenomena of cross-cultural significance
while subverting any notions about an area's historical uniqueness. It is an especially
helpful approach in understanding the significant roles that the institutionalization of
vi
colonial expansion, racism and racial domination played in the United States and South
Africa.
The Upper Ohio Valley and the Eastern Cape functioned in many ways as testing
grounds for American and British expansion. Developments in each place contributed to
the making of colonial racial systems in the larger United States and greater southern
Africa. While the scenarios in the Upper Ohio Valley and the Eastern Cape did not repeat
themselves identically in other locations, comparable patterns would emerge in later
years as the United States expanded westward and Britain expanded into southern and
eastern Africa.
In the late eighteenth and nineteenth century in the Upper Ohio Valley and the
South African Cape, systems of racial exclusiveness became entrenched through
increasingly close ties between settlers and the state. In both places, settlers, indigenous
groups, missionaries and humanitarians attempted to influence the emerging colonial
racial orders with varying success. Yet ultimately, it was the power of the state with its
ability to defeat indigenous groups militarily, to dispossess and move, and to legislate,
which shaped the two regions' colonial racial orders.
vii
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INTRODUCTION
In June of 1966, the American politician Robert Kennedy addressed the students
at the University of Cape Town in South Africa. He began his speech with the following
comment.
I come here this evening because ofmy deep interest and affection for a
land settled by the Dutch in the mid-seventeenth century, then taken over
by the British, and at last independent. A land in which the native
inhabitants were at first subdued, but relations with whom remain a
problem to this day. A land which defined itself on a hostile frontier. A
land which was once the importer of slaves, and now must struggle to
wipe out the last traces of that former bondage. I refer, of course, to the
United States of America. 1
As Kennedy recognized, the histories of the United States and South Africa are startlingly
similar on several levels. These similarities have led historians to write comparative
histories of the two countries in recent decades. Most of these studies focus on relations
between whites and blacks. This dissertation, however, examines issues of white-Native
American and white-African relations during the period of colonization in the eighteenth
and nineteenth century. At first glance, this may seem like an unusual pairing. But
Africans and Native Americans are the indigenous populations of the two regions and
both employed numerous tactics to maintain their culture and ways of life in the face of
European colonialism. Still, many South Africans and Americans maintain that, unlike
Africans in South Africa, Native Americans "disappeared," "vanished," or were
"exterminated," overlooking the fact that significant numbers of people ofNative
American descent live on and off reservations all over the United States today. Moreover,
much of American mainstream thought ignores the role that internal and external
1
colonization and empire played in the history of the United States. 2 A comparative
examination of American and British efforts at empire building in North America and
southern Africa, and their impact on the indigenous populations may, illuminate our
understandings of the history of colonization, empire, and race relations in the two
regions.
Argument
This dissertation explores the circumstances surrounding colonial encroachments
in the American Upper Ohio Valley and the South African Eastern Cape. From the
second half of the eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth century, American Indians and
Africans in the two areas faced intrusions by people of European origin. Such encounters
led to the creation of empire, expropriation of land, violence, dispossession, decimation,
and in several instances removal of the original inhabitants. In turn, indigenous
populations pursued strategies of resistance, accommodation, revitalization, and survival.
Such processes reinforced the colonial transformations of the two regions examined here.
These transformations aided in the creations of "colonial racial orders" in the
United States and South Africa. By "colonial racial order" I mean a system where a white
1
This quote is from the PBS documentary Frontline: Apartheid Part 2, 1948-1963 (Dec.
14, 1987).
2 On this issue see for example Francis Jennings, The Creation ofAmerica: Through
Revolution to Empire (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); James Wilson,
The Imperial Republic: A Structural History ofAmerican Constitutionalismfrom the
Colonial Era to the Beginning ofthe Twentieth Century (Aldershot and Burlington:
Ashgate, 2002), 1-9. There has been an increase on literature on the "new American
empire" since September 11, 2001. Many pundits and commentators imagine the
"American empire" as a "benevolent" force, set to spread the ideals of "democracy,"
2
settler state imposed its control over indigenous populations, a power relationship that
over time increasingly manifested itself through "racial differentiation."3 A comparative
examinati6n of the above-mentioned processes in the two areas can offer insights into the
pervasive, complex, and conflicting nature of colonialism and racism in American and
South African history. The Upper Ohio Valley and the Eastern Cape, functioned in many
ways as "testing grounds" for the American and British empires. Developments in each
place contributed to the making of racialized colonial systems in the larger United States
and greater southern Africa. While the scenarios in the Upper Ohio Valley and the
Eastern Cape did not repeat themselves identically in other locations, comparable patterns
would emerge in later years as the United States expanded westward and as Britain
expanded into southern and eastern Africa.4
"civilization," and "freedom" around the world. See for example Emily Eakin, '"It takes
an Empire," Say Several U.S. Thinkers," International Herald Tribune, April 2, 2002.
3 My study implies that "race," "racism," "racial differentiation," and "racial orders"
cannot be understood as monolithic phenomena. They are social and historic constructs
that have different meanings at different times and places. They are tied to social
structures - such as the state and empire - and are constantly reshaped. My thinking on
these issues is in part influenced by Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, Race,
Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities (New York: Verso, 1991); David Theo Goldberg,
Racist Culture (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 81-82, 93; Goldberg, The Racial State
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2002); Paul Maylam, South Africa 's Racial Past: The History and
the Historiography ofRacism, Segregation, and Apartheid (Aldershot and Burlington:
Ashgate, 2001), 6-7.
4 My argument here has been influenced by I. W. Andrews, "The Beginnings of the
Colonial System of the United States," in Ohio Archaeological and Historical
Publications, vol. 1 (Columbus: Fred J. Heer, 1900), 1-9; George Knepper, Ohio and its
People (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1989), 46; Edward Watts, An American
Colony: Regionalism and the Roots ofMidwestern Culture (Athens: Ohio University
Press, 2002); and Clifton Crais, White Supremacy and Black Resistance in pre-Industrial
South Africa: The Making ofthe Colonial Order in the Eastern Cape (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1992), 3.
3
The creation of empire and colonial racial orders in the Upper Ohio Valley and in
the Eastern Cape was a complex process. The historian Eric Hinderaker describes the
American efforts of colonization in the Ohio Valley as "a dramatic departure" from the
French and British "models of empire." He argues that the "empire of liberty" that
emerged in the region stood "European imperial principles on their head" by advocating
two legacies - "decentralized, atomized political authority and deeper, sharper lines of
racial separation."5 Yet, it is important to underscore, that British efforts of empire
building in the nineteenth century Cape underwent similar, though more gradual changes,
when Britain seized control of the Colony from the Dutch.6
Certainly, there were striking differences between the two regions. These
disparities grew out of differing local circumstances. The Upper Ohio Valley, for
example, faced a larger wave of European migration than the Eastern Cape. This
demographic distinction, as well as the ecological differences between the two regions,
shaped the colonizers' disparate expectations regarding land and labor. North of the Ohio
River, land became the central interest of white settlers. In the Eastern Cape, European
colonizers were as interested in having an adequate non-white labor supply, as they were
in obtaining African land. Moreover, slavery and involuntary servitude were, at least on
paper, forbidden in the areas north of the Ohio River claimed by the Americans. Thus,
and unlike in the Cape, non-white labor did not play a central role in the making of a
colonial racial order in the Upper Ohio Valley.
5
Eric Hinderaker, Elusive Empires: Constructing Colonialism in the Ohio Valley, 1673-
1800 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 185-186,227.
4
Yet despite such differences, which can, for example, also be observed within the
British Empire in the Cape Colony and New South Wales in Australia, there were also
some revealing similarities in the creation of the two regions' colonial racial orders. In
both the Upper Ohio Valley and the Eastern Cape, the state played a significant role in
shaping the processes of colonization and dispossession. Though the change in the
Eastern Cape was more gradual, there emerged in both regions increasing ties between
settlers and the state as systems of racial supremacy and exclusiveness became more
entrenched. Popular and official racial attitudes reflected in the population of the two
areas also became more rigid as a result of this transformation. Moreover, in both
regions, colonization and white efforts to undermine indigenous sovereignty met with
local resistance.
Historiography
In the last few decades scholars have begun to explore the comparative potential
of South African and United States history. They argue that it is an especially helpful
approach in understanding the institutionalization of colonial expansion, racism, and
racial domination in the two societies. They believe that comparative history is a valuable
method for examining phenomena of cross-cultural significance while subverting any
notions about an area's historical uniqueness.
6 Edward Watts points to a similar "departure" in the British Empire, but does not explore
this issue further. See Watts, An American Colony, 17.
7 See for example Howard Lamar and Leonard Thompson, "Comparative Frontier
History," in idem, eds. The Frontier in History: North America and Southern Africa
Compared (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981); George Fredrickson, White
Supremacy: A Comparative Study in American and South African History (New York:
5
The concepts of "race," "frontier," "colonization," and "conquest" play an
integral part in shaping our understanding of the history of the United States and South
Africa. As organizing principles, however, they have also spurred controversy that has
led to conflicting interpretations. The work of the comparative scholar must address both
the discrepancies in the two historiographical traditions and the differences in historical
developments. As mentioned earlier, academics and intellectuals often point out that
unlike the first peoples of North America, as well as New Zealand and Australia, who
suffered under severe demographic pressures and marginalization, the indigenous peoples
in South Africa - though also marginalized - remained in the majority. Indigenous-white
relations and the issue of the "racial order" have thus always played - explicitly or
implicitly - a fundamental part in the writings of historians of South Africa. In American
historiography on the other hand, these issues are less central, and are largely worked on
by scholars with a particular interest in ethnohistory and the history of colonial
a
expansion, Native Americans, African Americans, and race.
Oxford University Press, 1981); John Cell, The Highest Stage of White Supremacy: The
Origins ofSegregation in South Africa and the American South (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1982); James Gump, The Dust Rose Like Smoke: The Subjugation ofthe
Zulu and the Sioux (Lincoln: University ofNebraska Press, 1994); Anthony Marx,
Making Race and Nation: A Comparison ofthe United States, South Africa, and Brazil
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
8
For some thoughts on this issue see Colin Bundy, "An Image of Its Own Past? Towards
A Comparison of American and South African Historiography," in Historyfrom South
Africa: Alternative Visions and Practices, eds. Joshua Brown et. al. (Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 1991), 83-104. On the contested terrain of the racial order in
South Africa see Maylam, South Africa 's Racial Past. My discussion of historiography in
this and the following paragraphs has benefited from Christopher Saunders, The Making
ofthe South African Past: Major Historians on Race and Class (Totowa, N.J.: Barnes &
Noble Books, 1988); and from Andrew Cayton and Frederika Teute, "On the
Connections of Frontiers," in Contact Points American Frontiersfrom the Mohawk
6
" or
Earlier generations of historians in the United States and in South Africa have
accorded special importance to the frontier. Studies by the so-called "settler historians,
such as the American Francis Parkman or Frederick Jackson Turner, or the Canadian
born South African George Theal, implied that on the frontier indigenous "savagisnr
"barbarism" was forced to surrender to an advancing European "civilization."9 Some
scholars of American and South African history argued that the frontier played a special
role in shaping the two countries' modern social orders and national characters. The
American historian Turner, for example, described the frontier as a driving force for
individualism and democracy in American history. 10 Eric Walker and C.W. de Kiewiet
developed a different but equally influential "frontier thesis" for South Africa. They
maintained that the experiences of South Africa's Dutch speaking settlers on the
eighteenth century frontier significantly shaped that country's racial attitudes. George
Fredrickson embraces a similar argument in White Supremacy. In this prominent
comparative monograph he maintains that Dutch-speaking Boers created a system of
"territorial apartheid" on the frontier, which served as a precursor to the twentieth century
regime in South Africa."
Valley to the Mississippi, 1 750- J830, eds. Cayton and Teute (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1998).
9
See for example Francis Parkman, The Works ofFrancis Parkman, vols. 20 (Boston:
Little and Brown, 1897-98); and George Theal, History ofSouth Africa, vols. 1 1 (Cape
Town: C. Struik, 1964). During his youth in Canada Theal read the writings of Parkman.
10
See especially Frederick Jackson Turner, "The Significance of the Frontier in
American History," in The Frontier in American History (New York: H. Holt, 1921), 1-
38.
1
1
See Eric Walker, A History ofSouth Africa, rev. ed. (London: Longmans, Green, and
Co., 1935); C.W. de Kiewiet, A History ofSouth Africa (London: Oxford University
7
Other scholars have challenged the view that European "settlers" on the southern
African and the American "frontier" were the sole forgers of the two regions' social
orders and national and cultural identities. Many historians today cast doubt on the
validity of Turner's "frontier thesis" that connects expansionism to democracy, American
exceptionalism, and individualism. Numerous scholars have also come to question the
links between the beliefs held by South African frontiersmen and the country's modern
racial order. They argue that on the early "frontiers" in southern Africa, as in North
America, foes and partners were not always rigidly defined by race. Here, they contend,
as I do in Part I of my dissertation, that despite frequent conflict and violence, exchanges
between local people and Europeans occurred through trade, social interaction, cultural
convergence, interdependence, and efforts to gain at least limited mutual understanding. 12
Such observations have led historians to maintain that racial orders only really
materialized in the late nineteenth and twentieth-century with the coming of
industrialization and segregation. 13 However, other scholars argue - more or less
cautiously - that the effects of conquest, colonialism, and slavery still provide some
useful insights in understanding the shaping of racially stratified societies in the United
Press, 1941); and I.D. MacCrone, Race Attitudes in South Africa: Historical
Experimental and Psychological Studies (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press,
1937); Fredrickson, White Supremacy, 49-53.
12 See Lamar and Thompson, The Frontier in History; Timothy Keegan, Colonial South
Africa and the Origins ofthe Racial Order (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press,
1996), chapter 2; P.J. van der Merwe, The Migrant Farmer in the History ofthe Cape
Colony, 1657-1842, transl. Roger Beck (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1995); Keegan,
Colonial South Africa, 15-36; Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and
Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815 (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1991); Hinderaker, Elusive Empires.
8
States and South Africa. 14 My dissertation does not maintain that the systems that
emerged in the Upper Ohio Valley and the Eastern Cape resemble the racial orders of the
twentieth century. That is why they are referred to as colonial racial orders. Still, the
creation of colonial racial orders in the two regions was accompanied by the development
and expansion of racism, empire, and capitalism, which played a formative role, and
provide a glimpse at the contested construction and representation of race in the two
countries
Outline
My dissertation is divided into three parts. Part I, which consists of a comparative
chapter, looks at the sometimes destructive transformations that early colonization caused
in the Upper Ohio Valley and the Eastern Cape. Still, this was a period in which a
balance of power existed between indigenous people and white colonizer. Furthermore,
the absorption of migrants, as well as political, economic, and social adaptation among
See Cell, The Highest Stage of White Supremacy; and Thompson and Lamar, The
Frontier in History.
14
See Keegan, Colonial South Africa; Mostert, Frontiers, XVII-XVIII; Clifton Crais,
White Supremacy and Black Resistance, 3; Alan Lester, Imperial Networks: Creating
Identities in Nineteenth-Century South Africa and Britain (New York: Routledge, 2001).
See also Richard Elphick and Hermann Giliomee, The Shaping ofSouth African Society,
1652-1840, 2nd ed. (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1989); Marx, Making Race
and Nation, 77. For the Ohio valley see Hinderaker, Elusive Empires, see especially
chapter 5 and 6. On this issue see also William Appleman Williams, "The Frontier Thesis
and American Foreign Policy," Pacific Historical Review 24 (1955), 379-395; Reginald
Horsman, Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins ofAmerican Racial Anglo-Saxonism
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981); Gregory Nobles, American Frontiers:
Cultural Encounters and Continental Conquest (New York: Hill and Wang, 1997);
Patricia Nelson Limerick, The Legacy ofConquest: The Unbroken Past ofthe American
West (New York: W.W. Norton, 1987); and Edmund Morgan, American
9
the indigenous peoples in both areas, laid important foundations from which Africans and
Native Americans drew when they encountered a sudden influx of white settlers.
Contacts between indigenous peoples and Europeans in the two areas led to the creation
of what the American historian Richard White, in his analysis of Indian/white relations in
the North American Great Lakes region, calls The Middle Ground. The Middle Ground
portrays a world inhabited by Native Americans and Europeans, where complex cultural
exchanges led to the creation of new systems of meaning and exchange. 15 Yet, among
many indigenous peoples and Europeans, permanent white settlement generated a gradual
reification of indigenous and white identities. These transformations, which occurred in
the Upper Ohio Valley prior to the American Revolution and in the Eastern Cape up to
the early nineteenth century, led to efforts by many white settlers and some policy-
makers to dispossess indigenous groups. They also spurred Native American and African
resistance to these processes. Still, it was only with the emergence of a more powerful
American and British colonial state in later decades that a gradual implementation of
colonial racial orders and more effective means of dispossessing indigenous lands took
place.
Part II, which is divided into two chapters dealing with regional discussions of the
Upper Ohio Valley and the Eastern Cape respectively, examines the processes of
indigenous dispossession and white efforts at undermining Native American and African
sovereignty in the late eighteenth and nineteenth century. In both places, colonialism was
not a monolithic or coherent process. Rather there existed, what Frederick Cooper and
Slavery/American Freedom: The Ordeal ofColonial Virginia (New York: W.W. Norton,
1975).
10
Ann Stoler term, "competing visions of the kind of colonialism" Europeans "wished to
build." Thus, settlers, officials, missionaries, and the colonial as well as the metropolitan
state often pursued varying ideals and strategies in their efforts to shape the two regions'
emerging colonial racial orders. But in both areas, the state increasingly implemented and
enforced the two distinct systems of racial order. 16
From an indigenous perspective, the self-proclaimed "humanitarian" or
"benevolent" strategies of many government officials and missionaries, as well as the
settler demands for indigenous dispossession, often proved equally detrimental. For
instance, while the American president Thomas Jefferson was advocating a "civilization
program" that encouraged accommodation with some Native Americans, he was also
buying land in the trans-Mississippian west through the Louisiana Purchase of 1803. He
bought this land for future white settlement, but he also intended to remove "savage"
Indians to this region.
17 Comparable paradoxical attitudes existed in southern Africa. The
granting of "self government" to the Cape by Great Britain, for example, reinforced the
promulgation of the so-called "color blind" 1853 Constitution. Yet these political changes
in the Cape also coincided with a more intensified cultural assault on the "eastern
frontier." In 1855 Governor George Grey told the colony's Legislative Assembly:
We should, I think, use our time and strength, when our generosity cannot
be misunderstood, to instruct and civilise - to change inveterate enemies
15
White, The Middle Ground.
16
Frederick Cooper and Ann Stoler, "Tensions of Empire: Colonial Control and Visions
of Rule " American Ethnologist 16, (Nov., 1989), 609-621; see also John Comaroff,
"Images of Empire, Contests of Conscience: Models of Colonial Domination in South
Africa," in ibid, 661-685.
17
See for example Anthony Wallace, Jefferson and the Indians: The Tragic Fate ofthe
First Americans (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 225.
11
into friends, alike from interest and increased knowledge - destroyers of
our stock and produce into consumers of our goods and producers for our
markets. 18
Though Grey advocated a message of accommodation and African incorporation
through a "civilisation policy," this was to be achieved by force if necessary.
Furthermore, officials in the Eastern Cape and in the Upper Ohio Valley argued
that it was the American Indians and Africans who had to change their way of
life.
Part Three, which is again divided into two chapters that discuss developments in
the Upper Ohio Valley and the Eastern Cape separately, looks at Native American and
African efforts to maintain their sovereignty - attempts to shape colonial racial orders
"from below." 19 By ignoring indigenous struggles to resist, to find mutual grounds and to
cooperate with white intruders, and to maintain their independence, historians
misrepresent the complexities of colonial transformation. The sociologist Ran Greenstein
writes in his comparative study of South Africa and Palestine/Israel, that "the capacities
of indigenous people to respond to and shape the process of group encounter and
conflict" are vital to understanding the different "historical courses" taken by colonial
regions. The role of what Greenstein calls "indigenous capacities," along with world
historical processes and "the strategies adopted by settler and colonial forces," provide a
18 Governor Grey to Legislative Council and the House Assembly, March 17, 1855, BPP
1969/1855,56-59.
19 My thinking on this issue has been influenced by Marx, Making Race and Nation.
12
useful means of distinguishing the differing developments in the Upper Ohio Valley and
the Eastern Cape.20
Africans and Native Americans pursued both accommodation and confrontation
in their efforts to maintain their independence. If one option ceased to be perceived as
advantageous, viable, or practical, indigenous peoples were likely to switch their
strategies. Ohio Indian leaders like the Shawnee Black Hoof, the Wyandot Tarhe, and the
Miami Little Turtle, for example, fought in three military campaigns in the Ohio region
against the United States military in the early 1790s. After the successful American attack
at Fallen Timbers in 1794, these chiefs who had previously fought to keep the United
States south of the Ohio river began to pursue at least partial accommodation. In the
Eastern Cape in the early nineteenth century, the African leaders on the Zuurveld,
Ndlambe and Chungwa attempted to find ways of peaceful coexistence with the
expanding Cape Colony. Yet, when British colonial authorities decided in 181 1 to push
the Zuurveld Xhosa beyond the Great Fish River by force, both leaders were left with no
alternatives to defending what they saw as their rightful territory.
Despite indigenous peoples' efforts to maintain their autonomy, the state, with the
assistance of the two white settler populations, implemented systems of colonial racial
orders in both the Upper Ohio Valley and the Eastern Cape by the mid nineteenth
century. This transformation was shaped by violence, conflict and cooperation. It left a
legacy that shaped the development of colonization and the contested construction and
20 Ran Greenstein, Genealogies of Conflict: Class Identity and State in Palestine/Israel
and South Africa (Hanover: University Press ofNew England, 1995), 3; Ran Greenstein,
"Rethinking the Colonial Process: The Role of Indigenous Capacities in Comparative
Historical Inquiry," South African Historical Journal 32 (May, 1995), 1 14-137.
13
representation of race in the United States and southern Africa. To this history we will
now turn our attention.
14
PARTI
CHAPTER 1
NATIVE AMERICANS, AFRICANS AND EUROPEANS: A COMPARATIVE
OVERVIEW OF THE PRE-COLONIAL AND EARLY COLONIAL HISTORY OF
THE UPPER OHIO VALLEY AND THE EASTERN CAPE
Even though the gradual implementation of colonial racial orders only became
possible in the Upper Ohio Valley and the Eastern Cape with the emergence of a more
powerful American and British colonial state in the nineteenth century, historians
interested in race relations and systems of colonial order should not ignore the pre- and
early colonial developments in the two regions. These shaped a legacy of inter-ethnic
cooperation and partial accommodation as well as irreconcilable rivalries. Thus, they
affected how Europeans, Native Americans, and Africans thought about cross-racial
interaction, and played a crucial role in shaping the transformation of the two regions.
Historians have challenged the view that initial indigenous-white contacts
provided the point of origin for the social and racial orders of the United States and South
Africa.
1
These revisionists contend that the history of early colonization, lasting in the
Upper Ohio Valley roughly to the American Revolution and in the Eastern Cape to the
British take-over from the Dutch in 1806, was a period of balance of power with complex
and diverse cross-cultural encounters. The American historian Richard White describes
this phenomenon in the North American Great Lakes region as the "middle ground,"
1
For the traditional view in the comparative scholarship see Fredrickson, White
Supremacy; Louis Hartz, ed., The Founding ofNew Societies: Studies in the History of
the United States, Latin America, South Africa, Canada, and Australia (New York:
Harcourt, Brace & World, 1964). For a comparative critique to this argument see Lamar
and Thompson, "Comparative Frontier History," in The Frontier in History, 3-13.
15
which he sees as a mutually comprehensible world in which indigenous people and
Europeans searched for common meaning and accommodation.2
Though this chapter embraces the concept of the "middle ground,"
acknowledging that indigenous groups and people of European origin in both the Upper
Ohio Valley and the Eastern Cape interacted and searched for accommodation and
common meaning, it also examines the ways in which different ethnic groups in the two
regions defined themselves in opposition to each other - a process that often reinforced
irreconcilable rivalries and violent struggles. In both the Eastern Cape and in the Upper
Ohio Valley, Africans and Native Americans sought to maintain and to impose their
diplomatic, trade, and social practices and understandings on white intruders. Likewise,
many of the two regions' white colonizers attempted to reproduce their metropolitan
practices and understandings, and tried to impose their commercial and imperial
imperatives on indigenous groups.
The Pre-Colonial and Middle Ground Eastern Cape and Upper Ohio Valley
Indigenous efforts to shape and respond to the efforts of empire-building by the
British in the Eastern Cape and by the Americans in the Upper Ohio Valley were rooted
in the pre-colonial and middle ground histories of the two areas. In both regions, through
migrations, the incorporation of outsiders, political, economic, and social interactions as
well as competitions and rivalries, indigenous peoples had developed a wide variety of
Harcourt, Brace & World, 1964). For a comparative critique to this argument see Lamar
and Thompson, "Comparative Frontier History," in The Frontier in History, 3-13.
2
White, The Middle Ground.
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diplomatic, trade, and social practices, which would, in later years, shape their
interactions with Europeans. 3
The Pre-Colonial Eastern Cape
Long before white colonists arrived, the Eastern Cape saw two major waves of
migration. The first encounter occurred between autochthonous hunter-gathering peoples
known as San and pastoralists generally called Khoikhoi. The herders are believed to
have moved into South Africa in the first centuries CE, and had permanently settled in
the Eastern Cape no later than 1 100 CE. The second contact in the Eastern Cape was
established between Khoikhoi and San communities and migrating Bantu-speaking
pastoralist-cultivators, probably no later than the fifteenth century. For centuries prior to
European colonization, these two migrations spurred interaction, cultural transmission,
and competition in the Eastern Cape, and turned it into "a site," as Clifton Crais writes,
"of ethnic ambiguity and intensive social construction."4
South Africa's original inhabitants, the San, lived in autonomous bands consisting
of a few to several families. A gendered division of labor shaped their foraging
economies. Women collected the veldkos (roots, berries, honey and insects) and often
contributed up to two thirds of the food required for the subsistence of a community. Men
did the trapping and hunting. Compared to the social structures developed by Khoikhoi
3 My thinking on these issues benefited from Neal Salisbury, "The Indians' Old World:
Native Americans and the Coming of Europeans," The William and Mary Quarterly, 53
(1996), 435-458; for southern Africa see Igor Kopytoff, "The Internal African Frontier:
The Making of African Political Culture," in The African Frontier: The Reproduction of
Traditional African Societies, Kopytoff, ed. (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana
University Press, 1987), 3-84.
4
Crais, White Supremacy and Black Resistance, 14-15.
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and Bantu speaking groups that migrated to the Cape region in later centuries, the
political organization of hunter-gatherer societies remained decentralized and relatively
egalitarian even after new groups arrived. 5
The encounter between the hunter gatherers and the migrating pastoralist, which
most scholars believe occurred throughout South Africa beginning in the first century
CE, led to rivalries but also to accommodation and confluence. Through emulation,
conflict, or clientage, some hunter-gatherers were transformed into pastoralists. Others
were compelled to retreat to more isolated, mountainous areas from which they raided the
herders' livestock on occasion. External and internal circumstances also led to social and
cultural mobility among the herders. Although pastoralists raised herds and collected
milk, women gathered veldkos, and men provided most of the meat through hunting -
ways of subsistence not unlike those of hunter-gatherers. Many herders were forced to
switch to a hunter-gathering subsistence economy when they lost their cattle and sheep in
times of drought or war. Moreover, as a result of centuries of interaction, herder
Khoikhoi and hunter gatherer San shared many religious, linguistic, cultural, and physical
elements, leading many scholars to group them together as Khoisan. This term has
another advantage as it underscores that the differences between the two groups are
largely economic rather than ethnic. 6
5 On the social organization of hunter-gatherers in southern Africa see for example
Anders Sparrman, A Voyage to the Cape ofGood Hope towards the Antarctic Polar
Circle around the World to the Country ofthe Hottentots and the Caffresfrom the year
J 772-1776, 2vols., ed. V.S. Forbes (Cape Town: Van Riebeeck Society, 1975-7), 2: 194-
6; see also Roger Hewitt, Structure, Meaning, and Ritual in the Narratives ofthe
Southern San (Hamburg: Helmut Buske Verlag, 1986), 1-60.
6
For a comparison of "hunters" and "herders" in the Eastern Cape see Crais White
Supremacy, 14-15; and Les Switzer, Power & Resistance in an African Society: The
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Important differences remained, however, between hunter-gatherers and herders.
For one, herder settlements, though varying dramatically in size, were usually larger than
hunter-gatherer communities. Pastoralist societies were also characterized by a higher
degree of social inequality based on differences in age, gender and wealth. Yet again, as
with the size of settlements, the scale of social disparity differed widely among the
partrilineal herder societies in southern Africa. Furthermore, wide discrepancies in social
organization and authority existed within pastoralist societies. Political strength was
based on the size of herds and claims of originating "from a great family." One early
European observer underscored this tremendous political diversity by noting that the
herders were "for the most governed by a chief." But some pastoralists, like hunter-
gatherers, lived "in the wilds without a leader," or "like the Namaqua" in the
northwestern Cape were, as the same writer put it, "under a king." Yet, it is important to
remember that Europeans' use of the term "king" to describe pastoralist leaders was
based on a misperception. Though some larger herder groups did develop hereditary
lineage systems, they hardly ever emerged as powerful centralized societies. For the most
part, political and social life in a pastoralist group evolved around a village encampment
that largely consisted of members of the same clan and was led by a headman. 7
Ciskei Xhosa and the Making ofSouth Africa (Madison: The University of Wisconsin
Press, 1993), 19-22. For a general introduction to Khoisan-speaking peoples see Alan
Barnard, Hunters and Herders ofSouthern Africa: A Comparative Ethnography ofthe
Khoisan Peoples (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); and Isaac Schapera,
The Khoisan Peoples ofSouth Africa: Bushmen and Hottentots (London: George
Routledge and Sons, 1930).
7
Travel accounts provide interesting insights into Khoikhoi societies. See for example
Isaac Schapera and E. Farrington, eds. and trans. The Early Cape Hottentots: Described
in the Writings of Olfert Dapper(1668), Willem Ten Rhyne (1686) and Johannes
Guiliemus de Grevenbroek (1695) (Westport: Negro University Press, 1970), quote on
75, see also 23, 27, 43, 55; Extracts of a Despatch from Commander Simon van der Stel
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Rivalries, competition, interaction, cultural transmission, and accommodation in
the Eastern Cape were once again energized when Bantu-speaking pastoralist-cultivators
began to arrive in southern Africa. Scholars believe that these groups were part of the
larger Bantu migration out of central Africa that probably began between 2000 and 1000
BCE, and which extended south of the Limpopo River probably no later than the third
century CE. The complexities of these processes are too intricate to be discussed
adequately here. For our purposes it is enough to state that Bantu expansion into eastern
and southern Africa from was spurred by a new Iron Age economy. The Bantu speakers'
discovery of iron and the development of mining and smelting, some time as scholars
0
believe between 700-200 BCE, led to more effective means of agricultural production, an
increase in herd keeping, and a centralization of power among political leaders. The new
means of food production among the Bantu, combined with the increasing consumption
of milk, led to a population explosion and expansion. As the Bantu speakers gradually
expanded into southern Africa, Khoisan speakers who populated much of the area were
either absorbed into Bantu societies as discussed below, or pushed into less fertile areas. 8
The forebears of the Xhosa people were the southernmost tier of Bantu migration
in Africa. These pastoralist cultivators pushed into the rolling landscape between the
Drakensberg Mountains and the Indian Ocean, and reached the Eastern Cape, as most
and Council to the Chamber XVII, in The Record, or a Series ofOfficial Papers Relative
to the Condition and Treatment ofthe Native Tribes ofSouth Africa, Donald Moodie, ed.
(Amsterdam: Balkema, 1960), 431-40. See also Richard Elphick, Khoikhoi and the
Founding of White South Africa (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 38-67, 151-
216; Emile Boonzaier, The Cape Herders: A History ofthe Khoikhoi ofSouthern Africa
(Athens: Ohio University Press, 1996).
8
Martin Hall, The Changing Past: Farmers, Kings and Traders in Southern Africa (Cape
Town: David Philip, 1987). For a good general survey that looks at these processes in a
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scholars estimate, between the twelfth and the fifteenth centuries. The expansion of the
Xhosa was further spurred by several dramatic schisms. Around the late seventeenth and
the early eighteenth century, for example, several smaller groups split from the Xhosa
nucleus west of the Mbashe River. They migrated further west and created separate
Xhosa chiefdoms such as the Mdange, the Ntinde, and maybe the Gqunukhwebe.9
A further westward shift of the Xhosa was also reinforced by disputes over
chiefly succession, especially complicated by the practice of polygamy among the Xhosa
elite. In the mid-eighteenth century, for example, a contest over the succession of the
Xhosa paramount Phalo led to a major schism among the Xhosa between the ama-
Rharabe and the ama-Gcaleka. According to Xhosa laws of succession, the heir of a
chief was not to be born from the first wife of the "Right Hand House," but rather from a
wife that a chief would marry later in life and whose household was known as the "Great
House." Gcaleka, Phalo's "Great House" son's claim to become paramount after his
father' death was challenged by Rharabe a son of the Right Hand House. Even though
continental perspective see Roland Oliver and Brian Fagan, Africa in the Iron Age, c. 500
B.C. toA.D. 1400 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975).
9
Scholars disagree on the status of the Gqunukwhwebe within Xhosa society. The Xhosa
historian J. Henderson Soga argues that this group was never a part of "the body of the
Xhosa tribe," but was rather a group of Khoikhoi that became only later incorporated by
the Xhosa. See Soga, The Southeastern Bantu (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University
Press, 1930), 1 17. Hermann Giliomee argues that "no eighteenth-century source verifies"
Soga's statement. He argues that the Gqunukhwebe like other Xhosa groups had split
from the Xhosa nucleus. Giliomee argues that it is certainly "conceivable that the
Gqunukhwebe, although Xhosa in culture, were regarded as inferior by the Xhosa
because of their partly Khoikhoi origin," since they more than any other Xhosa chiefdom
mixed and intermarried with Khoikoi. "The Gqunukhwebe chief was scorned by his
fellow chiefs because he was not of the royal lineage," writes Giliomee "but there is no
evidence that he was politically subordinate to them in the late eighteenth century." See
Hermann Giliomee, "The Eastern Frontier, 1770-1812," in The Shaping ofSouth African
Society, 1652-1840, rev. ed. (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1989), quote 462,
see also 425.
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Gcaleka defeated Rharabe, his paramountcy was dramatically weakened as Rharabe and
his followers migrated westward to the Fish River to form a new chiefdom.
Another division that led more Xhosa to move westward occurred among the
ama-Rharabe chiefdom in the 1790s. This migration resulted from the ama-Rharabe
paramount Ngqika's attack on his uncle, Ndlambe, who had only few years earlier helped
his nephew to overthrow Ntimbo the rightful heir to the Rharabe chiefdom. Ndlambe and
his followers who lost the power struggle against Ngqika moved onto the Zuurveld. Here
they joined several other groups of Xhosa and Khoikhoi, as well as an increasing number
of European colonists who also began settling in this area. 10
Inter-group relations often reinforced conflicts and rivalries over resources and
land. In 1750, for instance, an official report from the Cape Colony commented on the
contests that effected some Khoikhoi residing near the Amatola Mountains.
Those [Khoikhoi] whom we met could not say what nation they belonged
to, naming themselves according to the river where they lived or
sometimes "the Hottentots [Khoikhoi] of the country." All these
Hottentots were at one time rich in cattle, but have lost them through the
thieving of the Bushmen [San] and in wars they fought among themselves
and with Caffers [Xhosa]. 11
Despite the frequency and intensity of such hostilities, cooperation, cultural
borrowing, innovation, and accommodation also characterized inter-group relations in
many instances. Khoikhoi were often absorbed or associated themselves with the Xhosa,
who made use of them "as servants and in war time." Like the Khoikhoi with the San, the
10
For a general discussion of Xhosa laws of succession see for example John Maclean, A
Compendium ofKafir Laws and Customs (London: Frank Cass, 1968), 1 1-23; Giliomee,
"Eastern Frontier" in SSAS, 462-3; Peires, The House ofPhalo: A History ofthe Xhosa
People in the Days of Their Independence (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1981).
22
Xhosa would then generally accept their Khoikhoi or other clients as full members of
their society after one generation of staying with them. By that point, one European
traveler observed, "their clothes and lifestyles are precisely alike and they intermarry
without differentiation." Xhosa societies became thus more diverse as they expanded
their territorial influence. This observation seems also to support the argument made by
several scholars that Xhosa nationhood was a political and not an ethnic concept. But
Khoisan speaking groups were not mere recipients of Xhosa culture. Scholars argue that
Khoisan languages influenced Xhosa, which over time incorporated "click" consonants
and cognates. In fact, the word "Xhosa" derives from a Khoikhoi word meaning "angry
.
»»12
men.
Hunter-gatherers, pastoralists, and herder-cultivators in the Eastern Cape
competed, at times violently, for water, land, and other resources. But at the same time
through increased contact and interactions on various levels, they also created new social
worlds and systems. Economic, linguistic, ritual, and other connections that developed
over centuries created various lasting bonds between the different groups in the Eastern
Cape, as they interacted through trade, diplomacy, and other intercultural exchanges.
Foraging and hunting communities for example made use of iron, cattle, and foods grown
by African farmers, while the Bantu-speaking pastoralist cultivators adopted Khoisan
11
Peires, The House ofPhalo, 23.
12 Quoted in Peires, The House ofPhalo, 22-24, 98. On this issue see also Switzer, Power
and Resistance, 32-35, 45; Elphick, Khoikhoi, 52-53; Crais, White Supremacy, 18; Gerrit
Harinck, "Interaction between Xhosa and Khoi: Emphasis on the Period 1620-1750," in
African Societies in Southern Africa, ed. Leonard Thompson (London: Heinemann,
1969).
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building and hunting practices. Thus the Eastern Cape developed not only into a place of
intense ethnic competition, but also into a world of common meanings. 13
Middle Grounds and Rivalries in the Upper Ohio Valley Before Anglo-American
Settlement
Adaptation, accommodation, and rivalries also shaped the history of the Upper
Ohio Valley prior to the large scale Anglo-American settlement efforts that began during
the last decades of the eighteenth century. For the two millennia before Columbus, the
Ohio and Mississippi valleys had constituted sites of American Indian exchange networks
such as the Adena (c.a. 500 B.C.E. - 100 B.C.E.), the Hopewell (c.a. 200 B.C.E. - 400
C.E.), and the Mississippian (c.a. 700 C.E.-1500 C.E.). Archeological evidence in the
form of highly developed artifacts from mound burial sites and other earthworks indicate
the existence of ruling elites and of complex ceremonial and religious organizations in
these societies.
14
By the time of the first European landfalls in the Western Hemisphere in the late
fifteenth and the early sixteenth century, the Mississipian moundbuilding centers of the
13
Hall, The Changing Past; Crais, White Supremacy and Black Resistance, 14-15.
Richard Elphick has outlined some theories regarding the migration of Khoisan-speaking
pastoralists to southern Africa. Elphick, Khoikhoi and the Founding of White South
Africa, 3-22. See also Switzer, Power and Resistance in an African Society, 19-22, 26.
14
For an introduction to this topic see Lynda Shaffer, Native Americans Before 1492:
The Moundbuilding Centers ofthe Eastern Woodlands (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1992);
James Fitting, "Regional Cultural Development, 300 B.C. to A.D. 1000," in William
Sturtevant, gen. ed., Handbook ofNorth American Indians, XV, Northeast, ed. Bruce
Trigger (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian, 1978), 44-57; Bruce Smith, "Agricultural
Chiefdoms of the Eastern Woodlands," in The Cambridge History ofthe Native Peoples
ofthe Americas, I, North America vol. 1 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996),
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Eastern Woodlands were in rapid decline - a demise that remains somewhat of a puzzle
today. Much of the historiography emphasizes the devastating influence of alien
pathogens on Native American societies leading to population declines of about 50% and
with sustained contact over a century to as high as 90%. The long distance trade that
connected Ohio's aboriginal populations with the Gulf Coast, a region ravaged by
diseases introduced by Spanish conquistadores and shipwreck survivors, could have
easily led to the spread of deadly epidemics along the waterways that America's first
peoples used as their major trade routes. Thus waves of epidemic diseases in the Ohio
region could have caused dramatic depopulation and changes in the social landscape. 15
Other scholars have, however, also pointed out that there is convincing evidence that
indicates that the moundbuilding cultures of the Ohio and the upper and middle
Mississippi river valleys (but not in the Southeast) had already been in decline before
1500 due to indigenous warfare. 16
External demographic pressures on the Ohio country continued as European
colonialism established its roots on the North American coastal peripheries more than
267-323; Bruce Smith, ed., The Mississippian Emergence (Washington D.C.:
Smithsonian, 1990).
15
The influence of disease and the decline of Native American societies are widely
discussed issues. On the decline of the Mississippian culture and disease see Shaffer, 86-
92. Alfred Crosby suggests that diseases might have moved along the ancient American
Indian trade routes such as the major waterways of the Eastern Woodlands. See Crosby,
Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion ofEurope, 900-1900 (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1986), 209-215. On disease and its demographic legacy see
Russel Thornton, American Indian Holocaust and Survival: A Population History Since
1492 (Norman: University Press of Oklahoma, 1987); Ann Kamenofsky, Vectors of
Death: The Archeology ofEuropean Contact (Albuquerque: University ofNew Mexico
Press, 1987).
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250 years before Anglo-American settlement of the region began in earnest. By the 1650s
and 1660s the so-called "beaver wars," reinforced indigenous rivalries, leading to a
further population decline and a partial de-settlement of the region. The Iroquois'
invasions of their neighbors in the Upper Ohio Valley were spurred by demographic and
economic factors and were part of a series of attacks led by the confederacy throughout
the northeastern Woodlands. The Iroquois attempted to expand their territory, in order to
counter the depletion of their population by alien pathogens and protracted warfare. They
raided their neighbors in "mourning wars" to take captives for torture and adoption as a
means to avenge their deaths and to increase their numbers. But the attacks also resulted
from the Iroquois' desire to gain new hunting and trapping grounds, which provided them
with fur to obtain European trade goods that strengthened their position against rival
Indians as well as Europeans. Their campaigns of expansion ultimately failed since a
confederacy of Great Lakes Indians, backed by the French, pushed the Iroquois back to
their territory east of the Ohio country. However, their efforts did drive many Indians out
of the Upper Ohio Valley into surrounding areas to the south, northwest, and west. 17
A gradual resettling of the Upper Ohio Valley began between the 1720s and the
1750s. Challenging Iroquois' claims of territorial supremacy over the region, and seeking
refuge from white encroachment and Iroquois' pressures, an increasing number of
Delaware and Shawnee from the Susquehanna and the Delaware River region moved
16
See for example Salisbury "The Indians' Old World," 435-458; and Daniel Richter,
Facing Eastfrom Indian Country: A Native History ofEarly America (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2001), 2-7.
17
See Francis Jennings, The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire (New York: Norton, 1984), 84-
113; Daniel Richter "War and Culture: The Iroquois Experience," William and Mary
Quarterly 40 (1983), 528-559; Richter, The Ordeal ofthe Long-House: The Peoples of
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their towns to the Upper Ohio Valley. The Delaware, an Algonquian speaking people,
largely centered their settlements on the Allegheny, the Beaver and the Muskingum
Rivers. The Shawnee, another society of Algonquian speakers, may have been one of the
groups originally driven out of the Upper Ohio Valley region by the Iroquois
Confederacy. The Shawnee stayed predominately around the Scioto, Mad, and the Miami
Rivers, where they were also joined by some Shawnee migrants who came from the
south.
During the same period, other Native American groups moved their settlements
eastward to situate themselves more centrally between British and French trade. With the
end of the Beaver wars in the early eighteenth century, the Miami Indians returned to
their homelands on the south end of Lake Michigan, leaving behind their temporary exile
around today's Green Bay, Wisconsin. There they had found refuge from Iroquois
attacks. The Miamics now rebuilt their towns in the western parts of what would
eventually become the state of Ohio as well as the state of Indiana.
By the 1740s the rich hunting grounds of the northeastern parts of the Upper Ohio
Valley also began to lure some Seneca and other members of the Iroquois League to
move further west. This Iroquois faction became known as Mingos and often acted
fiercely independently of the Iroquois confederacy and its council at Onondaga. A faction
of the group that the English called Wyandots, remnants of the Huron nations destroyed
by the Iroquois during the Beaver Wars, migrated to Ohio from southwestern Ontario,
and focused their settlements around Detroit and on the Sandusky River. The Ottawas
the Iroquois League in the Era ofEuropean Colonization (Chapel Hill: The University of
North Carolina Press, 1992); White, The Middle Ground, chapters 1-2.
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followed the Wyandots onto Ohio's Lake Plains, but later came to settle farther west on
the Maumee and Auglaize Rivers. 18
Finally, Native American migrants such as Mahicans from western New England
as well as Nanticokes from Delaware and eastern Maryland, who had for decades prior to
their migration west lived in the vicinity of many Delaware and Shawnee villages in the
Susquehanna valley of Pennsylvania, joined Indian settlements in the Upper Ohio Valley,
further reinforcing the already polyglot character of the area. From these migrations, the
Upper Ohio Valley emerged as a region of interaction, cultural transmission, and
accommodation, but also at times of renewed rivalries and competition.
For Native American groups who suffered from the pressures of colonial
expansion and inter-Indian competition, and for those who searched for richer hunting
grounds, the Upper Ohio Valley provided a favorable haven for maintaining a more
"conservative" political, economic, social, and cultural existence than areas closer to the
coast. Even though Native Americans in the Upper Ohio Valley continued to live
between the competing French and English colonial empires and remained tied into a
European-dominated transatlantic market system through trade in beaver and deer skin,
the migration to the Upper Ohio Valley, away from the encroachments of European
settlements, enabled them to revitalize their societies. Furthermore, being situated
between the competing French colonial empire in North America, which from north of
the Great Lakes extended its influence over the Ohio and the Mississippi river valley, and
the British colonial empire which broadened its control from its colonies on the eastern
18
For the settlement locations of Ohio Indians in the eighteenth century see the map
"Indian Villages in Ohio, Pennsylvania, New York," in the Atlas ofEarly American
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North AlMriCM leabOtrd, Indians in Ihe Upper Ohio Valley frequently found themselves
In a strategic position to turn the competition between the French and British to then
advantage. Oftentimes the Anglo-French imperial rivalry aided American Indians in then
efforts to maintain their sovereignty and homelands as well as to impiove the terms of
Hade. Thus through much of the eighteenth century, there existed a "middle ground" of
accommodation, interaction, and cultural transmission between Indians and European
empirei in the Upper Ohio Valley. Still, at times, this balancing game and cooperation
could also ignite indigenous and impenal rivalries. A violent encounter occurred, lor
example during an attack by French backed Great Lake Indian factions on the Miami
village of Pickawillany on the Great Miami River in June of 1752, an assault perpetrated
to punish this group of Mianus foi then tiade and diplomatic connections with the
British, a relationship that the French and their Indian allies feared could challenge their
position in the region.
1
''
History: The Revolutionary Era, 1 760- 1 790, eds. Lester Cappon et al. (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1976), 21.
1
' For a more extensive discussion of the migrations to Ohio and its larger implications
see especially Michael Mc( onnell, A Country Between The Upper Ohio Valley and Its
Peoples, 1724-1774 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992), chapter I; and
McConncll, "People 'in Between1 : The Iroquois and the Ohio Indians, 1720-1768," in
Daniel Richter and James Merrell, cds. Beyond the Covenant Chain: The Iroquois and
Their Neighbors in Indian North America, 1600-1800 (Syracuse: Syracuse University
Press, 1987), 93-1 12; and Peter Wood, "The Changing Population of the Colonial South
An Overview by Race and Region, 1685-1790," in Powhatan 's Mantle: Indians in the
Colonial Southeast, cds. Peter Wood, Gregory Wasclkov, and M. Thomas Ilatlcy
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989), 85-87. See also llmdcraker, Elusive
Empire, 18-32. I Iinderaker argues that "McConnel overemphasizes the communal and
tribal cohesion of Ohio Indian's migrations." He states that McConncll "underestimates.
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Native Americans. Africans. European s and Earlv Colonization
By the second half of the eighteenth century, the geographic isolation that had
[
kept both Africans in the Eastern Cape and Native Americans in the Upper Ohio Valley I
protected from overwhelming white influence increasingly broke down. The dangerous I
coast and the semi-arid Karoo to the west of the Eastern Cape no longer kept European
colonists out of this region. The Upper Ohio Valley that was once far away from the
North American coast and its white population centers also began to increasingly
experience colonial pressures from migrating Anglo-American colonists.
European encroachments in the Upper Ohio Valley and the Eastern Cape led
Native American and African societies to experience dramatic changes, epidemic
diseases, the development of new trade networks, and territorial losses. Yet, despite such
often devastating transformations, indigenous peoples attempted to revitalize their
societies. As the Upper Ohio Valley and the Eastern Cape turned increasingly into sites
of colonial expansion and cultural exchange, indigenous groups made efforts to shape
and to contest the colonial orders that whites sought to impose in their respective regions
by trying to maintain indigenous understandings and practices of diplomacy and
exchange.
At times such developments could lead to the creation of systems of common
meaning and accommodation between indigenous groups and whites. Yet with increasing
colonization and competition for resources, animosity grew among indigenous peoples
and European settlers. On both sides, these feelings were manifested through violent acts
and struggles, leading to a reification of both white and indigenous identities.
for example, the extent to which Seneca villages in the Ohio Valley were populated by
Indians from various backgrounds."
30
Trade and the Establishment of Two Colonial Regions
The expansion of international trade networks and the advance of European
hunters into territories under Native American and African control initiated the extension
of European empires into the Upper Ohio Valley and the Eastern Cape. Yet, Europeans
did not create either the cattle and ivory trade in southern Africa or the fur and deerskin
trade in North America. Instead these exchanges were built on already existing and fluid
long distance trade networks established centuries before European contact. Native
Americans and Africans quickly learned the value of goods and often set the protocol for
trade. Moreover, American Indians and Africans used commercial interactions as a
means of establishing political relationships with outsiders.20
In those areas where exchange had been frequent, early trade relations were
shaped as much by the expectations and experiences of Native Americans and Africans
as by those of Europeans. Many Indian communities in the Upper Ohio Valley had
20
For a traditional interpretation of the North American fur trade see Eric Wolf, Europe
and the People Without History (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California
Press, 1982), chapter 6. Richard White criticizes Wolfs view on the fur trade as too
simplistic. White sees the early history of the fur trade not as exploitative as does Wolf.
White shows that throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth century Indians in the Great
Lakes region played an active role in trade transactions, and points out that Native
Americans avoided exchanges when it was to their disadvantage. White, The Middle
Ground, chapter 3. For some suggestions on the history of American Indian trade
relations in the pre- and post-contact period see Salisbury, "The Indians' Old World;" see
also Shaffer, Native Americans Before 1492. For some suggestions on the role of trade
among the Khoikhoi see Emile Boonzaeier, The Cape Herders, 66-67, 76-79. For the
Xhosa see Peires, The House ofPhalo, chapter 7. For a traditional interpretation of the
role of trade in the expansion of the Cape Colony see van der Merwe, The Migrant
Farmer. For some insights into Africa's inter-regional and inter-continental trade
relations see D. T. Niane, "Relationship and the exchanges among the different regions,"
in General History ofAfrica vol. IV: Africafrom the Twelfth to the Sixteenth Century, D.
T. Niane, ed. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984), 631-634.
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participated in exchanges with Europeans since the seventeenth century, when they had
lived closer to the eastern seaboard before they migrated westward. There is evidence that
Native Americans initially traded goods like glass beads, copper crystals, and mirrors for
their symbolic value rather than for their material utility. Yet, over time Indians also
traded for weapons and metal goods. Furthermore, for Native Americans trade had a
strategic reason. It was used as much as a means to establish and maintain reciprocity and
diplomatic ties, as to obtain desired goods. 21
The first Dutch colonists in the Cape likewise had difficulty imposing their
commercial interests on the local populations. Throughout the 1650s, the colony's first
leader, Jan van Riebeeck, was frustrated with the Khoikhoi's reluctance to trade cattle -
their most valued possessions. Furthermore, van Riebeeck suspected the colony's African
translator of successfully enriching himself through the trade and of encouraging other
KJioikhoi to drive up the prices for those cattle they were willing to trade.22
The dangers and drawbacks of being tied into an international trade system
emerged for local peoples in southern Africa and North America over time and to a
degree that varied across time and space. Eager to have adequate meat supplies, which
the Cape colony needed to serve as a provisioning station for the Dutch East India
Company, Commander Cornelis van Qualbergen complained in 1668 that "the cattle
trade with the Hottentots has already so much declined that they seem to have vanished."
In little more than a decade after establishing a provisioning station in the Cape in 1652,
the Company's demand for cattle had begun to surpass what the Khoikhoi in the Western
21 On this issue see for example White, The Middle Ground, 99-107
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Cape were willing to supply. As a result, by the 1660s the relatively peaceful interaction
between Khoikhoi and Dutch had ended. Over the following decades, Dutch trade
excursions increasingly turned into violent missions in search of cattle, plunder, and
tribute.
23
in
The traffic in cattle was, however, not the only form of African-European trade
the region. Despite repeated Company restrictions, hundreds of trading and hunting
excursions left from the western parts of the Cape to go to the Eastern Cape throughout
the eighteenth century. Trade in such goods as ivory, ostrich feathers, and valuable skins
aided in the reduction of game. The decline of southern African wildlife, reinforced by
the expansion of colonial trade, deteriorated even further with the expansion of white
settlement. A somewhat later account by the popular Victorian writer and hunter Gordon
Cumming underscores these processes. Cumming, who hunted in the southern African
interior in the mid-nineteenth century and was, like so many other European travelers,
stunned by the abundance of wildlife, was reminded by older colonists that the amount of
game had greatly declined since they had first arrived in the area. Looking around white
farms, Cumming noticed that "the skulls and horns of hundreds of black wildebeest and
springbook are seen piled in heaps or scattered about." This process of over hunting had
gone hand-in-hand with colonial conquest in the region.
A description of the early trade relations between Dutch and Khokhoi can be found in
the "Extracts from the Journal of Commander van Riebeeck," see The Record, 75-86.
23 On trade with the Khoikhoi and their depleting cattle sources in the 1 660s see "Extract
ofA Despatch from Commander Quaelbergen and Council to the Chamber XVII" (1668)
in The Record, 300-301.
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For a comparative analysis of this issue see William Beinart and Peter Coates,
Environment and History: The Taming ofNature in the USA and South Africa (New
York: Routledge, 1995), chapter 2. On ivory hunters see O.F. Mentzel, A Geographical
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As in southern Africa, the expansion of trade in the Upper Ohio Valley, led to a
decline in the region's game resources throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth
century. Like the Xhosa and the Khoisan in the Eastern Cape who hunted for ivory and
skins, Native Americans in the Upper Ohio Valley also participated in an international
trade system by providing beaver pelts and deerskins. As a result of the depopulating
effects of the Beaver Wars, the Upper Ohio Valley of the early eighteenth century had
developed into a place inhabited by few people but abundant in game. Commenting on
this natural wealth, David Jones, a Baptist missionary in the region in the early 1770s,
observed that in Shawnee Scioto River meant "Hairy River." Jones argued that the name
was given to the stream because when the Shawnee first came to live in the area in the
1720s and 1730s, "deers were so plenty, that in the vernal season, when they came to
drink, the stream would be thick of hairs." Yet, with the gradual Indian resettlement of
Ohio, a strain was put on the local deer and beaver population as Ohio Indians such as
Delawares and Shawnees provided an increasing supply of deer, beaver, and other animal
skins to predominantly Pennsylvanian traders. By the 1770s and 1780s, over-hunting had
become so severe among the Delaware towns on the Muskingum River that Jones
observed a serious food shortage there.
and Topographical Description ofthe Cape ofGood Hope, 1785-87, transl. G.V. Marais
and J. Hoge, ed. H.J. Mandelbrote (Cape Town: Van Riebeeck Society, 1944), 126-127;
and Crais, White Supremacy, 37. On European hunting in the Cape in general see for
example R. G. dimming, Five Years ofa Hunter 's Life in South Africa (New York:
Harper & Brothers, 1850), quotation 122.
25 On over-hunting and its implication for Ohio Indians see for example David Jones, A
Journal ofTwo Visits Made to Some Nations ofIndians on the West Side ofthe River
Ohio, in the Years 1772-1773 (New York: J. Sabin, 1865), 46, 60, 89, 100. See also
David Zeisberger, "History of Northern American Indians," in Archer Butler Hulbert and
William Nathaniel Schwarze, eds. Ohio Archaeological and Historical Publications, vol.
19 (Columbus, OH: F.J. Heer, 1910), 14. For insights into the volume of Pennsylvania's
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The tremendous volume of the fur and deerskin trades not only led to a decline of
the Upper Ohio Valley's animal population, but it also changed social norms and
organization within Indian communities in this region. "Hunting for the market," argues
Eric Hindcraker, gradually undermined "some of the ruling assumptions of earlier
hunting practices," which "emphasized the sacred qualities of animals and the importance
of reciprocity and the propitiation of spirits."26 For a significant number of Ohio Indians,
hunting turned gradually from a means of subsistence to an activity driven by market
incentives. At the peak of trade relations, some skillful Indian hunters were willing to kill
as many as 50 to 1 50 deer during a single hunting season, wasting most of the meat that
was obtained when skins were collected. European backcountry hunters, who appeared in
growing numbers west of the Appalachians by the second half of the eighteenth century,
had the reputation of being even more wasteful. 27
fur and deer skin trade that was largely supplied by Ohio Indians see Stephen Cutcliffc,
"Colonial Indian Policy As a Measure of Rising Imperialism: New York and
Pennsylvania, 1700-1755," The Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine, 64 (1981),
237-268. ,i
Hindcraker, Elusive Empire, quotation 67.
Zeisberger, "History," 14. On the long distances that Delaware Indians had to travel as
a result of over hunting sec for example Edmund de Schweinitz, The Life and Times of
David Zeisberger (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1870), 80-81. My discussion on
Ohio Indians' connections to the transatlantic trade system in the eighteenth century
benefited from Eric Hinderaker's discussion of this subject in his study of colonialism in
the Ohio Valley. Hindcraker, Elusive Empire, chapter 1 and 2. On the wastefulness of
white hunters see Stephen Aron, How the West Was Lost: The Transformation of
Kentuckyfrom Daniel Boone to Henry Clay (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1996), 25.
For Delaware hunting rituals see Zeisberger, "History/' 84. It is easy to either
dismiss or to romanticize the issue of Indian-animal relationships among Ohio Indians,
though there is evidence that such religious attachments existed. For a controversial
discussion on this topic among the hunter-gatherer Micmacs see Calvin Martin, Keepers
ofthe Game: Indian-Animal Relationships and the Fur Trade (Berkeley and Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 1978). For a critical cross-reference sec Indians,
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Native Americans, Africans, and Early Colonization
Alien pathogens especially disrupted the life of African and Native American
societies. Though reliable numbers are impossible to obtain, the incursion of Europeans
in both areas led to demographic disasters. In the Cape, Khoisan speaking peoples and to
a lesser degree the Xhosa and other Bantu-speaking groups suffered from waves of
epidemic diseases to which they had little immunity. Some historians estimate that in
certain areas of the Cape disease caused population declines of as high as fifty to sixty
percent. The Khoikhoi in the Western Cape, for example, who had already been assaulted
by colonial expansion, were further ravaged by a devastating small pox epidemic in 1713.
Continuous waves of smallpox also hit the Eastern Cape starting at least as early as the
1750s. The later outbreaks became more severe due to the ever-increasing proximity of
colonial settlement which reinforced the exposure to infectious diseases.28
As aforementioned, in the Mississippi and the Ohio River valleys disease is
believed to have aided in the destruction of the moundbuilding centers. It continued to
haunt eighteenth century Eastern Woodland Indians. The use of disease infested blankets
by the British, handed to Delaware Indians who besieged Fort Pitt in the summer of 1763
as diplomatic "gifts," had a destructive impact on the military efforts of the Delaware and
other groups of Ohio Indians. As a result of this infamous incident Ohio Indians suffered
Animals, and the Fur Trade: A Critique ofKeepers ofthe Game, ed. Shepard Kreech III
(Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1981). More useful to understanding the
relationship between power and ritual in Ohio Indian farming societies is Gregory Dowd,
A Spirited Resistance: The North American Indian Strugglefor Unity, 1 745-1815
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), chapter 1.
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from a raging small pox epidemic that significantly undermined their military efforts.29
Among Native Americans, smallpox, as well as other epidemics, took their toll. Disease
accompanied the expansion of the colonial frontier that brought trade, imperial rivalries,
warfare, and an increasing number of European settlers across the Appalachian
Mountains. Disease killed more Indians than warfare and intruded into every aspect of
American Indian life. As with the local peoples of the Cape, it undermined planting,
hunting and social organization among Native American societies, leading to starvation
and instability. Such processes rendered the local peoples of the two regions even more
exposed to epidemics. 30
Colonial expansion in the Eastern Cape and the Upper Ohio Valley led to
significant changes in Native American and African material culture. In the Eastern Cape,
due to the connections between whites and local peoples, Africans had increasingly
begun to utilize European goods. Portuguese beads for example were circulated widely
among the Xhosa as a form of currency, accumulated, as historian Jeffrey Peires writes,
as equivalents to the highly valued cattle. Furthermore, there was an increased circulation
of ivory, copper, and iron in the Eastern Cape, all of which had been major trade items in
Xhosa society before the period of European encroachment. Over time, the Xhosa also
28
See for example Elphick, Khoikhoi, 234, 237-238; Elphick and Malherbe, "The
Khoisan to 1828," 22; Crais, White Supremacy, 41-42. See also South African
Commercial Advertiser, Jan. 7, 1832.
29 See for example Francis Jennings, Empire ofFortune: Crowns, Colonies and Tribes in
the Seven Years War in America (New York: Norton, 1988), 447-448. See also Elizabeth
Fenn, "Biological Warfare in Eighteenth-Century North America: Beyond Jeffrey
Amherst," Journal ofAmerican History 86 (March 2000), 1552-1580.
30
For a general study on Native Americans and epidemics see for example Thornton,
American Indian Holocaust. On disease in the Great Lakes region in the eighteenth
37
adopted the use of European blankets, cloth, tinder boxes, and iron pots into their daily
lives.
31
Similar developments occurred among Native Americans across the Appalachian
Mountains. Ohio Indians incorporated European fabrics, kettle, guns, and other material
items varying, however, from group to group and over time. The Delaware and the
Shawnee, the two easternmost societies, incorporated more European material culture and
at earlier points than other groups in region. In the early 1770s, an increasing number of
largely Delaware Indians who had been converted by the Moravian church, arrived in the
Upper Ohio Valley. Invited by Delaware leaders, these Moravian Indians started mission
towns in the Muskingum and Tuscarawas river valleys in what is today eastern Ohio. Due
to the Moravians, as well as the influence of other agents of cultural change, cattle,
chicken, and pigs became an increasingly common sight in many Delaware and Shawnee
towns by the last decades of the eighteenth century. Likewise, some Ohio Indians
adopted European-style housing that could be seen standing alongside the traditional
wigwams.32
century see for example White, The Middle Ground, 143-145, 217-218, 229-230, 233,
275, 460.
31 On beads originating from Portugal and their use among the Xhosa see Henry
Lichtenstein, Travels in Southern Africa, 1803, 1804, 1805, 2 vols., transl. and ed. A.
Plumptre (Cape Town: Van Riebeeck Society, 1928-1930), 1:338, 369. See also Peires,
House ofPhalo, quote 98, see also 95-103.
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For the early adoption of livestock and European housing among Ohio Indians see
Zeisberger, "History," 17-18, 45-46, 86; Jones, Journal, 92, 95; David McClure, Diary of
David McClure, Doctor ofDivinity, 1748-1820, ed. Franklin Dexter (New York: The
Knickerbocker Press, 1899), 50; William Newcomb, Culture and Acculturation ofthe
Delaware Indians (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1956), 13-30. C.A.
Weslager, The Delaware Indians: A History (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press,
1972), 285-91; Emma Gray and Leslie Robb Gray, Wilderness Christians: The Moravian
Mission to the Delaware Indians (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1956), 48-50.
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The practice of gift giving helped to disseminate European material culture
among both the Ohio Indians and Xhosa. Significantly, the exchange of gifts was seen by
both peoples as fulfilling political and diplomatic purposes. Ohio Indians and Xhosa
considered exchange an effective way to establish and maintain friendly relations with
outsiders. They both saw gifts as symbols of reciprocal social relations and expected
colonial officials to provide them as part of diplomatic exchanges and social interactions.
In addition, by making Europeans conform to their political customs such as gift giving,
Ohio Indians and Xhosa demonstrated a desire to maintain continuity in their political
systems.
33
Local peoples in the Eastern Cape and in the Upper Ohio Valley were receptive to
outsiders and open to search for means of cooperation and accommodation with
European intruders. The Xhosa of the Eastern Cape, frequently provided refuge to
Khoikhoi laborers who fled from the farms of their European masters, and sometimes to
runaway whites who wanted to or who had to escape from the colony. In the early years,
the Xhosa were also inclined to adopt ship-wrecked Europeans. Over time such
individuals, and even entire groups that had been conquered or who had established
tributary relations, could be incorporated into Xhosa societies. The Xhosa rationalized
this inclusion of outsiders, just as they understood intermarriage and gift giving. It was a
political means to extend their social networks and to ease social distance between
3 On gift giving and Europeans' partial adoption of local customs in the conduct of
diplomacy in the Eastern Cape see for example Lichtenstein, Travels, 1: 402. For the
Eastern Woodlands see for example Wilbur Jacobs, Wilderness Politics and Indian Gifts:
The Northern Colonial Frontier (Lincoln: University ofNebraska Press, 1966); Dorothy
Jones, Licensefor Empire: Colonialism by Treaty in Early America (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1982), chapter 1 and 2; James Merrell, Into the American Woods:
Negotiators on the Pennsylvania Frontier (New York: Norton, 1999).
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different groups. This strategy enabled the continuity of Xhosa expansion while at the
same time lessening some of the pressures that it created for other societies. 34
Like Africans in the Eastern Cape, Ohio Indians were also open to the
incorporation of outsiders into their societies. As mentioned above, many Eastern
Woodland Indians used the adoption of war captives as a means to replace the deaths in
their own ranks. Thus, by the second half of the eighteenth century an increasing number
of Anglo-American captives, especially children, started to live in Ohio Indian towns.
Even though many Europeans eagerly sought opportunities to return to their homes, a
considerable number remained and became members of Native American communities.35
Moreover, newly incorporated outsiders often functioned as cultural brokers who
slowly acquainted local peoples with European technology, tools, culture, customs, and
languages. Yet their incorporation reveals an even more telling issue about the local
communities in the Upper Ohio Valley and the Eastern Cape. By extending their culture
and identity to outsiders, both groups attempted to adopt Europeans into their systems of
social order.
Increasingly, however, and as will be discussed in more detail in later chapters, a
growing number of indigenous people in the Upper Ohio Valley and the Eastern Cape
See Extract of Declaration of Ten Officers and Sailors of the Ship Stavenisse, 2d
March 1687, in The Record, 417-9. For British deserters who lived among the Xhosa see
for example "Colonel Collins' Journal" in Records ofthe Cape Colony, 36 vols., ed.
George Theal (London: William Clowes and Sons, 1897-1905), 7: 63-65. On the
diplomatic and political meanings and functions of the incorporation of outsiders and gift
giving see Peires, The House ofPhalo, 42-4.
35
McClure, Diary, 61. See also James Axtell, "The White Indians of Colonial America"
in The European and the Indian: Essays in the Ethnohistory ofColonial North America
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 168-206; McConnelM Country Between,
215-216.
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rejected white territorial encroachments and partial adaptations to European culture. In
their efforts to resist colonial expansion, many emphasized cultural values and lifeways
that they imagined to be traditional. Such messages were often proclaimed by prophetic
figures who advocated separation from whites, and aided in the reification of the
identities of a growing number of indigenous people.
In the American Great Lakes region, the Delaware prophet Neolin, whose
"nativist" and anti-European materialist preaching supported the uprising of an alliance
of Great Lake Indians against the British in 1763, was certainly not an isolated case. In
fact, the Moravian missionaries David Zeisberger and John Heckewelder wrote about a
number of prophets who were active in the Muskingum river valley region alone. Even
though such prophets incorporated Christian symbolism, they also attributed the loss of
power among Ohio Indian communities to contact with Anglo-Americans and their
culture. By revitalizing their way of life and by seeking separation from whites, Native
American prophets hoped that Ohio Indian societies could regain control over their land,
resources, and sovereignty. 36
For the Moravian missionaries' complaints about rival prophets see for example
Zeisberger, "History," 134; John Heckewelder, History, Manners, and Customs ofthe
Indian Nations (Philadelphia: Historical Society of Philadelphia, 1881), 291-295. For
Ohio Indians' resistance to the adaptation of white cultural elements in the upper Ohio
valley see McConnell, A Country Between, 222-223. See also Anthony Wallace "New
Religions Among the Delaware Indians, 1600-1900," Southwestern Journal of
Anthropology 12 (Spring, 1956), 7-8; and Wallace, "Revitalization Movements"
American Anthropologist 58 (April, 1956), 264-281. For an insightful perspective on
these issues see also Gregory Dowd who argues that such local nativist movements did
not only have a revitalizing impact on individual Eastern Woodland societies, but that
they were in fact part of a larger "Indian Great Awakening" a "pan-Indian" resistance
struggle against Anglo-American colonialism. See Dowd, A Spirited Resistance. See also
Dowd, War Under Heaven: Pontiac, the Indian Nations, & the British Empire
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002).
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Similarly, and as discussed in more detail in chapter 5, in the years following the
War of 181 1-1812, in which British authorities pushed the Zuurveld Xhosa beyond the
Great Fish River, prophets like Nxele and Mlanjeni began to have an increasing appeal in
Xhosa society. Like their Native American counterparts, Xhosa prophetic-figures'
messages were influenced by Christian aspects. Yet, both African and Native American
religious leaders fit Christianity into their traditional world-views, choosing the Christian
elements they considered compatible with their messages and discarding the rest. This
religious syncretism, it seems, was an attempt to come to terms with the new realities that
were emerging in their regions. In both the Eastern Cape and in the Upper Ohio Valley,
prophetic leaders condemned the harmful effects of the European presence, indigenous
material dependency on whites, alcoholism, and witchcraft.37
Colonists and Indigenous People
In both North America and in southern Africa the material culture of colonists
also changed, as Europeans adopted indigenous knowledge, material culture, and ways of
subsistence. Like Eastern Woodland Indian societies, the so called Anglo American
"backcountry settlers" depended on agriculture and hunting as means of subsistence.38
The ways of life of white migrants who lived on the colonial periphery and American
On this issue see Peires, The House ofPhalo, chapter 5; Peires, The Dead Will Arise:
Nongqawuse and the Great Xhosa Cattle-Killing Movement of1856-7 (Bloomington and
Indianapolis: University of Indiana Press, 1989); Dowd, A Spirited Resistance.
38 On Ohio Indians' subsistence see McClure, Diary, 89-90. On Shawnee's subsistence
see James Howard, Shawnee'.: The Ceremonialism ofa Native American Indian Tribe
and its Cultural Background (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1981), 43. On Delaware
subsistence see Zeisberger, "History," 44-48, 55-75. See also Herbert Kraft, The Lenape:
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Indians overlapped in so many ways that the French emigrant Michel-Guillaume de
Crevecoeur described backcountry settlers as "new made Indians" who lived the "idle
life" of "half cultivators and hunters "39 To Crevecoeur such ways of subsistence were in
clear opposition to how a farmer should live.40
What Crevecoeur failed to note, was that mixed food production was due less to
an alleged laziness and more to necessity. In order to survive in what colonists called the
"backcountry," early Anglo American settlers had to rely on methods of subsistence not
unlike those of Native American groups in the region. This system was based on farming,
hunting and fishing, gathering, and the raising of livestock. Furthermore, since the
seventeenth century, backcountry settlers not only grew European crops but also
incorporated "Indian corn" and other Native American plants. Through decades of
observation and experience, backcountry settlers had learned that Indian farming and
subsistence were best adapted to their surroundings and situations.
Hunting had also become an increasingly central activity among male
backcountry settlers. In fact, Anglo American hunters had adapted a similar hunting dress
to that of Eastern Woodland Indians, had borrowed many hunting techniques from their
Indian neighbors, and were tied into the trans-Atlantic skin and fur trade. When game
Archeology, History and Ethnography (Newark: New Jersey Historical Society, 1986),
138-158; and Newcomb, Culture and Acculturation, 13-24.
39
Michel-Guillaume de Crevecoeur, Lettersfrom an American Farmer, ed. Warren
Barton Blake (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1912), 47-49.
40
See also Charles Woodmason, The Carolina Backcountry on the Eve ofthe Revolution:
The Journal and other Writings ofCharles Woodmason, Anglican Itinerant, ed. Richard
Hooker (Chapel Hill: University ofNorth Carolina Press, 1953).
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became more sparse in the east, white backcountry hunters also became attracted to the
rich hunting grounds of the Upper Ohio Valley for their subsistence and for trade 41
Nevertheless, even though many early white settlers attempted to secure a living
from working their land and hunting for meat and for animal skins, and despite fears of
members of the colonial elite of losing settlers to "savage" ways, Anglo American settlers
were not seeking complete isolation from mainstream white society. Many white
migrants who moved west of the Appalachians were eager to reconstruct the economic
and cultural systems of the east in their new locations. For instance, as John Mack
Faragher demonstrates, Daniel Boone, the proverbial American pioneer was involved
with hunting animal skins for trade, land speculation, and river transportation. These
were not unusual business ventures for white backcountry settlers. As early as the 1780s
and 1790s, Ohio's white farmers raised "hog crops" that were then driven and sold to
slaughterhouses that were often weeks away from the farmers' homes. Ohio's early
colonists also raised cattle and sheep and sold the butter, wool, and meat they produced to
merchants who distributed these goods throughout the Ohio and Mississippi River
systems. In addition, white farmers in the region raised corn and wheat not only for
personal consumption, but surpluses were distilled and sold as whiskey until the region's
infrastructure, strengthened by the buildings of canals in the first decades of the
nineteenth century, made it profitable to sell corn and wheat harvests directly to the
market.
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41 My discussion of changes and adaptations among backwoodsmen has benefited from
Aron, How the West Was Lost,21-23; and John Mack Faragher, Daniel Boone: The Life
and Legend ofan American Pioneer (New York: Henry Holt, 1992), 17-23, 80.
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As in trans-Appalachia, the interaction between Africans and colonists on the
early southern African frontier, led to changes in the ways of life of whites who at least in
part adopted indigenous cultural and economic practices. Like many African societies in
the region, the Dutch speaking colonists, often referred to as trekboers, based their
subsistence economy on the raising of cattle and sheep, a form of production believed to
be most practical in the Eastern Cape.43 Their growing numbers and expansion into the
southern African interior, led to increasing competition with independent African
societies for land, cattle, and water. Trekboers grew sorghum like the Xhosa, and adopted
the hairy fat-tailed sheep from the Khoikhoi. Only in the 1830s and 1840s, with the
shifting demand in the British imperial economy from meat to wool, would pastoralist
farmers in the region begin to replace indigenous sheep with the heavily wooled Merino
sheep. Moreover, the seventeenth and eighteenth century trekboer diet, like that of
Africans, was largely based on the consumption of milk and meat. The resources they
used to make clothing, were often similar to those used by Africans. There were also
similarities in housing and living styles. Many trekboers on the early frontier settled in
On Boone's commercial involvement see Faragher, Daniel Boone, 260-263. For early
agricultural production in Ohio see R. Douglas Hurt, The Ohio Frontier: Crucible ofthe
Old Northwest (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996), chapter
8.
43 As with African pastoralist farmers, the mobility of Dutch speaking stock farmers has
been exaggerated by contemporary observers and scholars. Recently some historians
have come to reject the use of the term trekboer. They instead prefer to call them
veeboeren (stock farmers). See for example Susan Newton King, Master and Servants on
the Cape Eastern Frontier, 1760-1803 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
See also Elizabeth Elbourne, Blood Ground: Colonialism, Missions, and the Contestfor
Christianity in the Cape Colony and Britain, 1799-1853 (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-
Queen's University Press, 2002), 80.
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simple houses, often resembling African huts. Others, to have greater mobility to follow
their herds, lived in their wagons.44
Similarly to the eighteenth century North American frontier, the way of life of
colonists in the Eastern Cape concerned many officials and travelers who felt
apprehensive about a new class of white "nomad families." Henry Lichtenstein, a
German traveler and employee of the Cape Governor, described the trekboers as in "no
way connected in society with any of their fellow creatures, so that they are almost sunk
to the situation of savages." O. F. Mentzel, another German traveler, reflected this
sentiment arguing that the stock farmers were themselves accustomed "to such an extent
to the carefree life, the indifference, the lazy days and the association with slaves and
Hottentots, that not much difference may be discerned between the former and the
latter."
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Despite such charges, which reflected a certain elitism of many colonial officials
and travelers, colonists in the Eastern Cape, like their counterparts in the Upper Ohio
Valley, attempted to reproduce the social orders and many of the institutions, and
conditions of developed colonial society. The isolation of pastoralist farmers in the
eighteenth and early nineteenth century that Europeans travelers so often commented on
was relative. Certainly, trekboer life required self-reliance, and the Cape government was
largely ineffective in enforcing order as well as controlling colonists' expansion.
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For housing and living conditions of white pastoralist farmers see for example John
Campbell, Travels in South Africa (Cape Town: C. Struik, 1974), 328. On the switch to
Merino sheep see for example Beinart and Coates, Environment and History, 57; South
African Commercial Advertiser, Aug, 25, 1832, Nov. 27, 1833.
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Nonetheless, the stock fanners of the Eastern Cape had strong economic and cultural ties
with the western parts of the colonial settlement. Throughout most of the eighteenth
century, Cape Town remained the only administrative center of the colony and pastoralist
farmers had to conduct much of their administrative and civil affairs there. Besides, there
was a solid and long-lasting economic co-dependence between the two parts of the Cape.
Susan Newton King's research shows that colonists in the Eastern Cape were the
principal suppliers of meat and butter for the colony in the last decades of the eighteenth
century. They also traded soap and candles. In exchange white pastoralist farmers
obtained a wide variety of goods such as sugar, coffee, Flemish linen, broadcloth, and
slaves. Even on their wagons or in their modest huts, Dutch speaking colonists on the
colonial periphery tried to emulate the social and cultural life of the western parts of the
colony as much as they could.46
If they were able to afford it, white settlers in the Eastern Cape also eagerly
purchased slaves, predominantly imported from parts of Asia and eastern Africa, as
workers to satisfy their labor demands just like western Cape landowners whose estates
were often based on chattel slavery. But in the early nineteenth century, eight out often
slaves in southern Africa lived in Cape Town and the arable southwestern district. Thus
most Eastern Cape colonists did not have the resources to acquire slaves. Instead, they
45 On the living conditions and on critiques of white pastoralist farmers' lifeways see
Lichtenstein, Travels, quote 2: 83, see also 1: 446-7; Mentzel, Description ofthe Cape,
quote 115.
46 On the economic connections between the Eastern and the Western Cape see for
example Sir John Barrow, An Account of Travels into the Interior ofSouth Africa 2 vols.
(London: T. Cadell and W. Davies, 1801-1804), 1: 35, 67-68, 84-5, 204; Anders
Span-man, A Voyage to the Cape ofGood Hope, 2 vols., ed. V.S. Forbes (Cape Town:
Van Riebeeck Society, 1975), 1: 233. See also Newton King, Master and Servants,
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would attempt to satisfy their labor demands by employing Khoikhoi and later Xhosa
speakers, both coveted for their pastoral skills. Through much of the eighteenth and early
nineteenth century, the economic integration of Africans frequently happened in a fashion
similar to that in indigenous societies, where clients and servants maintained a degree of
economic self-sufficiency. It is important to underscore though that Africans had little
prospects of being accepted on an equal footing in white pastoralist society, as trekboers
believed them to be culturally inferior. The potential threat of violence remained an ever-
present component in this relationship. Moreover, as colonial records of whippings and
other acts of racial violence in rural areas seem to indicate, the colonists' hold on power
gradually increased, they pushed African laborers into more servile positions.47
In both the Upper Ohio Valley and the Eastern Cape, the surge in migration of
white settlers increasingly worsened indigenous/white relations and augmented the
potential for interracial violence as Africans and Native Americans tried to stem colonial
advances. In the late 1760s and early 1770s, numerous Ohio Indian communities were
frustrated about the loss of land west of the Appalachian mountain range. Contesting
white encroachments, Native American combatants attacked surveyors, hunters, and
settlers. Similarly, Xhosa and Khoikhoi fighters responded to the colonization of the
Zuurveld with attacks, in which they secured "as large a portion of their flocks and herds
as they thought proper." At times, they also burned the houses of white stock farmers
• 4R
who had abandoned them in fear.
chapter 8; Crais, White Supremacy and Black Resistance, 30-32, 36-38; and Giliomee,
"The Eastern Frontier," 430-1.
47 On African labor and trekboers see Switzer, Power and Resistance in an African
Society, 45-46; Elbourne, Blood Ground, 79; Keegan, Colonial South Africa, 25-26, 5
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Colonists in the Upper Ohio Valley and the Eastern Cape responded in kind. Like
Native Americans and Africans, they attempted to improve their situation by using
violence, which became a means by which many whites asserted their identities in the
face of indigenous resistance. Commandos staffed by Boers and their Khoisan servants in
the Eastern Cape, and Anglo American militias in North America, frequently struck
against indigenous groups in attempts to intimidate them.
By participating in acts of violence against Native Americans and Africans, a
significant number of colonists asserted views which favored the subjugation of
indigenous peoples.49 In the Lancaster area in Pennsylvania, late in 1763, for instance, a
group called the Paxton Boys complained that Native American communities that lived
within or close to the colony posed a threat to white settlement. The group of vigilantes
then attacked and brutally lynched several friendly Moravian Indians. To exert political
pressures on the authorities to pursue a policy of ethnic cleansing, the Paxton Boys began
to march toward Philadelphia. Colonial representatives eventually convinced the group to
disperse, but not without an official promise to publish the insurgents' grievances and to
discuss them before the Pennsylvania assembly.50
For Indian attacks on surveyors and others see for example Dr. Hugh Mercer to Col.
William Preston, Jan. 8, 1774, in The Documentary History ofDunmore's War, 1774,
eds. Reuben Thwaites and Louise Phelps Kellogg (Madison: Wisconsin Historical
Society, 1905), 1-2; and John Floyd to Preston, April 26, 1774, in ibid., 7-8. For African
violence on the Zuurveld see for example Stephen Kay, Travels and Researches in
Caffraria (London: John Mason, 1833), 11.
49 My understanding that violent actions can be read as symbolic language has been
influenced by James Gilligan, Violence: Reflections on a National Epidemic (New York:
Putnam, 1996), see especially chapter 3.
50 See Richter, Facing East, 201-6; Hinderaker, Elusive Empire, 157-61.
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Some white settlers in the Eastern Cape also revolted against the perceived
inaction and ineffectiveness of the colonial state. Similarly to the Paxton Boys, Boer
rebels during the Graaf-Reinet Rebellion (1795-1796) criticized the British interim
government for being unable to confront what they described as a Xhosa threat. The Boer
insurgents, saw the Xhosa as an obstacle to expansion and urged the government to strike
decisively against the Africans, retake allegedly stolen cattle, and to remove the Xhosa
east of the Fish River. In 1799, another group of Boer farmers unsuccessfully rose up
against the British government, complaining about the continued presence of the Xhosa
on the Zuurveld. 51
The Colonial State and Indigenous/White Relations
Colonial governments were however not as opposed to expansion as the rhetoric
of some insurgent colonists suggests. On several occasions, the state in the two regions
used violence to obtain indigenous lands and enforce its colonial projects, despite the
official position of respecting boundaries.
To be sure, Great Britain did issue the Proclamation of 1763, which, at least de
jure, forbade the advance of Anglo-American colonists west of the Appalachians.
Likewise, in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century British as well as Dutch
colonial administrations in southern Africa were reluctant to make decisive territorial
claims against various groups of Xhosa who lived on the Zuurveld. These decisions came
For the Graaf Reinet Rebellion see for example H. Giliomee, "Democracy on the
Frontier: A Comparative Study of Bacon's Rebellion (1676) and the Graaf-Reinet
Rebellion (1795-1796)," South African HistoricalJournal 6 (1974), 30-51. For the 1799
rebellion see for example Noel Mostert, Frontiers: The Epic ofSouth Africa 's Creation
and the Tragedy ofthe Xhosa People (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), 289-290.
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in response to indigenous groups' ability to effectively challenge territorial
encroachments in the two regions by military means, rendering plans to obtain new lands
too expensive for colonial administrations to undertake.
Such policies did not mean, however, that colonial officials were not interested in
changing the balance of power to their advantage when given the opportunity. British
administrators in North America assumed on several occasions the role of agents of
Indian dispossession in the post-Proclamation of 1763 years. As early as during the
Treaty of Fort Stanwix in 1768, the superintendent of Indian affairs William Johnson
supported a questionable Iroquois claim to sovereignty over the territories north and
south of the Ohio river. The Iroquois Confederacy argued that they possessed these lands
by right of conquest, and were willing to sell the areas south of the Ohio to the British -
an offer that gave the Anglo-American colonization of Kentucky a legitimate appearance.
The Iroquois' declarations of territorial sovereignty and the land sale was of course
contested by Native American groups in the region. But Iroquois and British diplomats
ignored, dismissed, and suppressed their protests. 52
The volatile situation in the Upper Ohio Valley erupted in early May 1774, when
a group of Virginians massacred an estimated twelve Mingoes in the vicinity of their
settlement on the Yellow Creek. Their leader, Logan, who lost three close family
members in the massacre, and who had until this point sought friendly relations with the
colonists, now began to reject accommodation in favor of militant resistance. Logan was
however unable to recruit much backing for his plans among the Delaware and most
52
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Shawnee, who were unwilling to risk another outright war with their Anglo-American
neighbors. Still, the Mingo and some twenty to forty Shawnee warriors backed his
retaliatory strike against white settlements. Logan's campaign killed about thirteen
colonists and led several hundred to flee in panic. 53
In response to the attacks, military officials at Fort Pitt and the governor of
Virginia, Lord Dunmore, saw a need to chastise the Indians to impress "an Idea of the
power of the White People, upon thefir] minds." Dunmore, a major land speculator and
adamant supporter of Virginia's colonization efforts in Kentucky, believed that a decisive
victory against the Ohio Indians would provide better security for the estimated 50,000
Anglo-American colonists who lived west of the boundary established in the
Proclamation of 1763. To Dunmore the land speculator, a stable situation would mean
rising land values and profits. To Dunmore the official, it would mean higher tax
revenues.
Anglo-American troops struck decisively against Mingo and Shawnee towns.
They burned and plundered Indian crops, wigwams, and cabins. At Point Pleasant, at the
mouth of the Kanawha river, Dunmore 's troops were challenged by 1000 Shawnee
warriors led by the previously neutral Cornstalk who feared an imminent attack on
Shawnee settlements. After one of the bloodiest battles in the region's history, the
Shawnee retreated, and their towns on the lower Scioto were destroyed by colonial
reassessments of this relationship see McConnel, A Country Between; White, The Middle
Ground; Hinderaker, Elusive Empire.
On the massacre at Yellow Creek and its influence on Logan see the Reminiscences of
Judge Henry Jolly, in Dunmore's War, 9-14. On the Delawares' and Shawnees' position
during Dunmore's War see the extracts of two letters from The Maryland Journal, June
18, 17774, in ibid., 28-30; and a letter from The Pennsylvania Gazette, July 13, 1774, in
ibid., 66-7.
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forces. The decisive defeat of the Shawnees and Mingoes led Cornstalk to sue for a
controversial peace among the Ohio Indians in which the region's first people became
confined to the areas north of the Ohio river - a significant loss of territory that many
resented.
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Just as various groups of American Indians in the Upper Ohio Valley
reluctant to give up their lands south of the Ohio River, the Gqunukhwebe, the Ndlambe,
and other smaller Xhosa factions continued to hold on to their lands west of the Fish
River prior to the War of 181 1-12. Not all Xhosa resisted British encroachments. Some
used the presence of whites to advance their goals. British officials and the Ngqika Xhosa
leader Ngqika, for example, pursued a loose alliance. Ngqika was increasingly frustrated
about losing his grip on the western most Xhosa factions living on the Zuurveld, and
hoped that a partnership with the British would strengthen his position in the rivalry
against his uncle Ndlambe.
Colonial authorities on the other hand pursued the objective to clear Africans
from the Zuurveld, a goal already pursued before the War of 181 1 to 1812. Following
upheavals by several Dutch speaking settlers in the late eighteenth century, officials
responded to white settler complaints about the continued Xhosa presence on the
Zuurveld by attempting to "gently push the [Zuurveld] Kaffirs back into their own
country." But the colony's efforts at removal backfired. In a united campaign in 1799,
Zuurveld Xhosa, "rebel" Khoikhoi, and runaway slaves pushed the Europeans as far west
54
See Lord Dunmore to the Earl of Dartmouth, Dec. 24, 1774, in Dunmore 's War, 368-
395. For the destructiveness of the Anglo-American campaigns of Dunmore's war see for
example Maj. Angus McDonald to Maj. John Connoly, in ibid., 151-4; Extract from Col.
William Fleming's Journal, in ibid., 281-91. On the battle of Point Pleasant see Fleming's
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as the Gamtoos River. Hence, British officials had to negotiate a peace that permitted the
various Zuurveld Xhosa groups to "remain at their kraals on the banks of Sundays and
Bushmans River, or in other words in the situation in which" the British had "found
them" before the war. 55
When the British retook the Cape from the Dutch in 1 806, after having left the
colony for a brief interlude in 1803, the attention of colonial administrators came to focus
soon again on the Eastern Cape. Many white settlers on the Zuurveld resumed to
complain about the presence of the Xhosa, who were blamed for cattle "thieving,"
"begging," "wandering," and for several killings. As we will discuss in more detail in
chapters three and five, the situation escalated when John Cradock became the governor
of the Cape in September of 181 1. Only a few weeks after taking office, he ordered the
removal of the independent African nations east of the Fish River. Khoikhoi, colonial,
and British forces under the leadership of John Graham struck decisively against the
about 20,000 Xhosa living on the Zuurveld who had objected removal. Though the two
major African leaders on the Zuurveld - Ndlambe and Chungwa - had pursued at least a
moderate degree of peaceful coexistence with the Cape colony in previous years, they
were left with little choice but to resist. In the ensuing war, the Xhosa were gradually
forced to withdraw from the Addo Bush whose thick and dense growth had provided
them with some strategic advantages. Cape troops shot indiscriminately at the Xhosa,
killed the Gqunukhwebe leader Chungwa on his sickbed, captured African cattle,
Account, in ibid., 253-7. My argument in this section has also benefited from Hurt, Ohio
Frontier, 55-60.
55 Ben Maclennan, A Proper Degree of Terror: John Graham and the Cape 's Eastern
Frontier (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1986), 46-47. For a more detailed discussion on
the situation on the Zuurveld in the 1790s see Elbourne, Blood Ground, 85-89.
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methodically destroyed Xhosa fields, and carried off the harvest in an effort to starve the
Africans into submission. By the end of the campaign in 1812, Governor Cradock
concluded that his forces had impressed "on the minds of these savages a proper degree
of terror and respect."56
Conclusion
Dunmore's War in the Upper Ohio Valley and the War of 181 1-12 in the Eastern
Cape failed to implement permanent colonial racial orders in the two regions. The Ohio
and Fish river boundaries between white and indigenous territory that the architects of the
two wars intended to establish, remained all but unchallenged, and both the Cape Colony
and the United States would expand in the decades to come. The two conflicts were
staging points in the colonial transformation in the two regions - a history of contested
grounds. Though processes of inter-ethnic cooperation and rivalry, which had shaped
much of the pre-colonial and early colonial history discussed in this chapter, would
continue to influence race relations in the Upper Ohio Valley and the Eastern Cape in the
following years, the balance of power increasingly shifted against the two areas'
indigenous peoples, especially as the state, settlers, and other interest groups attempted to
create colonial racial orders.
See Maclennan, A Proper Degree of Terror, for quote see frontispiece.
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PART II
CHAPTER 2:
CONQUEST, "CIVILIZATION," AND DISPOSSESSION: THE TRANSFORMATION
OF THE UPPER OHIO VALLEY
During the American Revolution there existed not only a growing struggle over
power and control among Anglo-American colonists and the British government, but also
between whites and Indians. In the contest in the Upper Ohio Valley from the 1770s to
the 1810s, just as in the South African Eastern Cape from the 1810s to the 1850s, the
colonizers developed increasingly racialized perceptions of differences between whites
and indigenous groups. It is important to reiterate though, that in both places, white
colonizers disagreed among themselves and at times chose conflicting strategies on how
to deal with the local populations.
Unlike nineteenth-century colonists in the Eastern Cape, whom we will examine
more closely in chapter 3, white settlers in the Upper Ohio Valley committed many acts
of unofficial violence against indigenous groups. Some scholars have argued that such
hostilities were caused by white backcountry settlers' racism and hatred for American
Indians." Others have challenged this view. Elizabeth Perkins, for example, argues that
conceptions of race in the revolutionary Ohio Valley were ill defined and that interracial
1 See for example Richard Drinnon, Facing West: The Metaphysics ofIndian-Hating and
Empire Building (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980).
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violence between Anglo-Americans and Native Americans "seems too personal, too
immediate, too intimate" to be described as "categorical racialism."2
This chapter examines the impact played by vigilante aggression as a force of
changing the balance of power in the region. Unofficial acts of violence committed
against Indians by militant white Americans in the last decades of the eighteenth and
early nineteenth century, contributed to ethnic cleansing and the eventual creation of a
racial order in the region. Inter-ethnic enmities and racial views were also not static
phenomena, but grew stronger in the decades that followed the Revolution.
In contrast to settlers, American government officials in the Upper Ohio Valley,
advocated a self-proclaimed benevolence toward Native Americans, exemplified by the
United States' "policy of civilization." American administrators, like the Secretary of
War Henry Knox (1789-1794) or President Thomas Jefferson (1801-1809), argued that
their philanthropic program would aid Native Americans to change to fit American norms
of "civilization." This would, they believed, "improve" the situation of the Indian. Yet, it
is also important to underscore that, like white frontier settlers, national officials were
interested in extending the United States' territory onto Native American land. They did
so by violent means if they deemed it necessary. In many ways, as Anthony Wallace has
argued, the federal government used the civilization program as a means to free up Indian
lands. Policy makers hoped that a switch among Ohio Indian societies to modes of
European farming would open up more land to white settlement. Moreover, federal
officials assumed that the economic transformation they advocated among Native
Americans, would force Indians to accumulate debts. These changing circumstances,
2
Elizabeth Perkins, Border Life: Experience and Memory in the Revolutionary Ohio
Valley (Chapel Hill: The University ofNorth Carolina Press, 1998), 136-137.
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officials believed, would make it easier for the United States to purchase Indian lands
through treaties. 3 Therefore, despite their often disparate views on both social and
political issues, on the objective of national expansion white settlers and national leaders
worked in accordance with each other.4 The active involvement of the American
government and its national leaders might explain why, unlike in the Eastern Cape, there
emerged no powerful outspoken settler elite in the Upper Ohio Valley that accused the
government of inaction and abandoning the interests of its colonists.
Conte^dJirounds (Part I): The Revolution in the Upper Ohio Valley I
At the outset of the Revolution, the issue of how to interact with Indians became a
central concern for the young and fledgling American nation as the country's
revolutionary elite had mixed views on the relations that their country should pursue with
Native Americans. Some influential leaders advocated that the rebellious colonies seek
rapprochement with Indians. In the Upper Ohio Valley, however, American officials had
little success in establishing closer ties with Indians. Here the native peoples mostly
fought against the United States, and would continue their military resistance until the
mid- 1790s. The Coshocton Delaware and the Mequashake Shawnee were the only groups
that established serious diplomatic ties with the Americans. Yet even friendly relations
with a relatively small fraction of the region's Indian population provided problems for
Anthony Wallace, Jefferson and the Indians: The Tragic Fate ofthe First Americans
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999). On this issue see also Bernard
Sheehan, Seeds ofExtinction (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1973).
4
Hinderaker, Elusive Empires, 185-186, 226.
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the Americans, since these contacts were irreconcilable with the national interests of
expansion and were an obstacle to military strategy in the region.
American Officials and the Indians at the Outset of the Revolution
The American Revolution led to a variety of responses among the young United
States' political elite. Numerous American leaders, for example, wanted no interaction
with Native Americans at all. Their opinions reflected popular revolutionary rhetoric,
which generally depicted Indians as the natural allies or even pawns of the British.
Hence, several prominent political figures like John Adams, who would become the
second president of the United States (1797-1801), shared the animosities of a significant
number of rebel colonists who saw Indians as costly, dangerous, and unreliable allies. 5
Still, American officials could not ignore the realities of their military
vulnerability. The Continental Congress recognized that western Indian societies could
pose a threat to the colonies in their efforts to obtain independence. Thus, in 1776 new
policies emerged in which American officials encouraged Native Americans to stay
outside the conflict pointing out that the revolution was a war between English and
American brothers, of which they should take no notice.6
The demands of some members of the revolutionary military and political elite,
most noticeably General George Washington and Thomas Jefferson, went even further.
As early as 1776, they argued that American Indians would not remain inactive in the
5
Richter, Facing Eastfrom Indian Country, 216-19.
6
See for example Colin Calloway, The American Revolution in Indian Country: Crisis
and Diversity in Native American Communities (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1995).
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upcoming conflict, and should therefore be enticed to fight alongside the Americans
wherever possible. But unimpressed by or unaware of American rhetoric and diplomatic
aspirations, most Native Americans showed a reluctance to get involved in the conflict on
the side of the thirteen colonies.7
United States-Coshocton Indian Relations during the Revolution
The largely unsuccessful attempts in the Upper Ohio Valley to obtain either
Native American support or non-participation in the revolutionary struggle, were
implemented by the Indian Agent George Morgan and several other officers at Fort Pitt.
United States diplomatic efforts focused especially on the Delaware factions around
Coshocton in the Muskingum and Tuscarawas River Valley and the Mequashake
Shawnee on the lower Scioto River. Both groups lived in close proximity to Anglo-
American settlements, and seemed keen on not getting involved in the conflict (see
chapter 4).
Early in the Revolution, official American rhetoric frequently affirmed the United
States' interest in maintaining the long-established "chain of friendship" between the
thirteen former colonies and Ohio Indians. American policy-makers promised to protect
Ohio Indians that would remain friendly to the United States, like "their own children
against all Enemies as long as the Sun or Moon shall shine & rivers flow." In a speech to
their "Brothers the Delawares," the Continental Congress assured them of the United
On the debate over congressional approval of the recruitment of Indian fighters see for
example Journals ofthe Continental Congress, 1 774-1 789, 34 vols., Worthington Ford et
al., eds. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1904-37), 4: 394-5. For Native
American views on this issue see Calloway, The American Revolution in Indian Country.
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States' determination "to cultivate peace and friendship," a message that Congress
wanted the Coshocton Delaware to pass on to other Ohio Indians. Furthermore, the
Americans provided guarantees for trade and assured the Delawares that they would
"prevent any of our people wronging them in any manner, or [of] taking their lands."8
In a treaty between the Coshocton Delaware, who by this point had also been
joined by many of the Mequashake Shawnee in an effort to consolidate the strength of the
two groups, and the United States, signed on September 17, 1778, American officials
reiterated those points, but also offered the Indians an opportunity to become part of their
union. They assured the Coshocton Delaware that the United States would provide trade
and diplomatic gifts such as "articles of clothing, utensils, and implements of war." The
treaty also provided territorial guarantees and protection from the encroachment of white
settlers. Furthermore, it invited the Coshocton Indians, pending on approbation of
Congress, "to join the present confederation," of the former thirteen colonies "and to
form a [Native American] state whereof the Delaware nation shall be head."9 Even
though the treaty was never ratified by the Continental Congress, it is still significant to
note that the possibility of a common political system was at least imagined by some
American officials and Native American leaders. However, overall the United States'
sincerity of its support of a Native American state has to be questioned.
See Gov. John Page to the Delawares, Sept. 18, 1777, in Frontier Defense on the Upper
Ohio, 1777-1778, eds. Reuben Thwaites and Louise Phelps Kellogg (Madison:
Wisconsin Historical Society, 1912), 88-91; and Speech to Captain White Eyes, April 10,
1776, in Journals ofthe Continental Congress, 4: 269.
9
For the treaty see Charles Kappler, ed., Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties, 3 vols.
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1904), 2: 3-5.
61
Yet the treaty also spurred controversy. Article III of the document posed a clear
threat to the Council of Coshocton's expressed desire not to get involved in the
revolutionary fighting. 10 It required the Coshocton Indians to enlist their men with United
States forces and to allow the Americans passage through their territory. When at a later
point American officers came to recruit some of the Coshocton Indian fighters, their
leaders seemed dumb founded. After American officers reminded them of Article III, one
of their chiefs, Killbuck, argued that the treaty had been "wrote down false." 11 Killbuck
reminded the officers that "all what I agreed to was to pilot the Army 'till beyond our
bounds, & my great Capt. White Eyes with several others to go before the Army &
convey them to the Enemy in order to be of use to both Parties, in case they should desire
to speak or treaty with one another." According to Killbuck's version of the treaty, the
Delaware had agreed to fulfill little more than their traditional role as mediators among
Eastern Woodland peoples. 12 A secret letter by Colonel Morgan to Colonel Daniel
Brodhead seems to support Killbuck's claim of the questionable nature of the treaty.
Morgan wrote that "there never was a conference with Indians, so improperly or
villainously conducted." 13
For the treaty see Laws and Treaties, 2:3-5.
1
Randolph Downes, Council Fires on the Upper Ohio (Pittsburgh: University of
Pittsburgh Press, 1940), 17.
David Zeisberger to Col. George Morgan, Jan. 20, 1779, in Frontier Advance on the
Upper Ohio, 1778-1779, ed. Louise Kellogg (Madison: Wisconsin Historical Society,
1916), 201-202; and John Killbuck to Morgan, Jan. 20, 1779, in ibid., 202-205.
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Brodhead, in Frontier Advance, 216-217.
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Furthermore, in asking the Coshocton Indians to found the fourteenth state,
American officials also left little doubt that the Indians had to change their way of life. In
1776, for instance, the Continental Congress announced to the Coshocton Indians that it
would send "a suitable minister, and schoolmaster, and a sober man to instruct you." 14
Some of these developments had already been introduced by a group of missionaries of
the Moravian church, who had been invited by the Council at Coshocton to move some of
their mission towns to the Tuscarawas and Muskingum River Valley area in the early
1770s. An American commissioner who visited the missions about two years after the
announcement by Congress, praised the missionaries' efforts in bringing Christian
education and commercial agriculture to the their "converts." The official also described
the Moravian Indians as looking as peaceful as sheep, and expressed a desire that all
Indians should be like this. 15 Thus the Moravian missionaries aided the American
strategy to change the Indians. But they also supported the American war effort in the
Upper Ohio Valley region in more direct ways. American officers at Fort Pitt relied
greatly on intelligence information from the missionaries, as well as the Moravian and
Coshocton Indians. 16
Speech to Captain White Eyes, April 10, 1776, in Journals ofthe Continental
Congress, 4: 269-70.
15
"Diarium von Lichtenau am Muskingum vom 19ten August bis Ende des Jahres 1778,"
Sept. 6, 1778, in Herrnhutter Indianermission in der Amerikanischen Revolution: Die
Tagebuecher von David Zeisberger 1772-1781, eds. Hermann Wellenreuther and Carola
Wessel (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1995), 463.
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For the reconnaissance work of the missionaries, as well as that of the Moravian and
Delaware Indians see for example David Zeisberger to Gen. Hand, Sept. 23, 1777, in
Frontier Defense, 101-3; Brodhead to Zeisberger, Nov. 26, 1779, in Pennsylvania
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White Backcountry Violence and Government Policy during the Revolution
Throughout the eighteenth century, colonial expansion on the trans-Appalachian
frontier had led to raids and attacks on one another by Anglo-American colonists and
Native Americans. This tense situation was accompanied by many acts of unofficial
violence, in which militant settlers often did not differentiate between Native American
friends and foes. At the time of the Revolution, the threat of white vigilante attacks on
Ohio Indians was further intensified by the creation of illegal white settlements north of
the Ohio river. Some American officials feared that white trespassers on Indian land, who
could be found virtually everywhere "thirty miles up the branches of the Ohio," posed a
"danger to the peaceable inhabitants," such as the Coshocton Indians. 17
Thus the "chain of friendship" that the United States tried to maintain with
potential Indian allies was frequently "stained." As early as September 1775, white
frontier settlers in western Pennsylvania shot at a Mingo leader and later at a Mingo and a
Shawnee on their way to treaty negotiations at Fort Pitt. For American officials who
attempted to gain support from various Ohio Indian factions, like the Shawnee, Mingo,
and the Delaware, the actions of backcountry vigilantes were a severe blow. In an effort
to maintain damage control, American officers assured the treaty participants that the
Archives, 12 vols. (Philadelphia: Joseph Severns & Co., 1852-6), 12: 192-3; Brodhead to
Washington, Dec. 13, 1779, in ibid., 12: 197-9.
17 On white frontier settlers' fears of Indians and how this spurred violent activity see
Col. John Gibson to Gen. Edward Hand, Aug. 1, 1777, in Frontier Defense, 35; Page to
Hand, Sept. 17, 1777, in ibid., 85-86. On illegal settlements north of the Ohio river see
Col. Daniel Brodhead to Col. David Shepherd, Oct. 10, 1779, in Frontier Retreat on the
Upper Ohio, 1779-1781 (Madison: Wisconsin Historical Society, 1917), 96-7; Brodhead
to the Delaware Chiefs, Oct. 1 1, 1779, in ibid., 97-8; Brodhead to Gen. George
Washington, Oct. 26, 1779, in Pa. Archives, 12: 176-177.
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perpetrators, if caught, would be punished. But through the continued use of violence,
white frontier settlers challenged the efforts of government officials who believed that a
strong American position on the Ohio frontier depended on the neutrality, cooperation,
and assistance of at least some of the local Native American groups. On such occasions
American officials, similarly to Ohio Indian leaders when blamed for violent attacks on
settlers by their people, attempted to defuse tense situations by arguing that violence had
been committed by "very bad people." But they also maintained that "the Sentiments and
Conduct of your Brothers the White People" should not be judged "from those of a few
Wretches among them." 18
Unofficial violence by backcountry settlers and attempts by the federal
government to maintain some degree of control in the Upper Ohio Valley caused serious
problems for American policy-makers. Some officials believed that their inability to
curtail settler activity exposed the United States "to the shameful reproach of being as
treacherous & perfidious as the worst of savages." 19 In May of 1778, Timothy Pickering,
an official with the military, was looking for solutions on how to prevent acts of violence
committed by the "wild ungovernable race" of white frontier settlers. Since many of the
unsanctioned acts of aggression against Indians were committed by militia units staffed
by backcountry settlers, Pickering advocated that only regular forces should be used in
1 o
See Treaty at Pittsburgh, Sept. 15, 1775, in The Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 1775-
1777, eds. Reuben Thwaites and Louise Phelps Kellogg, (Madison: Wisconsin Historical
Society, 1908), 27-9; see also Col. Dorsey Pentecoast to Capt. William Harrod,
November 12, 1776, in ibid., 219-220. For arguments that the United States could not
hold the Delaware nation accountable for the action by some renegade individuals see
Delaware Chiefs to Congress, May 29, 1779, in Frontier Advance, 352.
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the area. But the United States laeked the means to replace militia with regular forees in
the region.
The precariousness of the situation in the Upper Ohio Valley became especially
clear during the Mequashake Shawnee leader Cornstalk's visit to Fort Randolph at Point
Pleasant (Kentucky) in the fall of 1777. Cornstalk warned the Americans that an
increasing number of Shawnee planned to join the British. Allegedly fearing that the
Mequashake Shawnee leader would give up his friendly disposition toward the
Americans, the commanding officer at the fort arrested Cornstalk and his companions.
When anti-American Indians murdered a member of the militia in the vicinity of the fort
some days later, the situation escalated. A mob of local militia stormed the fort and
ransacked the prison-cabin, slaughtering Cornstalk and his three companions. These I
murders dealt a blow to the American chances of reducing tensions with its northern
neighbors. It pushed an even larger number of Ohio Indians into the anti-American camp,
which by 1778 included a majority of Native Americans in the region. 21
Acts of unofficial violence by white frontier settlers, even against friendly Ohio
Indians, continued unimpeded. About a year after the murder of Cornstalk, some
members of a frontier militia unit killed the influential White Eyes while he served the
Americans as a scout. The Delaware leader had been one of the United States' strongest
allies at the Council at Coshocton. American officers, remembering the earlier impact of
Cornstalk's killing, kept White Eyes' murder a secret. They claimed instead that he had
20
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were
died of smallpox. In the spring of 1779, in response to the arrest of a white frontier
settler who had been convicted for the murder of a friendly Delaware, a group of white
vigilantes assembled and threatened to murder a group of Coshocton chiefs who
traveling through Pennsylvania on a diplomatic mission to the Continental Congress in
Philadelphia. The Indians were rerouted several times during their travels since "there
were several parties made up to destroy them."23 In the fall of 1780, a group of western
Pennsylvania militiamen and their officers threatened to kill a band of around forty
Coshocton Indian fighters who had assisted Colonel Daniel Brodhead in the defense of
Hannastown against anti-American Ohio Indian raiders. A massacre was only averted
through swift interference by a guard of regulars.24 Backcountry settler violence during
the Revolution reached its pinnacle during the infamous Gnadenhuetten massacre of
1782, when more than ninety pacifist Moravian Indians were killed by western
Pennsylvania militiamen who accused them of raiding and stealing from white
settlements.
25
Like backcountry settlers, many American officers and officials had their share of
prejudices against Indians. During his service at Fort Pitt, Colonel Brodhead, for instance,
had grown increasingly frustrated about reports and rumors of Coshocton Indians leaving
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the Muskingum and Tuscarawas river valleys to join the anti-American resistance. Early
in 1781, Brodhead asserted "that much confidence ought never to be placed in any of the
colour, for I believe it much easier for the most civilized Indian to turn Savage than for
any Indian to be civilized."26
A good number of revolutionary policy makers blamed Indian violence against
Americans on British administrators, agents, and "scalp buyers," who had misguided
Ohio Indians. For American officials it was easier to argue that Native Americans were
acting as the pawns of the crown rather than to see their involvement against the United
States as being motivated by American actions and policies. This belief ignored the
impact of decades of Anglo-American encroachments onto Native American lands and
the United States' inability to provide supplies to Indians, both of which encouraged
many Ohio Indians to seek an alliance with the British.27
The interests of maintaining friendly relations with Native Americans in the
Upper Ohio Valley became, however, increasingly secondary if not irrelevant to
American officials. A growing number of officers argued that militia men in units with
Native American scouts had threatened to leave their companies as they objected to
26
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cooperating with Indians/8 As the Revolution in the Upper Ohio Valley progressed,
American efforts to seek rapprochements with at least some Ohio Indians became
increasingly difficult with the changing military strategies of the United States in the
region. General Edward Hand, the commanding officer at Fort Pitt from 1777 to August
1778, for example, was concerned with how "to preserve" Ohio Indian "friendship" with
small parties of militia on active duty in Indian country that would not "stay clear of the"
friendly Indians.
29
Furthermore, Colonel Brodhead feared that bounties offered for Indian
scalps by several state governments in 1780 would lead to the random killing and
scalping of Coshocton Indians by militia.30
Like backcountry settlers, American administrators embraced violence as a tool to
obtain their strategic goals. United States officials advocated that "offensive operations
can alone produce Defence agt. Indians," and that troops had to strike "terror" into Indian
country. "Savages must be managed by working on their fears."31 For American officials,
violence was a viable strategy to maintain some order and stability in the region - even if
it required total warfare. In the fall of 1779, the American Allegheny campaign of 600
soldiers was especially planned for harvest time, and drew a 400-mile long destructive
path through Indian country. In the late summer of 1780 and again in 1782, General
28
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Clark marched with about 1000 men to destroy enemy Shawnee towns and their harvests.
Such attacks led anti-American Ohio Indians to grow more dependent on British supplies
and to relocate their villages further to the northwest, to gain greater distance from
potential American attacks. In this way, American forces achieve the ethnic cleansing of
significant parts of what is today southern and eastern Ohio.32
Contested Grounds (Part II): America's First Colony. 1782-1812
When the British sued for peace with the Americans in 1783, the Indian peoples
of the Upper Ohio Valley were far from defeated. Nevertheless, in the Treaty of Paris,
Britain ceded all lands east of the Mississippi River to the United States without
consulting its Native American allies. This development enabled United States officials
to declare territorial sovereignty over the region, a claim that would be contested by
many of the area's native groups. Thus the trans-Appalachian West became the United
States' first colony. From the 1780s to the early decades of the nineteenth century, the
Northwest Territory (a region delineated by the Mississippi to the west, the Ohio river to
the south, Pennsylvania to the east, and Canada to the north) as well as Ohio, the first
state created out of what historians today call the "Old Northwest," became the first place
33
where the United States attempted to implement a colonial racial order.
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The post-Revolution years saw a continuation of the tensions between United
States officials and backcountry settlers. Recurring acts of unofficial violence by
frontiersmen continued to worry some government administrators. 34 At the same time,
many backcountry settlers were critical of the federal government and saw its land
policies as only benefiting large speculators. The United States government, they often
argued, failed to represent their interests. Backcountry men also often ignored or mocked
federal officials whom they viewed as pompous and intrusive.35
More importantly, however, and despite such ill feeling, between the 1780s and
the early nineteenth century, national expansion became increasingly the goal of both
American settlers and federal officials. In the Upper Ohio Valley, the state, by applying
the tools of conquest, treaties, and a policy of "civilization," became the major agent of
Native American dispossession.
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Tensions Continued: Squatters, Settlers, and Government Officials
Many United States officials were advocates of national expansion. Political
leaders like George Washington, Alexander Hamilton, and Henry Knox on the national
level, as well as such regional figures as the territorial governor Arthur St. Clair and
Rufus Putnam, an early leader of Marietta and judge, advocated that the Old Northwest
had to be developed into a region viable for commercial agriculture. Several early
national figures like Washington and John Cleves Symmes, the proprietor of the Symmes
purchase (an area of several hundred thousand acres in the southwestern corner of Ohio),
were also major land speculators on the trans-Appalachian frontier, who had an economic
interest in national expansion. Security in the Northwest Territory, they knew, would
attract more settlers and would lead to an appreciation of land prices. In this endeavor,
the Ohio Indians' hold on the land became a central issue with which advocates of
American national expansion had to contend. At the same time, as discussed earlier,
federal officials were concerned about white squatters who moved north of the Ohio
River and whose numbers increased noticeably throughout the 1780s.
Federal officials, many ofwhom shared eastern society's negative perceptions of
backcountry settlers, condemned squatter settlements and argued that they threatened to
undermine the government's Indian policy, treaties, and in the promotion of land
speculation. Government bureaucrats often described squatters as "illegal" settlers and as
a "lazy" and "lawless set of fellows," who defied authority and could seriously threaten
the United States' position in the West. In order to avoid chaos on the frontier, some
policy makers argued, Congress needed to ban unauthorized settlements or run the risk
36 New Haven Gazette and Connecticut Magazine, Oct. 5, 1786.
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that the Northwest Territory would "not only remain profitless to the United States, but
wou'd become a prey to lawless banditii and adventurers."37 As a result, politicians
rushed to pass the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, the constitution of the territory, in an
effort to promote social order and to spur the development of commercial agriculture.
Federal efforts to control illegal settlements, which were considered to increase
the possibility of tensions with natives in the Upper Ohio Valley, remained limited
throughout the 1780s. For instance, in the spring of 1785 at Mingo Bottoms, prior to the
passage of the Northwest Ordinance, federal troops clashed with the squatter leader
Joseph Ross. Ross defied the authorities and told the commanding officer Ensign
Armstrong that "he was determined to hold his possession, and if I should destroy his
house he would build six more in the course of a week." After a long argument Ross was
arrested. The remaining illegal settlers were ordered to destroy their properties and to
move back south of the Ohio. Yet federal officers like Armstrong also realized the futility
of their mission, as they saw squatters migrating to "the unsettled countries by forties and
fifties" in defiance of Congressional orders. Many of these intruders already had been
previously removed from public lands. But with only two to three hundred soldiers
stationed throughout the entire Northwest Territory in the 1780s, federal officials were in
no position to enforce their authority.38
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Many administrators continued to believe that white squatters, as well as legal
settlers, could threaten their Indian policy through acts of unofficial violence. Several
observers of the Ohio frontier pointed out that illegal settlements along with violent
provocations by backcountry settlers from Kentucky and Pennsylvania, spurred
aggression by Native Americans. In the summer of 1787, Henry Knox described this
volatile situation in a report to the Continental Congress:
The deep rooted prejudices, and malignity of heart, and conduct,
reciprocally entertained and practiced on all occasions by the Whites and
Savages will ever prevent their being good neighbours. The one side
anxiously defend their lands which the other avariciously claims. With
minds previously inflamed the slightest offence occasions death - revenge
follows which knows no bounds. The flames of merciless war are thus
lighted up which involve the innocent and helpless with the guilty.39
As Knox indicated, chronic small scale warfare between American Indians and whites
continued to haunt the Ohio valley throughout the early national period.
American settlers' image of Native Americans served to promote and justify the
settlers' acts of unofficial violence and ethnic cleansing. A considerable number of them
imagined the Upper Ohio Valley, in the words of Indiana territory governor William
Henry Harrison, as "one of the fairest portions of the globe" that had to be uplifted from
its "state of nature, the haunt of a few wretched savages."40 Furthermore, many
Americans throughout the revolution and the early national period saw Indians as a
threat. Settler views of Native Americans would become increasingly racialized in the
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first decades of the nineteenth century. For many white settlers by this point, according to
the American writer Herman Melville, "the red man" had become "a creature, ,n whose
behalf mercy were not wisdom; truce is not vain; he must be executed."41
To the concern of some federal officials, backcountry militia in the 1780s struck
as indiscriminately against Native Americans as they had done during the American
Revolution. During one of many campaigns, Kentucky militiamen killed at least
friendly Piankashaw Indians in their village on the Wabash river. These Indians i
particular, wrote Secretary of War Henry Knox in June of 1789, had "prided themselves
in their attachment to the United States."42 Two years earlier, in the summer of 1786, and
without the approval of the federal government, General George Rogers Clark and
Colonel Benjamin Logan led two independent expeditions against American Indian
towns and villages north of the Ohio river. The two missions infuriated federal officers,
who were unable to stop them. Logan and some 900 backcountry fighters from Kentucky
led an especially destructive campaign into Shawnee territory that year. Logan ordered an
attack on Mequashaketown on the Mad river, which humiliated federal officials. The
town's chief, Moluntha, had been friendly with the Americans, and had signed the Great
Miami treaty in late January of the same year. Moluntha and his followers were caught
unawares. Militia men destroyed their crops, burned the town, and shot several of the
1
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villagers who were fleeing in shock. Moluntha tried to avert the massacre through
negotiations, but was shot down holding on to an American flag and a copy of the Great
Miami treaty.43
Even after the decisive defeat of an alliance of Ohio Indian groups by U.S.
military in the 1790s, which, as discussed in more detail later in the chapter, significantly
undermined Native Americans' capacity for military resistance in the region, pledges
made by federal representatives that they will "punish any white Man, who shall.
. . kill
or in any manner injure any of his red Children" were often empty promises.44 Unofficial
white violence in the region continued throughout the 1 790s and 1 800s as some
American citizens robbed and sometimes murdered Native Americans, recurrently killed
game and livestock of Indian neighbors, and illegally occupied their lands.45
Acts of unofficial settler violence increased again during the War of 1812.
Vigilante activity was often not directed against anti-American factions among the Ohio
Indians who sided with the British. Instead they targeted Native Americans who lived in
43
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the vicinity of white settlements in the Upper Ohio Valley and who, for reasons explored
in detail in chapter 4, had pursued strategies of accommodation with the Americans in the
post-Treaty of Greenville years. Several letters by American citizens in the region had
praised the "improvements" of "civilization" that had occurred in these Indian towns,
and contended that such native communities had become "a watchful safeguard to our
Frontier Inhabitants." Over three thousand of these Ohio Indians did not take up arms
against the Americans when hostilities broke out in 1812. In fact, many assisted the
United States' war effort as informers, scouts and soldiers. Despite these actions,
American settlers used the turmoil created by the war to target these Indians.46
During the War of 1812 many American settlers feared Native American attacks.
When United States officials relocated members of the friendly Delaware nation and of
some other groups to Miami County, the white public there was outraged. Over fifty
signers of a petition lobbied Ohio's wartime governor Return Meigs to intervene on their
behalf, charging the Indians with being able to pass on information to the enemy, which
put "the people of the neighbourhood ... in a dangerous situation."47 In New
Philadelphia, in the Muskingum river valley region, a considerable distance from the
fighting, a significant number of white settlers was concerned that the impoverished
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Moravian mission of Goshen, the home of no more than twenty Indians, would be used as
a staging ground to attack the surrounding American settlements. In the summer of 1812,
many ofNew Philadelphia's citizens were keen "to embrace the first opportunity to
destroy" the mission and kill the Christian Indians before the detachment of local militia
left for military duty. Though no bloodshed occurred, a mob insisted on searching the
settlement despite repeated reassurances by the missionary, Benjamin Mortimer, that no
enemy Indians were be harbored at Goshen. Mortimer explained white resentments and
threats directed against the mission as being motivated by fear. "It cannot be denied,
however," the missionary continued "that it proceeds also in part, from the blood thirsty
spirit against the Indians in general, by which many persons appear to be actuated."48
Despite repeated assertions and acts of friendship by those Ohio Indians who
refused to join the anti-American alliance, distrust, fear, and land hunger led some
American settlers to strike against them. The illegal movement of Anglo American
squatters onto the lands of friendly Ohio Indians increased noticeably during the War of
1812.
49
Militia detachments and American settlers also attacked several parties of
friendly Native Americans - at times killing, wounding, or arresting them. One of the
Indian agents in the region, John Johnston, admitted that he had increasingly "great
difficulty in preserving the lives of those who had come to me for protection." He was
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also forced to send speeches to friendly Ohio Indian factions warning that white
settlements constituted no safe places for Indians. Ohio Indians who joined the United
States forces as scouts and soldiers were frequently targeted or threatened by American
militia men. For instance, while serving the United States, the Shawnee chief Black Hoof,
was injured during a failed assassination attempt by a white soldier. Furthermore, United
States militia sacked several friendly Native American towns and villages, destroying
cabins and houses. They also killed or seized friendly Indians' cattle and hogs, destroyed
fields, and stole horses. 50 Such acts of vigilantism functioned in many ways as
trailblazers for territorial expansion in the early national period, a goal pursued with
growing efficiency by succeeding federal administrations, which implemented a policy of
conquest, treaties, and "civilization."
Conquest, Treaties, and "Civilization:" U.S. Indian Policy (1780s-1812)
Like American settlers, federal officials supported territorial expansion. For much
of the 1780s, however, several key American policy makers morally opposed the violent
means used by frontiersmen to force American Indians to accept white territorial
demands. As a solution to the dilemma, these officials advocated dispossession of
indigenous peoples through negotiations and treaties. The Northwest Ordinance of 1787
affirmed this understanding by stating that "the utmost good faith shall always be
observed toward the Indians. Their lands and property shall never be taken from them
50
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without their consent."51 At the same time, as Erie Hinderaker points out, the ordinance
demonstrated the United States' commitment to land acquisition and to undermining
Native American sovereignty. 52
The processes of colonization and dispossession in the Upper Ohio Valley were
accompanied by a rhetoric of good intentions shaped by the policy of "civilization,"
which dominated Indian-white relations from the 1780s to the 1810s. The civilization
policy was promulgated by such high ranking government officials as George
Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and Henry Knox. As Bernard Sheehan and Anthony
Wallace argue, these men believed that by changing the circumstances under which
Native Americans lived, by educating them in what American administrators described as
"civilized culture," Indians could become incorporated into white society. At the same
time, both authors emphasize that such publicly stated benevolent visions played an
ambiguous role in the construction of racial order in the Upper Ohio Valley. For one,
federal policy-makers proved quite willing to make use of "just and lawful wars
authorized by Congress," when they grew frustrated with Ohio Indians' resistance to land
cessions and the expansion of white settlement in the early 1 790s. Secondly, and despite
the government's assurances of its benevolence, treaties and civilization policy became
the primary tools for transferring indigenous lands to white ownership. 53
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1987), 60-64.
Hinderaker, Elusive Empires, 242-244.
53
Sheehan, Seeds ofExtinction; Wallace Jefferson and the Indians.
80
American Indian policy northwest of the Ohio River was especially confusing in
the years immediately following the Revolution. Officials argued that the United States
had legitimately obtained the area between the Appalachian Mountains and the
Mississippi through the Treaty of Paris (1783) from Britain. Still, to give their territorial
claims greater legitimacy, American policy-makers attempted to convince Ohio Indian
groups to cede their land through various treaties. Some Delaware, Wyandot, and
Shawnee leaders gave into American pressures and signed the Ft. Mcintosh treaty of
1785 and the Great Miami treaty of 1786. These treaties transferred about two thirds of
the territory of the modern state of Ohio to the Americans, leaving only the northwestern
corner of the state to Native Americans. The border between the two peoples was later
delineated by the Treaty of Greenville ( 1 795). 54
As discussed more extensively in chapter 4, Native Americans in the Upper Ohio
Valley saw the United States' territorial demands as non-binding because they considered
themselves undefeated by the Americans. In their efforts to strengthen their claims to
sovereignty, factions among the Miami, the Delaware, the Shawnee, the Wyandot, the
Iroquois Confederacy, and several Great Lakes Indian groups established an Ohio Indian
Confederacy, which advocated resistance against white settlement expansion north of the
Ohio River. Due to the United States' weak military position in the 1780s and early
1790s, it would take the federal government almost another ten years and three major
military campaigns to secure the borders it had demanded at Ft. Mcintosh and at the
Great Miami.
For the two treaties see Kappler, Treaties, 2: 6-8, 16-18.
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Officials like Henry Knox insisted that even though Native Americans had no
legal ownership over the western territories, they still had a right to use these lands, and
had to be compensated for this "custodianship." Knox and other bureaucrats maintained
that "policy and justice" required an attempt at peaceful negotiations with Indians. They
contended that "the dignity and interest of the nation," obliged the United States to be
benevolent on these issues and that "blood and injustice, would stain the character of the
nation."55
From the 1780s to the 1810s, the policy of civilization played an integral part in
Indian-United States relations. Through difficult and patient efforts, American officials
believed, white reform efforts could help to change and "uplift" a "barbarous race." To
Knox, whose beliefs were shaped by Enlightenment thought and ethnocentric values, to
presume that American Indians could not conform to the "superior" way of life of Anglo-
Americans, was "to suppose the human character under the influence of such stubborn
habits as to be incapable of melioration and or change - a supposition entirely
contradicted by the progress of society from the barbarous ages to its present degree of
perfection."
56 Knox wrote to Ohio Indians in April of 1792 that the United States wanted
to provide them with "all the blessings of civilized life." The Secretary ofWar promised
the Indians that he would send missionaries to teach them Christianity and how "to
cultivate the earth, and raise corn; to raise oxen, sheep, and other domestic animals; to
build comfortable houses, and to educate your children, so as ever to dwell upon the
Knox to Washington, 15 June 1789, inASPIA, 1: 12-14.
Knox to Washington, July 7, \7S9, ASPIA, 1: 52-54.
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5 7land." Furthermore, United States policy-makers believed that a switch to pi,
agriculture and the raising of livestock among Native American societies would open up
more lands to white settlement.58
Early in 1789, in an effort to avoid a costly war, Secretary ofWar Henry Knox
attempted to revitalize treaty negotiations with Ohio Indians over the border between the
United States and Indian country. He ordered American officials once again to attempt to
convince Ohio Indian groups to sign a treaty that would confirm the boundaries
established by the treaties of Fort Mcintosh and the Great Miami. Predictably, some Ohio
Indians accepted the Fort Harmar Treaty of 1789. They took the government's gifts and
compensations and signed the document. But a majority of the Upper Ohio Valley's I
Native American groups remained again absent from the negotiations, and refused to
accept the legitimacy of the treaty. Their resistance, argued Knox, would lead to war but
now "the evils of it may be justly charged to the Indians."59
The opening of the land north of the Ohio River to white settlers through the
Northwest Ordinance, led to an increase in retaliatory Native American strikes, which
caused a growing number ofmembers of officials to advocate the use of coercive means
to subdue the Indians in the region.60 Federal policy-makers reminded territorial governor
Knox to the Northwestern Indians, April 4, 1792, ASPIA, 1: 230. For a similar
argument see also Washington to Ohio tribes, Nov. 29, 1796, in Writings ofGeorge
Washington, 35: 194-5.
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Arthur St. Clair that "every exertion must be made to defeat all confederations and
combinations among the tribes" to undermine Ohio Indians' capabilities for military
resistance. As many Ohio Indians continued to stay away from treaty negotiations, more
federal policy-makers came to argue that a military strike was the only viable option left
to the United States to obtain Indian lands. 61 Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson also
supported a military strike against the northwestern Indians. "I hope we shall drub the
Indians well this summer."62 Hence, American policy-makers concluded that a decisive
attack had to be directed against the Ohio Indian Confederacy. Only an aggressive
intervention by the state, believed a growing number of officials, could establish the
desired transfer of land in the region.
The two major military expeditions in the early 1790s turned out to be humiliating
failures for the Americans. In the fall of 1790, Colonel Josiah Harmar and 1500 soldiers,
mostly militia, set out to destroy the Indian settlements in northwestern Ohio and parts of
Indiana. American troops succeeded in burning and destroying Native American crops
and towns at the head of the Maumee river in Indiana. But the communities already had
been evacuated by their inhabitants. A coalition of Indian fighters from the region, on the
other hand, succeeded in leading two detachments of Harmar's troops into ambushes. The
0 On Indian violence against whites see for example Harmar to the Secretary of War,
July 12, 1786, St. Clair Papers, 2: 15; Major Hamtramck to St. Clair, April 19, 1790,
ibid., 2: 135; John May, The Western Journals ofJohn May: Ohio Company Agent and
Business Adventurer, ed. Dwight Smith (Cincinnati: Historical and Philosophical Society
of Ohio, 1961), quote 64, see also 38, 49, 94, 105, 144, 147-148, 150-151.
61
Secretary Charles Thomson's instructions to St. Clair, ASPIA, 1: 9. See also St. Clair to
the Secretary of War, July 16, 1788, St. Clair Papers, 2: 58; St. Clair to the Secretary of
War, September 14, 1788, ibid., 2: 89.
62
Jefferson to James Monroe, 17 April 1791, in Paul Ford, ed., The Writings ofThomas
Jefferson, 10 vols. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1892-99), 5: 319.
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American troops suffered almost 200 casualties and withdrew.63 A year later, American
aspirations to undermine Ohio Indian resistance rested with the territorial governor St.
Clair
-
a highly decorated general during the Revolution. But like Harmer's troops in the
previous year, St. Clair's forces consisted largely of poorly trained militia. Moreover, St.
Clair like Harmar, underestimated Ohio Indians' military capabilities. On the morning of
the fourth of November, the poorly guarded camp of St. Clair's advancing forces was
overrun in a surprise attack by an estimated 1000 fighters. Struck by terror, most militia
men fled in panic. St. Clair and his regular forces attempted to defend the camp, but they
were eventually forced to escape from the battle field using a breakout charge. For the
second time an outnumbered force of Ohio Indian warriors had defeated a major
American military expedition. With over 600 dead or missing and almost 300 wounded
soldiers, the United States had experienced its biggest defeat yet at the hand of an
American Indian force.64
After two dramatic defeats, federal policy-makers resumed promoting
negotiations with Native Americans as a means to obtain their territorial demands in the
Upper Ohio Valley. They took pains, however, to assure their Indian foes that their
"desire for peace has not arisen in consequence of the late defeat of the troops under
Major General St. Clair." It was rather, according to officials who used benevolent
rhetoric, "the most decisive proof of the justice and liberality of the United States toward
the Indian tribes." Whatever the reasons, and as elaborated in chapter 4, between 1792
See Ebenezer Denny, Military Journal ofEbenezer Denny: An Officer in the
Revolutionary and Indian Wars (New York: Arno Press, 1971), 140-149.
64
For St. Clair's campaign see St. Clair to Knox, November 9, 1791, in St. Clair Papers,
2: 262-267; and Denny, 163-171.
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and the spring of 1794, the War Department sponsored several diplomatic missions to
negotiate with the Ohio Indians. But reassured by their earlier successes, native leaders
continued to insist on the Ohio to serve as a dividing-line between white and Indian
settlements. To American officials who were eager to obtain new territory, this boundary
was unacceptable. 65
If nothing else, the diplomatic missions gave the federal government time to
reorganize its efforts to conquer the lands north of the Ohio River. At the same time as
Americans were negotiating with the Ohio Confederacy, they were also getting ready to
fight another campaign against them. This time the command of the American troops fell
to Anthony Wayne. Unlike his predecessors, Wayne disciplined and drilled what he
called his "Legion," an army of 3,000 regulars and militia men, for over two years.
Wayne also strengthened and expanded the existing infrastructure of forts in the
Northwest territory, to guarantee efficient supply lines for his campaign. During the
summer of 1794, Wayne's Legion brought destruction to Ohio Indian towns, villages,
and crops. On August 20, at a place remembered as Fallen Timbers, a heavily
outnumbered Ohio Indian force challenged the American advance. The Indians faced a
disastrous defeat, and retreated in panic to the British Fort Miami in hopes of obtaining
assistance from their allies. The British, who had supplied the Ohio Confederacy with
arms and goods and had encouraged resistance to United States expansion, refused to
help. British officers in North America had been ordered to avoid any escalations with
the Americans because negotiations were underway between Britain and the United
"Speech from the Secretary of War, to all the Sachems and Warriors of the Tribes...,"
in ASPIA, 1: quote 230. See also ASPIA, 1: 146, 166, 169, 230, 319-320, 323.
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States that eventually led to Jay's Treaty and a British promise to withdraw troops from
territory claimed by the United States. 66
As we will explore in more detail in chapter 4, the Battle of Fallen Timbers
marked the end of native resistance in the Upper Ohio Valley for over a decade.
Abandoned by their British allies and militarily defeated by the Americans, Ohio Indians
had little choice but to submit to United States demands. Thus, in July and August of
1795, Ohio Indian representatives gathered at Fort Greenville for treaty negotiations with
General Wayne who was the leading government representative at the talks.
For American officials, the Treaty of Greenville was not only a tool to obtain
Native American land and to subjugate native groups north of the Ohio River, but it was
also integral to American policy makers' perceptions of their benevolence. Historian
Andrew Cayton observes that in their efforts to extend their control north of the Ohio
river, "American officials genuinely believed that their triumph was incomplete without
the defeated tribes' public acknowledgement of its essential justice."67
The American government used the negotiations at Greenville as a way to finally
obtain the territorial demands it had made in the treaties of the 1780s. The "foundation"
of the Treaty of Greenville was the Treaty of Fort Harmar (1789), which according to
Wayne had been "founded upon the principles of equity and justice." Yet for their
territorial losses that opened up all but the northwestern corner of the modern state of
Ohio to white settlement as well as significant parts of Indiana, American Indian tribes
66
For an account of the battle of Fallen Timber see Wayne to Knox, August 28, 1794,
Richard Knopf, ed., Anthony Wayne: A Name in Arms (Pittsburgh: University of
Pittsburgh Press, 1960), 351-355. This paragraph is drawn from the letters in this volume.
67
Cayton, '"Noble Actors upon the Theatre of Honor'," 239.
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received a mere $20,000 "beyond" the previous $9,000 received as compensation in
1789. The federal government also promised Ohio Indians annuities of $9,500 to be paid
in goods. But to reinforce the apparent tensions and rifts displayed by the Ohio Indians
during the negotiations, Wayne left it to the American Indian nations to work out on how
to divide these spoils.68
The crushing of Ohio Indian resistance and the Treaty of Greenville had multiple
implications for United States' Indian policy. Increased security spurred the migration of
white settlers north of the Ohio river, which soon strained existing land resources, and led
the government to purchase more Indian land through several new treaties. American
efforts to "civilize" the Indians took on a new life as well, even though a discourse about
"civilization" had been an intrinsic part of official rhetoric for at least a decade. With the
dramatically changed situation north of the Ohio River, the "civilization program" to
change the Indians could be moved from theory into practice. Annuities, to be paid in
goods, services, and livestock, became the main tool to achieve this objective.
As the nineteenth century began, officials of the Federalist Party were
increasingly replaced by supporters of Jefferson. Unlike Federalists who expressed a
degree of disdain for squatters and backcountry settlers, Jeffersonians painted a more
idealized picture of them. They believed that with the easy availability of land, white
frontier settlers would become members of a self-reliant and prosperous class of yeoman
farmers.
69
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For the negotiations at the Treaty of Greenville see ASPIA, 1 : 562-583
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But in terms of federal Indian policy little substantive change occurred as political
power gradually shitted from the Federalists to the Jeffersonians. Like the Secretary of
War Henry Knox in earlier years, Thomas Jefferson, president of the United States from
1 801 to 1809, asserted the United States' commitment to "civilization." In fact, Jefferson
had supported many of the earlier policies. Like other Enlightenment thinkers Jefferson
ignored the existence of agriculture in Eastern Woodland society, work that was mostly
performed by native women, and argued that the Indians had remained in "the hunter's
state." Therefore, he believed, "humanity enjoins" the United States "to teach" American
Indians "agriculture and the domestic arts." Jefferson assumed that such efforts would
bring Native Americans "to that industry which would enable them to maintain their
place in existence and to prepare them in time for that state of society which to bodily
comfort adds the improvement of the mind and morals."70
Missionaries became a major instrument for spreading "civilization" among
Native Americans, functioning in many ways as agents of colonial expansion. According
to official rhetoric, missionaries should serve as "friends and fathers" to Native
Americans. David Zeisberger wrote that missionaries needed "to preach the gospel to the
Indians, establish schools among them, inculcate habits of industry and sobriety, and
instruct them to live a quiet and peaceable life in all godliness and honesty."
Missionaries such as the Moravians, Quakers, Baptists, Presbyterians, Methodists, and a
70
Jefferson's Second Inaugural Address, in James Richardson, ed., A Compilation ofthe
Messages and Papers ofthe Presidents, 20 vols. (New York: Bureau of National
Literature, 1897-1917), 1: 368; Jefferson to the Miamis, Potawatomis and Weas, January
7, 1802, M15, roll 1, 142-143, National Archives.
71 David Zeisberger, Benjamin Mortimer and John Heckewelder to St. Clair, October 28,
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variety of other denominations worked to bring the Ohio Indians "a knowledge of
Husbandry and some of the most necessary arts of civil life."72 However, their efforts
also damaged the fabric of Native American societies. This became especially the case in
the Northwest Territory after 1795, where Native Americans faced increasingly limited
options. Furthermore, and as Henry Bowden and George Tinker argue, missionaries
labored with a fervor on the assumption of their Christian cultural superiority, and argued
that American Indians had to "assimilate" to Anglo-American standards.73
Yet, despite a dramatically changed balance of power, American Indians did not
blindly succumb to missionary pressures. The Wyandot chief John Hicks, for example,
told John Stewart an African American missionary at Upper Sandusky in the 1820s:
I for one, feel myself called upon to rise in defence of the religion ofmy
fathers; -- a system of religion the Great Spirit has given his red children,
as their guide and the rule of their faith, and we are not going to abandon it
so soon as you might wish; we are contended with it because it suits our
conditions and is adapted to our capacities. Cast your eyes abroad over the
world, and see how many different systems of religion there are in it.
.
.
say this is not the work of the Lord. No, my friend, your declaiming so
violently against our modes of worshipping the Great Spirit, is, in my
opinion, not calculated to benefit us as a nation; we are willing to receive
good advice from you; but we are not willing to have the customs and
institutions which have been kept sacred by our Fathers, thus assailed and
abused. 74
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Furthermore, several Indian leaders welcomed the presence, advice, and assistance of the
missionaries in their peoples' continuing efforts to shape the colonial racial order in the
Ohio region in the post Treaty of Greenville years in the Upper Ohio Valley.
The realities behind the lofty rhetoric of "civilization" policy proved to be quite
different when they played out on the ground. United States officials repeatedly failed to
deliver plows, hoes, guns, or to provide the services of blacksmiths, which they had
agreed to furnish the indigenous peoples of the Old Northwest as part of their annuities.
Native American leaders too, complained about the poor quality, as well as damaged and
belated goods, which they received from the government in accordance with the treaties.
Moreover, American Indian leaders grumbled that United States policy-makers gave
them fewer annuities and horses than promised. 75
For Jeffersonians, acquisition of indigenous lands had become a crucial
component of the "civilization" policy. Throughout the first decade of the 1800s, United
States officials purchased even more Indian land north of the Ohio River. These land
transfers were made possible through a series of treaties, signed by Native American
communities who found it hard to subsist on their shrinking land base with the small
annuities provided by the United States government. Native Americans groups like the
Wyandots of Upper Sandusky, who remained opposed to selling their lands, soon felt the
diplomatic pressures of American officials to cede land. The Wyandots reminded United
States policy-makers that they had complied with American demands. They had made
75
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"improvements" on their land, had built "valuable houses," and had "learned the use of
the plough." Pointing to the hypocrisy in American officials' demands they pointed out
that "if you really want to ameliorate our condition.
. . let us have the land given to us."76
Despite Native American complaints, United States officials continued to mask
the acquisition of Indian land in a humanitarian language. For instance, Jefferson
explained to the Miami chief Little Turtle that he "always believed in an act of friendship
to our red brethren whenever they wished to sell a portion of their lands, to be ready to
buy whether we wanted them or not, because the price enables them to improve the lands
they retain, and turning their industry from hunting to agriculture."77 American strategies
for Indian dispossession were more shrewd than Jefferson suggested. In a letter to the
territorial governor of the Indiana territory, William Henry Harrison, in February, 1803,
he wrote that "we shall push our trading houses, and be glad to see the good and
influential individuals among them [Native Americans] run into debt, because we observe
that when these debts get beyond what the individuals can pay, they become willing to
lop them off by a cession of land."78
As with previous conflicts in the Upper Ohio Valley, the War of 1812 was not
only accompanied, as discussed earlier, by unofficial, but also by officially sanctioned
violence against Native Americans. As American administrators increasingly predicted
76 Wyandots to the President and Congress, Feb. 5, 1812, in ASPIA, 1: 795-796;
Wyandots to Hull, Sep. 30, 1809, in ibid., 1: 796. For some of the abovementioned
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war
the likelihood of war with Britain, some policy-makers came to see the growing number
of militant factions among the Ohio Indians as a threat to United States expansion. For
instance, Governor Harrison wrote to the Secretary of War William Eustis about the
militant Shawnee leader Tecumseh, who along with his brother, the Shawnee prophet
Tenskwatawa, was building an anti-American pan-Indian confederacy, that he was "one
of those uncommon geniuses which spring up occasionally to produce revolutions and
overturn the established order of things."79 Harrison decided to strike against the pan-
Native American alliance in early November 1811, months before the outbreak of the
with Britain in June of 1812. With over 1,000 soldiers, he staged an attack on
Prophetstown on the Wabash river. 80 Throughout the War of 1812, the American
government followed the recommendations of the federal Indian agent in Ohio, John
Johnston, that the United States should attack and destroy the fields and towns of enemy
native groups "to cut off their means of subsistence."81 Such military actions crushed the
last large scale pan-Indian effort of resistance in the Old Northwest, eliminated the
possibility of large scale British military assistance to Native Americans, and enabled the
federal government to push for a white dominated racial order in the region.
Conclusion
The years that followed the War of 1812 spurred the creation of a racial order in
the Upper Ohio Valley, as United States policy-makers continued to marginalize and
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dispossess indigenous peoples through additional treaties. Furthermore, white opposition
to at least a partially multicultural society that included Native Americans became
increasingly entrenched in the region. More and more now, American officials would
blame the Indians' inability to change to white norms for the implementation of their
policies. Federal administrators argued that they had to protect Native Americans from
what they perceived as cultural shortcomings and from pressures of white settlement on
their lands. Gradually, the idea of removing Ohio Indian groups west of the Mississippi
would be seen as the only remaining way to solve the "Indian problem." Official
American rhetoric made it increasingly clear that within the social order of the region
there was little room left for American Indians.
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CHAPTER 3
HUMANITARIANS, SETTLERS AND THE STATE: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE EASTERN CAPE
In the southern African Eastern Cape, as in the North American Upper Ohio
Valley, territorial expansion, the dispossession of African land, and indigenous resistance
to colonization played a central role. But unlike in the Upper Ohio Valley, where in the
first decades of the nineteenth century a society emerged that excluded Native
Americans, local and imperial interests in the Eastern Cape demanded the economic
incorporation of Africans whose labor the colony needed. This chapter examines how
different white interests groups debated strategies to take over African lands and the
terms under which black South Africans in the Eastern Cape would labor for whites.
As in the Upper Ohio Valley, violence became a major tool in the Eastern Cape in
the construction of a system of colonial racial order that became established by the mid-
nineteenth century. For instance, as discussed in chapter I, in the War of 181 1-12 Cape
colonial forces removed independent African nations from the area east of the Fish River
called the Zuurveld. British administrators wanted to be assured that the Xhosa would
stay on the eastern side of the river, which colonial authorities declared the official border
of the Cape. To achieve this goal, officials like Colonel John Graham were keen on
"terrifying" Africans "into good behaviour." 1
Violence was not the only strategy advocated by whites in their efforts to create a
colonial racial order in the Eastern Cape. As in the Upper Ohio Valley in the late
Quotes in Maclennan, A Proper Degree of Terror, 131, 135-136.
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eighteenth and early nineteenth century, the first half of the nineteenth century in the
Cape saw several competing ideas as to what kind of colonial system should be created.
This contest was part of a larger ideological debate among white settlers, administrators,
officials, missionaries, and observers of the Cape, who quarreled over what kind of
colonial racial order should be established. As in the Upper Ohio Valley, the dispute and
the views that drove this debate were anything but static. They changed significantly over
the years. Furthermore, in both the Eastern Cape and the Upper Ohio Valley, indigenous
groups resisted these colonizing efforts as they attempted to maintain their sovereignty.
African and Native American resistance will be discussed in more detail in Part III.
A group known as the humanitarians, similarly to Jeffersonian government
officials in the Upper Ohio Valley, argued that their policy proposals were sympathetic
toward Africans. The humanitarian movement in the Cape consisted ofmen like the
director of the London Missionary Society (LMS), John Philip, as well as several other
leading missionaries of this organization. It was also supported by some English and
Dutch settlers and travelers, such as the editor of the South African Commercial
Advertiser John Fairbairn, Thomas Pringle, and Andries Stockenstrom, who had been
influenced by the ideology of liberal humanitarianism. Especially in the 1820s and 1830s,
humanitarians proposed a policy of colonial expansion based on treaties, and campaigned
against slavery and coercive labor. In the political discourse of the South African Cape
and of the British empire, humanitarians petitioned for the rights of indigenous and non-
white peoples. But as with the Jeffersonian policies in the United States discussed in the
previous chapter, the strategies of humanitarians for interacting with indigenous
populations proved quite harmful to them. Despite their rhetoric of good intentions,
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humanitarians aided in the creation of a colonial racial order in the region by pushing for
African dispossession and by assisting in driving the Cape's non-wh,te population
(consisting of Khoisan, Xhosa, and slaves from Asia and other parts of Africa) into labor
agreements that ultimately worked to their disadvantage.2
Most members of Eastern Cape settler society challenged the humanitarian
position. For instance, prior to and during the period of emancipation in the early 1830s,
especially in the western Cape where slavery was more prominent, numerous Dutch
speaking settlers attacked the humanitarians for their efforts to abolish slavery and to
reform the colonial labor system, which these farmers saw as a pillar of their economic
production and wealth. Furthermore, in the years that followed the War of 1834-35, the
English settler elite in the Eastern Cape and its mouthpiece the Graham 's Town Journal,
which in the aftermath of the conflict saw the Xhosa as a threat, increasingly demanded
the military subjugation and the territorial dispossession of Africans. English colonists,
who as adherents to a free labor ideology opposed slavery, nonetheless demanded the
implementation of harsh labor laws to control non-white workers. 3
The state and its official representatives played a crucial role in the creation of a
colonial racial order in the Cape. Several colonial officials, a disproportionate number of
whom were military officers serving as administrators, became allies of, or were at least
sympathetic to, the demands of the colonial settlers. Settler and humanitarian advocates
2 On this issue see for example Andrew Bank, "Liberals and their Enemies: Racial
Ideology at the Cape of Good Hope, 1820 to 1850," (Ph.D. Dissertation: Cambridge
University, 1995); Keegan, Colonial South Africa, chapter 4.
Crais, White Supremacy', Bank, "Liberals and their Enemies;" Lester, Imperial
Networks.
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attempted to influence both the colonial state in the Cape Colony and the metropol
Great Britain through their lobbying. Nevertheless, officials often followed their
agenda with regard to issues relating to indigenous and non-white peoples, to land, labor,
frontier policy, and to the colonial racial order they aspired to create. Thus, for much of
the first half of the nineteenth century, the Eastern Cape did not witness the emergence of
strong consensus on territorial expansion between government officials and settlers as it
occurred in the Upper Ohio Valley. Such developments led members of the English
settler elite in the Eastern Cape to accuse Great Britain of abandoning the interests of its
colonists.
Humanitarians. Settlers, and the State: Colonial Labor Policy
Colonial labor policy toward non-white people in the Cape was a central issue in
the battle between humanitarian and pro-settlement ideologues. A close examination of
4
labor policy also underscores the central role of the state in the Cape in eventually
implementing a colonial racial order by the 1850s. The passage of the Caledon Code of
1809, the Ordinance 50 of 1828, and the Master and Servant Ordinance of 1841
demonstrate how the state pursued its own interests in creating a colonial racial order in
the region.
Changing an Old Order: Land Tenure, the Caledon Code, and Circuit Courts
British authorities, as several historians point out, sought to create what they
believed to be an acceptable social order when they took over the Cape colony early in
the nineteenth century. This was especially the case with the Eastern Cape. Here, British
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officials intended to transform what they perceived as
"disorderliness" and
"lawlessness"
m the region. Administrators were especially concerned about potential African attacks
and wanted to change what they saw as the "primitive" ways of Boer settlers. These
perceptions reflected British stereotypes toward the Dutch speaking settlers of the Cape .«
One key component of the British plan to transform the former Dutch settlement
was to change the land tenure system. For most of the eighteenth and early nineteenth
centunes, as mentioned ,n chapter one, landholdmg ,n the Cape was based on loan farms.
The loan farm system, allowed colonists to register a land claim with little compensation
for the state. British officials believed that this system of land distribution, winch seemed
lax to them, had led the colony to expand too qu.ckly and uncontrollably. It also
frustrated British administrators like Governor Sir John Cradock (181 1-1814), as they
complained that it reinforced laziness among colonists, who allegedly wasted land by
practicing pastoralism instead of European-style agriculture. British officials also
believed that the existing land tenure system provided little revenue to the colony. Instead
British officials introduced a system based on quit rent payments that required
landholders to make yearly payments in cash to the colony. By charging colonists for
their land, colonial administrators believed, the colonists' agricultural practices would
improve, which, along with the introduction of British institutions, would bring
"progressive civilization" and "common defence" to the eastern parts of the colony. 5 But,
4
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the British failed to realize that their preferred modes of agricultural production did not
correspond with the environmental realities in the Eastern Cape, which was a region more
favorable to herding. Boers on the periphery of the colony were irritated by these changes
in the land tenure system, even though they were only poorly enforced.
The Boers were further antagonized by British efforts to regulate labor relations in
the Cape, which had profound social and cultural implications beyond their economic
effect. Two changes in particular reflect a new effort to put master servant relations under
the auspices of the colonial state. The Caledon Code of 1809 limited the power colonists
held over Khoisan and slave labor. A system of circuit courts was established to
implement the law. Official involvement in these issues were, at least in part, the result of
humanitarian lobbying, which for some time had condemned the harsh treatment of non-
white laborers.
Dutch-speaking agrarians in the Eastern Cape largely opposed these interventions.
Boers wanted to retain sole authority in their dealings with non-white labor. They saw the
state's interference as a violation of their rights "and an intolerable usurpation of
tyrannical authority." This level of government involvement ran counter to their interests.
The growing resentment led some Dutch speaking colonists to join the Slagtersneck
rebellion in 1815, a highly disorganized and unsuccessful uprising against British rule
that was relatively quickly defeated by the authorities.6
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Despite the new regulations, as many historians explain, Khoisan laborers
obtained few benefits from the Caledon Code and the circuit courts. Though both had the
appearance of providing better protection to non-white laborers, by allowing them to
protest the mistreatment by an employer and by providing them with greater liberty of
movement, officials rarely intervened on their behalf and generally sided with the
colonists. While offering a measure of protection, the code also denied Khoisans the right
to own land and required them to carry passes when traveling. It therefore legally
bolstered the differential treatment of non-whites based on racial grounds. Furthermore,
in 1812, Cape authorities passed a law that children born to Khoisan farm laborers must
be apprenticed to farmers for ten years. Thus, the Caledon Code and the apprenticeship
laws passed by the colonial state effectively aided white farmers in their efforts to recruit
non-white labor. 7
Creating a New Colonial Labor System
During the following decades, the problem of coercive labor and slavery
continued to preoccupy political discussions in the Cape. For instance, John Philip of the
London Missionary Society (LMS), whose organization had been active among slave and
Khoisan populations in the western and eastern parts of the Cape since the early
nineteenth century, strongly condemned the treatment of non-white labor in the colony
1966), quote 67, see 66-75;Testimony of Andrew Stoffel, June 27, 1836, BPP 538/1836,
586-588; Crais, White Supremacy, 58-60; Keegan, Colonial South Africa, 54-56.
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throughout the 1820s and early 1830s. Philip was a firm believer in free labor ideology.
He called on the government in London and Cape Town to
[d]o away with oppression; allow the people to have a fair price for their
for th. Ta ^ ^Ilab°rerS in any Part of the Colony they may choosetheir abode, and the natives themselves will prefer the advantage of a
residence among the inhabitants as a free people to their present
straightened condition at our missionary settlements, where they must
always find it difficult to find the means of subsistence."8
John Fairbairn, the editor of the South African CommercialAdvertiser and Philip's son in
law, was another leading humanitarian voice in the Cape Colony who denounced slavery
and the treatment of Khoisan labor. Like Philip he argued that unless higher wages were
paid, labor shortages and desertion would remain an issue in the colony. 9 This line of
reasoning acknowledged the point that low wages paid by white farmers were not
attractive to workers. But even though Philip and Fairbairn advocated Khoisan
citizenship rights and fair labor practices, they - like most other humanitarians - desired
mainly to recreate their idealized version of Britain's metropolitan social order in the
Cape. This was a system based on nineteenth-century British middle-class values and
ideals, one that challenged African societies at their political, social, and cultural core.
In fact, the LMS had send Philip to the Cape to clean up its image after colonists
and colonial administrators criticized two of its missionaries, T. J. van der Kemp and
James Read. Unlike Philip, van der Kemp believed that a Christian community would
thrive among slaves and Khoisans only if they were protected from the harmful
South African Commercial Advertiser, Aug. 15, 1829.
9
South African Commercial Advertizer, Feb. 7, 1829. See also South African Commercial
Advertizer, Jan. 3, 1829. For settler complaints about labor shortage see for example
evidence of Major Dundas and Colonel Wade BPP 538/1836, 128, 290.
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influences of metropolitan and colonial society. This view ran contrary to many
colonists' interests. Farmers complained when the missionaries preached a message of
equality to slaves and Khoisans. They also saw the missions as competitors for Khoisan
labor and charged missionaries with providing safe havens on their stations for Khoisan
"laziness and idleness." Furthermore, some LMS missionaries and officials clashed over
the abuses of Khoisan laborers and the mistreatment of Khoisans active in the Cape
military. Members of white Cape society also leveled personal accusations against Kemp
and Read for the relationships they maintained with non-white women. According to
many white settlers, this was disorderly conduct. 10
Philip and the newer generation of missionaries, on the other hand, readily
embraced the view that they had to aid the British Empire in spreading "Christian
civilization," "free labor," and "free trade." In his Researches in South Africa, a two-
volume work in which he tried to raise awareness about the situation of non-white
laborers in the Cape, Philip wrote of the benefits that missionaries brought to the
"civilising mission" of the British empire.
While our missionaries, beyond the borders of the colony of the Cape of
the Good Hope, are everywhere scattering the seeds of civilization, social
order, and happiness, they are, by the most unexceptionable means,
extending British interests, British influence, and the British empire.
Wherever the missionary places his standard among a savage tribe, their
prejudices against the colonial government give way; their dependence
upon the colony is increased by the creation of artificial wants; so
confidence is restored, intercourse with the colony is established, industry,
trade and agriculture spring up; and every genuine convert among them
made the Christian religion becomes the ally and friend of the colonial
Government."
10
Elbourne, Blood Ground, 211-212, 230-233; Keegan, Colonial South Africa, 83-88.
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Such rhetoric also suggests that humanitarians implicitly believed that Africans could
change to British norms of "civilisation." "We know of nothing," wrote John Fairbairn in
the South African Commercial Advertiser, "of which an Englishman is capable of which
they are not capable. They have the same powers of mind, the same virtues, the same
vices." Like Jeffersonians in America who adhered to environmentalist theories of race,
humanitarians in Britain and South Africa believed that all humans belonged to the same
family. As with Jeffersonians in the United States, humanitarians in the Cape thought that
it was the indigenous people that had to change to the more "civilised" ways of the
colonizers, a transformation that could be accomplished through their adoption of the
Christian faith, and one that would aid the imperial agenda. 12
Many historians argue that the promulgation of the Ordinance 50 of 1828 by
Lieutenant-Governor Richard Bourke was one of the high points of humanitarian political
lobbying in the Cape. The ordinance removed many of the restrictions imposed on
Khoisan workers by the Caledon Code. It allowed Khoisans the right to own as well as to
purchase land, abolished the pass system, and forbade the forcible apprenticeship of
Khoisan children. These provisions have led some scholars to describe Ordinance 50 as a
milestone in the history of the Cape. They see it as evidence of an enlightened, "colour
blind," British colonial policy. 13
11
John Philip, Researches in South Africa, 2vols. (New York: Negro University Press,
1969), 1:IX-X.
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South African Commercial Advertizer, April 3, 1830. For a direct trans-Atlantic
connection see for example John Philip to J.B. Purney, May 1832, in Letters ofthe
American Missionaries, 1835-1838, ed. D. J. Kotze (Cape Town: Van Riebeeck Society,
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were
Other historians, though certainly agreeing that Ordinance 50 granted certain
rights to the Cape's non-white working class, note that legal improvements led to few
economic advances which meant that most non-whites remained in a disadvantageous
position. Khoisan laborers and (after emancipation in the early 1830s) freed slaves
left with few options in the Cape economy but to sell their labor to white farmers.
Exploitation of workers continued after 1828.
In addition, there is disagreement over how much credit to give humanitarians for
the passage of Ordinance 50. Critics argue that Ordinance 50 was, at least in part, the
brainchild of colonial officials who believed that its passage would alleviate the colony's
"labor shortage" by granting Khoisan workers greater mobility. Several administrators
also argued that the Cape should attract African laborers from the interior as a way of
aiding the colony in attracting more labor. Their arguments spurred the passage of
Ordinance 49 of 1828, which attempted to regulate the migration of African workers
from outside the colony. 14
Ordinance 50, like the state-ordered emancipation of slaves in the early 1830s,
faced significant protest and opposition from colonists. The missionary James
Kitchingman, for example, observed a "spirit of persecution directed against Dr. Philip
and missionaries in general," because white settlers blamed them for the passage of the
13
See for example H.J van Aswegen, South Africa to 1854, (Pretoria: Academica, 1990),
204. See also De Kiewiet, History ofSouth Africa, 46; and J.S. Marais, The Cape
Coloured People (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1962), 157.
14 My analysis in the two paragraphs above benefited from W.M. Macmillan, The Cape
Colour Question (London: Faber and Gwyer, 1927), 211-213; Susan Newton King, "The
Labour Market of the Cape Colony, 1807-28," in Economy and Society in Pre-Industrial
South Africa, 197-200; and Robert Ross, Beyond the Pale: Essays on the History of
Colonial South Africa (Hanover: University ofNew England Press, 1993), 102; Keegan,
Colonial South Africa, 103-107.
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new rules. 15 Dutch-speaking agrarians appealed to officials throughout the Cape to alter
these laws, which they saw as contrary to their own interests. They complained that as a
result it was harder to get non-whites to work for them. The white farmers never
attributed such hardships to the low wages that they paid non-white employees, but rather
to the inherent "idleness" of Khoisan and former slave laborers. Reflecting the views of
many Dutch speaking colonists on this issue, the Zuid-Afrikaan advocated in an editorial:
"The whole Colony loudly calls for certain Rules, or Legal enactments, whereby idle
persons, thieves, and vagabonds, are prevented from living upon the hard earnings of the
laborious, and are then consequently indirectly compelled to seek for service, and for
work." Thus many Dutch settlers demanded that the colonial state should aid colonists in
their efforts to break non-whites from their "idle habits" by passing legislation against
"vagrancy" and to impose labor discipline. 16
Though largely opposed to slavery, English settlers in the Eastern Cape also
lobbied on the issue of vagrancy. For the most part, these colonists belonged to a group of
more than 4,000 settlers who arrived in the Eastern Cape in 1820. Initially, their
settlement and agricultural efforts were disastrously disorganized. Many of the English
settlers were ill-prepared to farm in the Eastern Cape and suffered from droughts and the
unpredictability and harshness of the climate. They also lacked essential supplies. In the
years following their migration, many became craftsmen in the emerging towns in the
James Kitchingman's Journal, 20 July- 31 August, 1830, in Kitchingman Papers:
Missionary Letters and Journals, 1817 to 1848, eds. Basil leCordeur and Christopher
Saunders, (Johannesburg: The Brenthurst Press, 1976), 101-102.
16 De Zuid-Afrikaan, May 3, 1 839, in Afrikaner Political Thought: Analysis &
Documents, vol. 1, 1780-1850, eds. Andre du Toit and Hermann Giliomee,(Berkeley and
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983), 75.
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Eastern Cape or switched to pastoral forms of agriculture. Others became traders and
merchants who participated in profitable business interactions with Africans living
beyond the border of the colony. 1
7
The Graham 's Town Journal, founded in 183 1 by Robert Godlonton, articulated
the views of the English settlers in the Eastern Cape. The newspaper retroactively
attacked the passage of Ordinance 50 and lobbied the Cape government under Governor
Benjamin D'Urban (1834-1838) to pass the Vagrancy Law of 1834. The Cape needed
vagrancy laws, wrote the Graham s Town Journal, because Khoisan laborers had an
"insurmountable aversion to labour" and preferred a "wandering kind of life." These
"evils" of "idleness" caused "losses to which our farmers are subject by bands of vagrants
which roam unmolested and unquestioned about the country." Financial damages reached
"in the aggregate an amount which is truly alarming." 18 English settlers believed that the
absence of vagrancy laws led to social disorder and labor shortage. Hence, the
"enactment" of such laws would be the "salutary measure, which should secure to the
industrious, whether white or black, the fruits of their labour." 19
Even though the Colonial Office in London eventually struck down the Cape's
Vagrancy Law of 1834, the following decades saw the passage of legislation that enabled
employers to tighten their control over their non-white employees. The unsuccessful
See for example W. Bird, State ofthe Good Hope in 1822 (Cape Town: C. Struick,
1966), 178- 183; see also RCC, XVII: 221. For a detailed discussion of this issue see also
Crais, White Supremacy, 87-95; and Keegan, Colonial South Africa, 61-74.
18 Graham 's Town Journal, Nov. 1, 1832. See also Ibid., June 27, 1831, Sept. 11, 1834.
19 Graham 's Town Journal, June 12, 1834. For a humanitarian critique of the 1834
Vagrancy Law see for example the South African Commercial Advertiser, Aug. 9, 1834.
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Vagrancy Law foreshadowed the passage of the Masters and Servants Ordinance of 1841
and the Master and Servant Act of 1856, both of which increased white farmers' power
over their ex-slaves and African laborers. The Masters and Servants Ordinance of 1841
did so, for example, by tying workers more closely to their employers through contracts,
a breach of which would be considered a criminal offense. The 1856 Masters and
Servants Act was even more severe. It established five-year contract periods, and
subjected workers to severe punishment for "laziness," desertion, and "disobedience."
Furthermore, it allowed employers to utilize the labor of their employees' children. The
language of the two legislative pieces did not utilize racially exclusive language, yet
several historians point out that they nevertheless aimed at subjugating non-white labor.20
The pursuit of harsher labor laws became an increasingly popular strategy in a colonial
state endeavoring to establish a system of colonial racial order.
Contested Grounds (Part I): The Cape Colony and the Xhosa. 1812-1834
Colonial labor policy was not the only or even most contentious issue that pre-
occupied the political debate between humanitarians, settlers, and government officials in
the Cape. Territorial expansion and the colony's so called "frontier policy" were arguably
an even more controversial source of disputes among the Cape's political interest groups.
In the first four decades of the nineteenth century, humanitarian critics such as the LMS's
John Philip, colonial commentators such as John Fairbairn, and travel writers such as
Saxe Bannister, Attorney General ofNew South Wales between 1824 and 1826, who had
See for example Robert Ross, "Pre-Industrial and Industrial Racial Stratification in
South Africa," in Racism and Colonialism, ed. Ross (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1982), 85-87;
Crais, White Supremacy, 140, 194, 196; Maylam, South Africa 's Racial Past, 73.
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also traveled extensively in Canada and southern Africa, attacked the way the Cape
colony expanded and acquired land from African groups like the Xhosa. 21 They also
condemned the government's use of warfare and colonial commandos to intimidate the
colony's African neighbors. By the mid- 1830s their criticisms would generate a
consolidated response by pro-settlement ideologues as they criticized the humanitarians'
positions and demanded further territorial expansion and the military subjugation of the
Xhosa
Frontier Policy in the Eastern Cape, 1812-1834
During the first half of the nineteenth century, the Cape's governors were the
main shapers of frontier policy with the mostly Xhosa speaking groups who lived on the
eastern border of the colony. Governors were predominantly military men and autocratic
rulers over whom the Colonial Office in London had only tenuous control. Such early
governors as John Cradock (181 1-1814) and Charles Somerset (1814-1826) advocated
territorial separation of whites from the Xhosa in the form of a line of partition between
"civilisation" and "barbarism." In spite of this, eastern border officials and colonists
continuously complained about Xhosa coming into the colony.22 To intimidate Africans
into not crossing the line of partition, Colonel Graham who had led the military campaign
Saxe Bannister, Humane Policy, or Justice to the Aborigines ofNew Settlements
Essential to a Due Expenditure ofBritish Money, and to the Best Interests ofthe Settlers,
with Suggestions How to Civilise the Natives by an Improved Administration ofExisting
Means (London: Dawsons, 1968).
22
See for example Lord Charles Somerset to Earl Bathurst, April 24, 1817, in RCC, XI:
303-309. See also Maylam, South Africa 's Racial Past, 74; and Keegan, Colonial South
Africa, 43-44, 47.
109
against the Xhosa during the War of 181 1-12, implemented "a system ofretaliation"
against Africans who violated the Cape's boundaries.
[Because
|
(hey will never cease to avail themselves of every Opportunityto comm.t murders and depredations, I think the most effectual measure
which could be dev.scd to check them, would be to pursue parties of
plundering Kaffirs to the kraal (hey belong to, and ifpossiblc, burn then-
huts and destroy every man Kaffir it contains. Two or three such examples
would m my opinion entirely put a stop to their incursions. Lenity and
mild measures with these bloodthirsty savages have by long experience
been found to produce effects exactly contrary to those desired I lowever
repugnant to humanity a superficial consideration of rigorous measures
may at first appear, my recommendation of their adoption arises f rom
considerable experience and much reflection."23
On numerous occasions this policy led colonial commandoes to strike indiscriminately
against Xhosa communities across the Fish River in retaliation for border crossings and
cattle thefts.
Governor Somerset eventually concluded that these small scale military missions
were insufficient. He argued that the Xhosa would remain a threat to the colony as long
as they maintained their independence. Thus Somerset underscored the importance of
violence, warfare, and continuing efforts "to overawe the restlessness of our hostile and
wily neighbours" and to exert pressures on the Xhosa 24
Violence was not the only means available to the colonial state in its efforts to
create a system of colonial racial order in the region. Government officials also pursued
strategies of limited accommodation with some Xhosa factions. At a meeting early in
1817 between Governor Somerset and the Ngqika Xhosa faction, British officials named
the Ngqika leader paramount chief of all the Xhosa, a title actually reserved for the
23 Quoted in Maclennan, A Proper Degree of Terror, 147-148
Quoted in Lester, Imperial Networks, 20.
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Gcaleka's leader Hintsa, who lived further to the east beyond the Great Kei River. In
return for their support, British officials pressed Ngqika to stop the Xhosa from stealing
livestock, telling him that he was to be held responsible for any future cattle thefts and
border violations. Ngqika gave Cape administrators his assurance that he was willing to
punish cattle thieves among his people but pointed out that he had "no control over other"
factions of the western Xhosa. British administrators saw this as a short-term problem
because they believed that, with their support, Ngqika would increase his power among
groups like the Ndlambe and Gqunukhwebe which had been recently removed from the
Zuurveld, and would thus be able to control them. The British seemed especially
concerned about Ngqika's uncle Ndlambe whose followers colonial authorities blamed
for many of the cattle thefts within the colony. 25
The strategy failed. As discussed in more detail in chapter 5, British efforts to
bolster Ngqika's position had the opposite effect. A growing number of western Xhosa
increasingly saw Nqgika as a pawn of the British, which raised Ndlambe's popularity and
increased his support. Indiscriminate raids by colonial commandoes also contributed to
the growing anti-colonial feeling among many Xhosa. The rivalry between the Ngqika
and Ndlambe factions reached its highpoint at the Battle of Amalinde in October of 1818,
in which Ngqika was decisively defeated.
Colonial administrators demanded swift intervention on behalf of Ngqika, which
led the colony to meddle even further with internal Xhosa affairs. By December 1818, a
25
Lord Charles Somerset to Earl Bathurst, April, 24, 1817, in RCC, XI: quote 313, see
also 303-329; Major Rogers to Lt. Col. Brereton, Sept. 4, 1818, in ibid., XII: 38-45;
Secretary Bird to Rev. John Brownlee, Dec. 30, 1818, in ibid., XII: 1 18-124. Thomas
Pringle, Narrative ofa Residence in South Africa, A.M.L. Robinson, ed., (Cape Town: C
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commando unit nnder the leadership of Lientenant Colonel Brereton staged a large scale
attack against Ndlambe and his followers and captured 23,000 cattle - 9,000 of which
given to Ngqika. Brereton's attack on the Ndlambe and their allies escalated the
were
crisis
In retaliation for this attack, Xhosa parties raided the colony, attacking soldiers,
colonists, their slaves, servants, and raiding cattle.26 On April 22, 1819, a western Xhosa
army staged a full fledge daylight attack on Graham's Town. The attackers suffered
heavy casualties induced by the town's artillery and the superior firepower of Khoisan
and British soldiers as well as the colonists. In the end, the Xhosa forces had to retreat.
Cape officials were outraged by what they saw as a challenge and demanded a
retaliatory campaign. In an effort to push the Xhosa beyond the Keiskamma River, their
villages and fields were attacked and destroyed and Xhosas were shot.27 In the aftermath
of the war, colonial authorities moved to annex the territory between the Fish and the
Keiskamma River. However, officials not only ordered the dispossession of their enemies
but also their supposed Xhosa allies - the Ngqika. Thomas Pringle, a British writer with
strong humanitarian sympathies who had settled in the Cape for some time in the 1820s,
wrote:
The war was finished by an act quite in character with the mode in which
it had been conducted. It was commenced upon the pretext of supporting
our ally Gaika [Ngqika]: it ended in a convention by which that chief was
Major Rogers to Lt. Col. Brereton, Nov. 1, 1818, in RCC, XII: 52-55; Major Fraser to
the Landrost of Uitenhage, Feb. 4, 1819, in ibid., XII: 134-136; Major Rogers to Lt. Col.
Brereton, Feb. 12, 1819, in ibid., XII: 138-139.
27
See Somerset to Bathurst, May 22, 1819, in RCC, XII: 193-202; Somerset to Bathurst,
Sept. 24, 1819, in ibid., XII: 319-322.
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The land between the F,sh and Keiskamma became the so-ealled "Ceded Territory
-
Even though this land was intended to serve as a non-settled "neutral zone" between the
Xhosa and the Cape, it soon attracted colonists.28
The War of 1818-19 did little to alleviate the tensions between the colony and the
Xhosa. A mutual mistrust persisted throughout the 1820s and in the first half of the
1 830s. In March 1 822, for example, Cape forces staged a surprise attack against Ngqika,
whom officials accused of having warned Ndlambe about a raid planned by colonial
forces to retrieve cattle. Throughout this period, colonial commandoes continued to raid
Xhosa villages, ostensibly to capture and reclaim livestock and horses. As we will discuss
in some more detail in chapter 5, some Xhosa resisted these efforts. Others, however,
aided troops in recovering cattle and horses from neighboring groups. Furthermore,
during these years, Xhosa continued to enter the colony. Here they were sometimes
arrested or shot. In return, African livestock raiders committed violence and murders
against colonists.29
Government Frontier Policy and its Critics
Even at the time, the border policy was criticized both by administrators in the
colony and in the Colonial Office in London. Some officials who were sympathetic to
Quote Pringle, Narrative, 288.
29
See for example Justus, The Wrongs ofthe Caffre Nation (London: James Duncan,
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humanitarian views, took a critical stance toward the commando units, used to enforce
order on the frontier. Charles Lennox Stretch, for example, a mid-level administrator who
played an active and often controversial role in Cape affairs in the nineteenth century,
called it a policy of "unremitting plunder" which achieved little else than "provoking and
injuring" the Xhosa. Stretch maintained that the white
inhabitants who had advanced into the ceded territory had only to
complain to the military station of the loss of cattle, and immediately
without examination the patrols were set in motion and brought back to
the complaining farmers anything they wanted; if they could not find the
cattle, which m many instances had never been stolen, they brought other
beasts instead and frequently at the rate of two or three Caffre oxen for
one of the colonists on the plea that the colonial cattle were ofmuch
greater value than those belonging to the Caffres.
Stretch believed that "some persons in the colony" deliberately called in commandos "to
provoke" the Xhosa to war.30 Several administrators in London shared Stretch's
interpretation, arguing that commando raids led to unnecessary killings. They argued that
Dutch and English farmers used the commandoes "as a means of gratifying the[ir]
cupidity and vengeance."31
Other colonists and Cape officials, however, dismissed such contentions as
untrue. Sir Lowry Cole, who sympathized with the colonists and was Governor of the
Cape Colony in the late 1820s and early 1830s, wrote to London that
[i]t may suit the views of some writers to hold up the local government
and the colonists to the detestation of mankind, as the authors and abettors
of a system of most diabolical atrocities, and to represent the native tribes
as the most injured and innocent of human beings; but those who have had
30
C.L.R. Stretch, The Journal ofCharles Lennox Stretch, Basil leCordeur, ed., (London:
Longman, 1988), 17-20.
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interaction
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Like many of his predecessors, Cole favored a military approach to the Cape's :
with the Xhosa. He, along with other administrators and numerous white settlers, alleged
that the Xhosa "character" had an inherent "disposition to plunder." Critics who saw this
as the root of the "depredations.
.
.
committed by" the Xhosa, claimed that stolen cattle
numbered in the thousands, and demanded harsher punishment as the Graham 's Town
Journal wrote "for the infliction of injuries."33
Yet in the early 1830s, as some historians have pointed out, the views of the
Xhosa held by the supporters of settler interests were not as harsh and monolithic as they
became with the War of 1834-35. That conflict was an experience that altered English
settler attitudes in the Eastern Cape. 34 Before the war, the Graham 's Town Journal, the
mouthpiece of English settler interests in the region, utilized rhetoric not unlike that of
humanitarians. The paper wrote, for example, that "[w]e do not view the Caffres as a
'perpetual enemy' but rather as a people with whom it is greatly in our interest to
maintain friendly relations."35 Over the years, the "frontier trade" with Africans in ivory,
hides, leather skin, and ostrich feathers had become a lucrative business venture for the
English settler elite in Graham's Town. The Graham 's Town Journal endorsed a "mild
Cole to Stanley, Nov. 15, 1833, in BPP 252/1835, 63.
33
Cole to George Murray, June 14, 1829, BPP 252/1835, 42-43; Cole to Murray, Jan. 2,
1830, ibid., 52-54; Graham 's Town Journal, Feb. 7, 1833.
34
Crais, White Supremacy, 125-141; Bank, "Liberals and their Enemies, chapter 4;
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35 Graham fs Town Journal, June 27, 1833.
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saw
and humane policy" toward the Xhosa "to secure tranquility in the Colony, and the
extension of our inland trade." But again the business concerns of English settlers in
Graham's Town shaped their position. The newspaper asserted that special attention must
be given to the about 100,000 Xhosa "at our doors.
. . who will require to be clothed and
supplied." Thus Graham's Town merchants, in the years prior to the War of 1834-35
the so-called humanitarian policy as a good opportunity to make a profit.36
Humanitarians on the other hand believed that the main task of the British empire
was to pursue a lofty policy of "civilisation" toward indigenous people who came under
the influence of its rule. The editor of the South African Commercial Advertiser, John
Fairbairn, for example, supposed that the colonies were "portions of the great family of
free men." But as "offshoots and dependencies of a free and enlightened Empire," he
wrote, "we become the depositories of those Principles of Justice and Humanity which
elevate the human race to their proper rank in the Scale of Being, and the channels by
which the blessings of Civilisations may be conveyed to the most distant and barbarous
37
corners of the earth." Humanitarians argued that Christian and moral commitments
required the citizens of the British empire to bring "civilsation" and "progress" to
indigenous peoples within and beyond its borders. This mindset led to an increase in
missionary activities among the Xhosa starting in the 1820s. Like American officials in
the United States who advocated a civilization policy, humanitarians in the Cape believed
that education was the key to turning a "rude barbarian" into a "polished citizen . . . and.
.
Graham 's Town Journal, Jan, 17, April 17, June 27, Sept. 5, Oct. 24, Dec. 5, 1833.
South African Commercial Advertiser, July 21, 1832.
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.man of commercial enterprise."38 To teach European ways of agriculture to Africans
was a key component in this process. Humanitarians believed that the introduction of
plow farming, which challenged the gender dynamics of many African societies where
women farmed, and the building of "houses" would bind Africans to the land and would
convince them to "accumulate property." Such developments would also increase African
"dependency on the colony, and multiply the bonds of union and the number of securities
of the preservation of peace." Thus, and as discussed in more detail in chapter 5, the
humanitarian agenda was at odds with the desire by many Africans to retain their social,
economic, and political autonomy.39
Humanitarians in the 1820s and 1830s were critical of the Cape's policy of
territorial expansion, and the treatment of independent African nations like the Xhosa.
They held negative views ofmany of the settlers, especially the Dutch speaking colonists
- reflecting the general negative attitudes that many British held toward the Boers - who,
according to the missionary Stephen Kay, had a tendency to look at Africans "as a
superior species of animals, but not men!" Kay and other humanitarians also condemned
encroachments by white settlers on Xhosa lands, and believed that the "unrighteous
conduct" of colonists proved a "serious and destructive" threat to the Xhosa.40
Furthermore, supporters of humanitarianism condemned the Cape's frontier policy and
the actions of colonial commandos. Humanitarians argued that the British frontier policy
reduced Xhosa landholding, and that military patrols often struck against the Xhosa
Philip, Researches, 2: 316.
39
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indiscriminately, leading to desolation, unnecessary deaths, and retaliation. 41 To ease the
tense situation on the eastern frontier and to create a colonial racial order there,
humanitarians advocated the sending of missionaries and the "civilising" of the Xhosa.
Thus, like Jeffersonians and many of the missionaries in the Upper Ohio Valley, the
humanitarian agenda in the Eastern Cape embraced empire as an ideal. Humanitarians
believed, though, that their strategies would do "more towards effectually conquering the
'savage beast' and establishing permanent peace, than all the sanguinary terrors of war
could possibly" achieve.42
The establishment of the Kat River settlement in 1829 provides a glimpse at the
differing views of empire and frontier policy among contending interest groups in the
Cape colony. The lands near the Kat and Keiskamma River juncture had been part of the
controversial "Ceded Territory," which colonial authorities claimed had been surrendered
by Ngqika in 1819. This was an area inhabited by a Ngqika faction under the leadership
of Maqoma. Maqoma was an older brother of the young Nqgika paramount chief Sandile,
the Right Hand son of Ngqika who, according to Xhosa laws of succession discussed in
chapter I, had inherited this office after his father's death in December 1829. Maqoma,
however, ruled the Ngqika Xhosa until Sandile reached manhood. Under the proposal of
Andries Stockenstrom, a Dutch speaking Cape official, the colonial state took the
territory from the Xhosa and turned it into a Khoisan settlement. Cape administrators
believed that the Kat River settlement would serve as a military buffer zone between
41 Quote see South African Commercial Advertizer, Nov. 9, 1833. See also South African
Commercial Advertizer, Dec. 8, 1832; Dec. 7, 1833, Feb. 22, 1834.
42
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1832.
118
colonists and Xhosa. Maqoma's removal, however, led to strong disapproval among
numerous humanitarians, who saw this territorial annexation as another act of illegal land
acquisition from the Xhosa by the Cape colony. To assuage criticism, Cape officials
argued that the Kat River settlement would provide homes and opportunities to many
landless Khoikhoi. Furthermore, they maintained that Maqoma had lost the right to
occupy the Kat River basin due to his provocative behavior, including an alleged attack
against a neighboring African community.43
Despite their initial criticism, humanitarians quickly came to idealize the Kat
River settlement. During the 1830s and 1840s, they came to imagine the community as a
successful experiment in creating a "most peaceable and loyal subject" among Africans.
Humanitarians described the settlement as an exemplar of the benefits that colonialism
and free markets could bring to African societies. They praised the building of irrigation
systems and schools as well as farming and timber businesses as major steps toward
"civilization."
Contested Grounds (Part ID: Frontier Policy. 1835-1853
The ideological struggle among white interest groups over the shape of the
colonial racial order of the Eastern Cape became increasingly intense after the War of
1834-35. In the aftermath of this conflict, the debate between humanitarian and pro-
settlement ideologues went into full swing. Still, though their political pressures certainly
influenced colonial policy by appealing to sympathetic British colonial officials, the state
See for example Andries Stockenstrom, The Autobiography ofthe Late Sir Andries
Stokenstrom, ed. C.W. Hutton (Cape Town: C. Struick, 1964), 1: 347.
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continued in many ways to pursue its own agenda in regards to creating a system of
colonial racial order in the region.
Humanitarians and Pro-Expansionist Ideologues - the War of 1834-35 and Its
Aftermath
Xhosa-white relations in the Eastern Cape deteriorated after the Kat River
dispossession. Continuing commando raids only made things worse. The situation
escalated when colonial forces shot at Xhoxho - one ofNgqika's sons - lightly injuring
the chief. Predominantly Ngqika and Ndlambe forces attacked the colony in December
in retaliation - a strike that in conventional histories began the War of 1834-35. The
Xhosa struck against white settlements, destroyed white properties, and seized livestock.
The Cape government retaliated. By May 1835, colonial forces had taken the
offensive in western Xhosa territory and were destroying huts, capturing livestock and
horses, and shooting at Xhosa fighters and non-combatants including women and
children. "These cruel and merciless savages," wrote Col. Harry Smith, the officer in
charge of the campaign against the Xhosa, to Governor D'Urban, without a hint of irony
"will now be taught [that] their treachery, murders, and devastations will be punished by
the most rigorous and relentless hand."
44
British forces also turned against the territory of the Gcaleka Xhosa who lived
east of the Kei River. Cape officials accused them of aiding the anti-colonial resistance of
the Ngqika and Ndlambe, an alliance that authorities seemed to have exaggerated. Yet,
44 Smith to D'Urban, Feb. 16, 1835, in G. M. Theal, ed. Documents Relating to the Kaffir
War of1835 (London: Government of the Union of South Africa, 1912), 68-70.
See also
Smith to D'Urban, June 7, 1835, in ibid., 205-207.
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the mission provided an opportunity for colonial forces to strike against the most
powerful of the Xhosa factions. Military officials invited the Gcaleka leader, Hintsa, to
come to negotiate the return of tens of thousands of colonial cattle allegedly harbored by
the eastern Xhosa. Although guaranteeing his safety, military authorities detained him for
several days in hopes of exchanging Hintsa for the cattle demanded by the Cape. When
Hintsa attempted to escape, he was killed and mutilated by members of the colonial
forces.
45
By September 1835, the all-out campaign conducted by colonial forces had
pressured the western Xhosa to agree to peace. D'Urban estimated the number of Xhosa
deaths at 4,000, compared to less than 100 English losses. The Xhosa had been
"chastised," the governor believed "not extremely, but perhaps sufficiently."46
As mentioned earlier, and as several historians point out, the War of 1834-35
widened the ideological rift between pro-expansionists and humanitarians in the colony.
In an increasingly heated debate, English settler ideologues, like Godlonton, accused
humanitarians of being complicit in the violence committed by "bloodthirsty savages."
Now, the Graham 's Town Journal argued against the "civilisation policy" that it had
supported earlier. The newspaper maintained that the Xhosa attacks demonstrated the
futility of the "policy which has been of late adopted towards the Native Tribes." Instead,
the English settlers now saw the Xhosa as "incorrigible plunderers" who have committed
"a catalogue of crimes and offences" against the colony. The Xhosa were now viewed as
45
Harry Smith, The Autobiography ofLieutenant-General Sir Harry Smith (New York:
E. P. Dutton & Company, 1902), 2: 32-49; Stretch, Journal, 95-96.
46
D'Urban to Glenelg, Nov. 7, 1835, BPP 279/1836, 89.
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possessing "a combination of vices perhaps scarcely surpassed by any nation or people
under heaven." "It is with feelings of deepest regret I am compelled - wrote Godlonton,
"to pronounce them treacherous, merciless savages."47 Furthermore, the Graham >s Town
Journal attacked the South African Commercial Advertiser and humanitarian writers "for
defending" their "darling Kafirs." At a time of increasing ideological tensions, Godlonton
also wrote a book called The Irruption ofthe Kaffir Hordes to counter what he described
as the false narratives of humanitarian writers.48
The colony's success during the War of 1834-35 led to expectations for the
accumulation ofnew territory among English settlers. Just as American soldiers made
note of rich lands in the Ohio Valley and in western New York state during the American
Revolution, military campaigns into Xhosaland had acquainted settlers in the Eastern
Cape with lands that would make superb sheep farms. The region between the
Keiskamma and the Kei river, wrote one settler, was "far too good for such a race of
runaways as the Kaffirs."49 By the 1820s and especially the 1830s, wool production from
newly introduced Merino sheep had begun to increase in the Cape. In the following
decades, and until the mineral revolution in the last third of the nineteenth century, wool
production would become the pillar on which settler capitalism in South Africa was built.
47 Graham 's Town Journal, Dec. 25, 1834, July 3, 1835. On the changing attitudes
among English settlers in reaction to the war see Crais, White Supremacy and Black
Resistance, 125-141; and Bank, "Liberals and their Enemies," chapter 4; Lester, Imperial
Networks, 54-63.
48 Graham 's Town Journal, June 19, July 3, 1835. See also Robert Godlonton, A
Narrative ofthe Irruption ofthe Kaffir Hordes into the Eastern Province ofthe Cape of
Good Hope, 1834-1835 (Cape Town: C. Struick, 1965); and John Chase, The Cape of
Good Hope and the Eastern Province ofAlgoa Bay (Cape Town: C.Struik, 1967), 84-86.
49 Quoted in Mostert, Frontiers, 701.
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Furthermore, this gradual shift to wool production required not only new pasture lands
but also herders to tend the stock, and laborers to wash and shear wool, as well as to
grade and pack it for sale - work largely performed by Africans.50
Governor Benjamin D'Urban (1834-1838) proved to be a strong ally to white
settler interests in the colony. In a controversial speech, he proclaimed the Xhosa
"irreclaimable savages" with an "inherent propensity to rob and pillage," and blamed
them for causing the war. 51 Following the successful military campaign that pushed the
Xhosa beyond the Kei, he annexed an area of about 7,000 square miles between the
Keiskamma and the Kei river, naming it Queen Adelaide Province. D'Urban earmarked
the territory mostly for sale to members of the English settler elite in Graham's Town,
who had made significant profits during the war by trading supplies to the military, and
who wanted these lands to expand their wool production businesses.
D'Urban's Queen Adelaide project was not only an effort by the Cape
government to gain new territory on the eastern frontier, but also an attempt to impose its
control over the various western and still independent Xhosa factions. Colonel Smith,
whom D'Urban appointed as the head of the Queen Adelaide province in the aftermath of
the war, planned to actively undermine Xhosa independence by putting them under the
authority of magistrates and missionaries. Smith, who insisted on being called "Inkosi
Inkulu" (Great Chief) by the Xhosa, believed that the Xhosa wished to "come out of the
bush" to become "real Englishmen." Smith eagerly "entered upon the task of what he
50
For articles that impress the importance and potential benefits of wool production see
for example Graham 's Town Journal, March 28, April 4, May 2, 1833.
51 Graham's Town Journal, Sept. 17, 1835
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described as "rescuing [the Xhosa] from barbarism" in an effort to bring them under
British rule. In various meetings with Xhosa leaders, he advocated a view similar to that
of many humanitarians, arguing that the Xhosa could become "civilised" by adopting
Christianity, European dress, and "habits of industry."52
Smith believed that this transformation could only happen if the Xhosa would
give up what he called "witchcraft" and the "eating up" system, forms of social control
internal to Xhosa society. Smith saw both as potential sources of resistance to white
colonization, as means used by the Xhosa elite to pressure commoners into subordination,
and as undermining English efforts "in introducing a new order of things." To English
observers much of the Xhosa's traditional religion and cosmology was based on
"witchcraft." Smith believed that "diviners," "witch doctors and rain makers" were strong
allies of the chiefs, and like "Inquisitors" persecuted any "poor wretch" they saw as a
threat. He also strongly opposed the practice of "eating up." Through this system, chiefs
could levy judicial fines and tributes in form of cattle, thus "eating up" the livestock of
their subordinates. This practice was an important in maintaining a leader's power and
patronage, and administrators like Smith and D'Urban wanted it ended in order to realize
their goal of undermining the authority of the chiefs.53
Unlike pro-settlement activists who believed that the Xhosa's inherent desire for
violence was the cause of the War of 1834-35, humanitarians blamed the conflict on
government policy toward the Xhosa. The South African Commercial Advertiser, for
52
See for example Col. Smith's meeting with Xhosa, Sept. 17, 1835, BPP 503/1837, 250
253; Smith, Autobiography, 2: 72-73.
53
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example, severely eritieized Durban's "irreclaimable savage" speech, the territorial
annexation of Queen Adelaide Province, and the removal of the Xhosa from much of the
territory between the Fish and the Keiskamma River m the aftermath of the War of 1818-
19. "[I]n the course of sixteen years," the newspaper wrote, the Xhosa "have been
deprived by the British Government of eleven thousand square miles of Territory, and the
whole nation is now compressed into a corner of their ancient possessions - where there
is not the means of subsistence for one half of their number."54 The South African
Commercial Advertiser also maintained that "[t]he terms 'savages' and 'barbarians' as at
present used amongst us, explain nothing, and, in fact, signify nothing. Our neighbours
are men; and unless they are treated as men, they will harass and torment us as injured or
neglected men do."55
Opponents of D'Urban's plan to annex the Queen Adelaide territory lobbied hard
in London for a reversal of the Cape colony's frontier policies. During hearings of the
Select Committee on Aborigines in 1835 and 1836, humanitarians raised concerns about
the colony's policies toward Africans and condemned their treatment by white settlers.
Like several other critics, Andries Stockenstrom, the commissioner general in the eastern
district from 1828 to 1833, who testified in London, strongly denounced the commando
raids by colonial forces and demanded that the Xhosa should be treated as independent
nations through a treaty system. 56 Stockenstrom not only argued for the abandonment of
South African Commercial Advertiser, May 30, 1835.
55
South African Commercial Advertiser, Oct. 7, 1835.
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the Queen Adelaide Provinee but also suggested that the Xhosa should be allowed to
reoccupy the lands between the Keiskamma and the Fish River. There they should "be
domesticated" through a "civilisation program" supported by the "cordial co-operation"
of missionaries and the government.57
Lord Glenelg, the secretary of state in London in the mid- 1 830s, who was lobbied
by British parliamentary evangelicals with humanitarians leanings on the Queen Adelaide
issue, seemed partial to this strategy. Like D'Urban's opponents in the Cape, Glenelg
blamed the War of 1834-35, on decades of ill-guided policy toward the Xhosa, through
which the colony had unjustly dispossessed the Africans of their land. He also
complained about the harsh conduct of colonial troops during the war which, Glenelg
argued, led to "the loss" of the Xhosa's "food, the spoiling of their cattle, the burning of
their dwellings, the expulsion of their wives and families from their homes, [and] the
confiscation of their property." The secretary of state believed Xhosa resistance during
the war to be justified, as the colony's conduct had violated "the great principles of
morality." Accordingly, the Colonial Office in London overturned D'Urban's Queen
Adelaide proposal. It also moved the colony's border back to the Great Fish River and
permitted the Xhosa to reoccupy parts of their former territories. Furthermore, Glenelg
followed Stockenstrom's suggestion of introducing a treaty system and advocated
revitalizing the earlier strategy of using Xhosa chiefs to undermine cattle raiding. Not
See for example Stockenstrom, Autobiography, 1: 298, 366-366; Testimony of
Stockenstrom, Aug. 14, 1835, BPP 538/1836, 43-45; Testimony of Stockenstrom, Aug.
19, 1835, ibid., 83-90; Testimony John Philip, June 15, 1835, ibid., 554-558.
57
Stockenstrom, Autobiography, 1 : 246.
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surprisingly, the secretary of state appointed Stockenstrom as Lieutenant Governor of the
Cape and put him in charge of the treaty policy. 58
Despite these seemingly progressive accomplishments, as Timothy Keegan
emphasizes, the mid- 1830s policies and humanitarian rhetoric from members of the
Colonial Office in London should be approached critically. It is important to underscore
that British government administrators like Glenelg were as much preoccupied with
considerations of the costs and benefits of an expansive frontier policy, as they were with
"humanitarian impulses." They especially feared that a costly overextension could be
detrimental to the future of the British empire. 59
In the Cape, however, Glenelg's decision angered pro-expansionists, who
opposed the treaty policy and who increasingly favored the subjugation of the Xhosa and
the annexation of their territories. Even though white settlers living between the Fish and
the Keiskamma rivers, and those who had moved to Queen Adelaide Province, were
allowed to retain their lands, advocates of settler interests argued that humanitarians had
"gained their object in persuading our countrymen.
. . that we are monsters." Numerous
English colonists in the Eastern Cape felt betrayed and abandoned by the metropolitan
state. "England," wrote one white settler "instead of protecting us, accuses us, who were
born and bred in her bosom, and have the like feelings as the rest of her sons, of cruelty
and oppression."60 The Graham 's Town Journal exclaimed that those who favored
Stockenstrom' s treaty policy, had "too often overlooked the most insidious and
58
Lord Glenelg to D'Urban, Dec. 26 1835, BPP 279/1836, 59-72.
59
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60 Quotes John Bowker, Speeches, Letters and Selections From Important Papers (Cape
Town: C. Struick, 1962), 2, 7. See also Graham 's Town Journal, Aug. 4, Sept. 29, 1836.
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dangerous designs upon our essential interests." The newspaper painted a picture of a
white community under threat, abandoned by the metropolitan government in London.
"Philanthrophy.
.
.
may be a mere matter of speculation in Europe," stated the Graham 's
Town Journal, "but to those who live on the verge of civilisation, and in immediate
proximity to savage and barbarous communities - the subject of this sympathy is a term
of significant import, and embraces topics which to them are of the highest moment.
. . It
may be fun to you but it is death to us."61
In the years that followed the war, pro-expansionists in the Eastern Cape
aggressively attacked humanitarians and their policies, a challenge that was accompanied
by a harshening racial discourse. 62 The Graham 's Town Journal, for example, decried the
"civilisation" and "treaty policy" envisioned by humanitarians, arguing that "[w]e have
not changed the Kafirs' nature yet, and I doubt ifwe ever will change them."63 The
political activism of pro-settlement ideologues went however beyond aggressive rhetoric.
For instance, colonists and pro-expansionist administrators repeatedly defied and
undermined Stockenstrom's authority, and brought about his dismissal in 1838.
Furthermore, in 1844, in Graham's Town and Beaufort, white settlers burned the effigy
of the humanitarian activist and London Missionary Society director John Philip in
protest over the treaty system.
64
In 1846, after trying for some time to get political office,
01 Graham 's Town Journal, May 7, 1837, June 6, 1839.
62 Graham 's Town Journal, Apr. 21, 1836. See also the "famous springbok speech" in
Bowker, Speeches, 125; Crais, White Supremacy and Black Resistance, 125-141; and
Bank, "Liberals and their Enemies," chapter 4; Lester, Imperial Networks, 54-63.
63 Graham 's Town Journal, Nov. 13, 1836, May 22, 1837.
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several hard-line pro-settlement activists like Robert Godlonton, J.C. Chase, and T.H.
Bowker gained several key positions in the colonial administration. 65
Pro-expansionists especially attacked the treaty system which, they argued,
proved unable to protect colonists against the Xhosa. The latter according to one English
colonist, were "thieves from the principal chief to the meanest of the nation."66 The
Graham 's Town Journal reported cattle raids by "Kafir Banditti" on "poor exposed
farmers" almost on a weekly basis.67 The newspaper even blamed the Great Trek, a
migratory movement of some of the Dutch-speaking colonists out of the Cape into the
southern African interior, on the failure of the colonial state and the British empire to
actively defend the interests of its settlers on the frontier.68 By focusing so much attention
on the issue of "Kaffir depredations," pro-settlement ideologues lobbied hard to change
public opinion and to increase their political support. Even though officials like
Stockenstrom and his successor John Hare, as well as D'Urban's successor, Governor
George Napier, who arrived in the Cape in 1838, accurately dismissed the colonists'
claims of Xhosa aggression as overblown, settler political lobbying had some success.69
James Read Sen. to James Kitchingman, Sept. 30, 1844, in Kitchingman Papers, 252.
65 Tony Kirk, "The Cape Economy and the Kat River Settlement, 1846-53," in Economy
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66 Graham 's Town Journal, May 2, 1839. See also George Nicholson
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67 Graham 's Town Journal, Dec. 15, 1836. See also Graham 's Town Journal, Sept. 29,
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In the early 1840s, for instance, and as discussed in more detail in chapter 5, colonial
officials pressured the Xhosa to accept treaty changes that would provide colonists and
military forces with the authority to search for stolen cattle in Xhosa territory and forced
Xhosa leaders to cooperate even further in the prosecution of livestock theft. 70
Still it is important to underscore that the colonial state continued to follow its
own policy agenda. Governor Napier, for example, resisted English settler pressures for a
consolidated military strike against the Xhosa. He saw such retaliation for cattle thieving
as foolish and too costly, and prided himself on his non-confrontational approach, which
had kept the colony at peace for his six years in office. 71
The Graham 's Town Journal, on the other hand, remained critical of the
government. The newspaper was unimpressed by the changes in the treaty system, which
it argued did not address the main problem. "[T] he only effectual remedy for the existing
evils," wrote the paper, was to include the Xhosa "within the circle of the British
* 72dominions." To pro-expansionist settlers this meant the military and economic
subjugation of Africans. Furthermore, the Graham 's Town Journal blamed violence and
theft not only on the Xhosa, but also on "those who in legislating for this colony have
thrown up the reins to untamed barbarians."73
Proclammation by Governor George Napier, Dec. 7, 1840, BPP 424/1851, 70-72;
Napier to Lord John Russel, July 10, 1841, BPP 424/1851, 87-88; Treaty Negotiations,
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•Several English settlers in the Eastern Cape urged that colonization needed the
strong support of an imperial government. Borrowing from the rhetoric of humanitarians,
they advocated that the Cape should be considered the staging ground for introducing
"universal benevolence" to the areas of "degrading barbarism" in Africa. 74 But the
benefits of empire and "civilisation" could only be brought to Africans through their
military defeat. 'The conquest must be ultimately complete," wrote the Graham 's Town
Journal, "the dominant power of the stronger party must be felt while the broken
fragments of the weake [sic] will be scattered to the winds, or be moulded as to assume
the form, and become homogenous, with the power by which they have been subdued."75
A shift toward racial conservatism occurred not only among English settlers in the
Eastern Cape, but as historian Andrew Bank observes, colonial racial discourse changed
throughout much of the Cape and the British empire in the 1840s and 1850s. The
emergence of what Bank calls a "conservative consensus" in Great Britain, the Cape, and
all over the British Empire was spurred by increasing indigenous resistance to
colonization. Changing Victorian attitudes toward indigenous peoples were in part also
shaped by the gradual rise of scientific racism, and an increasing erosion of faith in the
humanitarian "civilising mission."76
' Graham 's Town Journal, March 10, 1843, Jan. 25, 1844.
75 Graham 's Town Journal, Feb. 14, 1846. See also J.M. Bowker to Lord Redeshale,
August, 1846, in Speeches and Letters, 237; and Bowker to C
— ,
Aug. 19, 1846, in ibid.,
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For an extended discussion of these issues see Andrew Bank, "Losing Faith in the
Civilizing Mission: The Premature Decline of Humanitarian Liberalism at the Cape,
1 840-60," in Martin Daunton and Rick Halpern, eds. Empire and Others: British
Encounters with Indigenous Peoples, 1600-1850 (Philadelphia: University of
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This change in racial attitudes certainly influenced the views of the
representatives of the colonial and metropolitan state, and led to a gradual alteration of
the Cape's frontier policy. The Graham 's Town Journal welcomed the hardening of
metropolitan attitudes:
It cannot be otherwise than satisfactory to find that sound sentiments with
regard to Colonies and Colonization in general, are rapidly becoming
more and more prevalent among our leading public men in the Parent
Country. It is seen that the British Empire is made up of Colonies- that
England is merely the metropolis of the Realm - a Realm so various as to
embrace every clime; so extensive as that the sun never ceases to shine
upon some part or the other of its wide circumference."77
In the Cape Colony as well, a growing number of officials began to openly assert racially
conservative views. A Civil Commissioner in the Eastern Cape, for example, maintained
that Africans "would soon part" with their land and would make "place to a more
productive race, who would convert the wilderness into a field of superabundance."
Clifton Crais describes how colonial administrators and the state aided in the
establishment of the rural capitalist economy in the Eastern Cape. This transformation
was based on the creation of a white landowning class that employed black laborers. The
state aided white landowners in their desires to obtain labor by taxing Africans for their
lands, by requiring African fields to be fenced, and by violently expelling African
"squatters" living in independent African settlements. Along with the aforementioned
Masters and Servants Ordinance, which tightened employers' control over their non-
Pennsylvania Press, 1999), 364-383; and Bank, "Liberals and their Enemies," conclusion
See also Lester, Imperial Networks, chapter 6.
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white workers, the Cape government also contemplated the passage of a "Squatters
Ordinance" to help farmers more actively with their "labor shortage" problem.78
By the 1840s, influenced or intimidated by the conservative surge, several
humanitarians also steered increasingly clear of, or even actively supported, contentious
political issues like the wars with the Xhosa and the Masters and Servants Ordinance of
1 84 1
.
The editor of the South African Commercial Advertiser, John Fairbairn, for
instance, now focused his attention on issues like the security of colonists. A
humanitarian stance and pro-expansionist attacks, the editor feared, could threaten the
future of his newspaper. Fairbairn also came to embrace white unity between English and
Dutch speaking white settlers who, in his words, "do not stand apart, like the European
and African." Timothy Keegan reminds us that "the general stampede in favor of
aggressive and expansionist policies towards the Xhosa" among humanitarians in the
Cape colony should not come as too much of a surprise. "After all," the eventual
"acculturation and incorporation of the native peoples as a dependent class, was always
the humanitarian vision, and if that could not be achieved by moral suasion, then
conquest and dismemberment of African societies might be presented as a logical
alternative to the same end."
80
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Within the ranks of the LMS, the racial views of missionaries became also more
conservative by the 1840s and 1850s. Many LMS missionaries had developed what
James Read called "a little taint of colonial feeling." They became even more supportive
of the political, economic, and cultural mission of empire than the previous generation of
LMS missionaries. 81 Racial stereotypes among missionaries also undermined the more
effective use of non-white missionaries. James Read for example observed that he was
working with "a number of youths.
.
. who know more than I knew when I was received
[as a] full missionary.
.
.
but because of their skin they must be kept upon the
background."82
The mid- 1840s signaled a dramatic shift in the Cape's policy toward the Xhosa.
As discussed in more detail in chapter 5, Peregrine Maitland, who replaced Napier as
governor in 1 844, further undermined the treaty system and reintroduced the commando
system. Maitland complained that the "daring outrage, attended with murder" committed
by the Xhosa on the colonists were violations of the treaties and a defiant act toward
colonial government. The new governor believed that the treaties were an ineffective tool
to end the "depredations" committed by the Xhosa. It had become "imperative," argued
Maitland who increasingly favored the interests of the settler elite, to take active
measures to punish the offenders," and "to overawe" the Xhosa "into submission."83
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The Emerging Colonial Racial Order and the State: The War of 1846-47 and the
War of 1850-53
The pressures exerted by the officials of the colonial state on the Xhosa led to
renewed conflict between 1846 and 1847. Governor Maitland used the liberation of a
Xhosa prisoner accused of stealing an axe, an incident discussed in more detail in chapter
5, as a justification to order an attack against the Xhosa. Yet, the hopes of British officials
for a quick success remained unfulfilled. The War of 1846-47, like previous wars, was
shaped by cattle seizing and the destruction of crops. The conflict remained inconclusive
for a long time, as Xhosa resistance centered in the hard-to-penetrate Amatola Mountains
and the densely bushed river valleys. Yet, eventually, the Xhosa had to surrender and
comply with Cape officials' demand. 84
The War of 1846-47 was followed by a de facto reintroduction of the D'Urban
system, which the former Governor had tried to impose during his failed Queen Adelaide
Province experiment. A statement by the colonial secretary Earl Grey of Howick in
London, reflected the changing attitudes of the state's representatives both in the Cape
and in Great Britain toward the Xhosa. He instructed colonial officials that "sound policy
and enlightened regard for the welfare of the colonists required that the Kafir tribes no
longer be left in possession of their independence." The state's new postwar policy aimed
at pacifying and subjugating the Xhosa up to the Kei river, to acquaint them with the
For a more detailed discussion of the war see Basil Le Cordeur and Christopher
Saunders, eds. The War ofthe Axe, 1847 (Johannesburg: The Brenthurst Press, 1981), 15-
19; Buck Adams, The Narrative ofthe Private Buck Adams 7th Dragoon Guards on the
Eastern Frontier ofthe Cape ofGood Hope, A. G. Brown, ed. (Cape Town: Jan Van
Riebeeck Society, 1941) , 1 14-220; Peires, House ofPhalo, 150-158; Mostert, Frontiers,
855-935.
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"Arts of Civilised Life," to reduce the power of the chiefs, and to put the Africans under
the control of white magistrates. 85 These dramatic changes were to be implemented by
the newly appointed Governor Harry Smith (1847-1852), who had formerly been in
charge of the Queen Adelaide Province under D'Urban. The territory between the
Keiskamma and Kei River was now known as "British Kaffraria," and became a "reserve
under the sovereignty of the Queen."86
The power of the state and its representatives in enforcing a colonial racial order
in the Eastern Cape remained, however, limited. Smith's efforts to control the western
Xhosa, were in many ways more memorable for their theatricality than for their
effectiveness. In meetings with the western Xhosa, Smith posed as the "Inkosi Inkulu" or
the "Great Chief of the Xhosa, waving "a long stick of the Chiefs.
. . a species ofmagic
wand," as a sign of his authority. He angered the Xhosa by insisting that several leaders
kiss his feet during public ceremonies, a demand with which the chiefs were forced to
87
comply. Smith also attempted to revitalize the colonial state's efforts to undermine
Xhosa' s traditional culture, to end "witchcraft" and the "sin of buying wives," and to
undermine African raids on the colony. These decisions antagonized the Xhosa further.
Smith pressured them "[t]o acknowledge no chief but Her Majesty the Queen of
England" and her representatives in the Cape colony, and to remain faithful to Britain. He
wanted the Xhosa "[t]o listen to the missionaries" and to send their "children to schools,
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Advertiser, Dec. 29, 1847.
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to leam those habits of industry and knowledge which make Englishmen rich, good,
happy and clothed." At one of several meetings, grandiose performances which Smith
loved to host for his African "subjects," the governor ordered a wagon to be blown up at
some distance to intimidate the Xhosa with his "great power." "That is what I will do to
you," he wrote in his autobiography, "if you do not behave yourselves." Smith then took
a treaty and ripped it into pieces. "There go the treaties!" Smith crowed "Do you hear?
No more treaties."88 This incident signaled the end of the treaty policy.
Smith revitalized the argument that humanitarians had advocated in the 1820s and
early 1830s by maintaining that the costs of bringing "civilisation" to the Xhosa would
ultimately bring "peace and tranquility to the colony" at a fraction of the cost of war. Yet
the Cape's financial assistance for "civilisation programs" among the Xhosa, as United
States' efforts among Ohio Indians, was limited. Many Cape officials argued that too
much aid would impede Xhosa agricultural productivity, that gifts could be seen by
indigenous groups as an effort to pacify them, and would encourage them to stay out of
the colonial labor force.
89
The over-confident Smith misjudged the impact of colonial policies on many of
the Xhosa, among whom, as discussed in more detail in chapter 5, resentment toward the
Cape continued to grow. The undermining of their sovereignty and territorial losses
angered Xhosa commoners and leaders alike. The increasing popularity of a prophetic
figure named Mlanjeni, especially among the Ngqikas, was also seen by government
88
Meeting between Smith and Xhosa leaders, Jan. 7, 1848, BPP 969/1847-48, 50; see
also Smith, Autobiography, 2: 231. See also Graham 's Town Journal, Oct. 14, 1848.
89 Smith to Early Grey, Jan. 4, 1848, BPP 969/1847-8, 39-40; George Mackinnon to
Smith, July 2, 1848, BPP 1056/1849, 18-22.
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officials as a factor m fanning the flames in Xhosaland. Smith's dismissal of Sandile as
the Ngqika paramount in October 1850, and subsequent efforts to arrest this chief (an
endeavor eventually declared as too dangerous by the colonial authorities due to the
Ngqikas' resistance) led to a rapid escalation of hostilities. The Ngqika retaliated with
attacks against colonists. In the ensuing war, the Ngqika Xhosa received assistance from
Maphasa's Thembu faction, mutinous members of the Xhosa police force and the Cape
Mounted Rifles, from a group of Ndlambes under the leadership of Mhala, as well as
numerous Kat River settlers. Khoikhoi from the western Cape, the Mfengu, the majority
of the Ndlambes, and the Gqunukhwebe figured prominently as allies of the Cape in a
war that would last until 1853. 90
Outrage existed in the Cape especially over the Kat River settlers who joined the
resistance against the colony. Smith and the English settler elite in the Eastern Cape
portrayed the Kat River insurgents as ungrateful rebels, and ignored the fact that colonial
encroachments on their lands and the threat of a vagrancy law had motivated them to
pursue such militant tactics, issues discussed in more detail in chapter 5. Instead Smith
alleged that the Kat River settlers, this "most favored race on earth," had been stirred up
by radical members of the LMS society.91 The Graham 's Town Journal as well blamed
the war on humanitarians who had repeatedly told Africans that the colony oppressed
T.R.H. Davenport and Christopher Saunders, South Africa: A Modern History (New
York; St. Martin's Press, 2000), 140. For a more detailed discussion see Crais, White
Supremacy and Black Resistance, 173-188; Mostert, Frontiers, 998-1 160.
91
For quote see Smith, Autobiography, 2: 272-273. See also Smith to Earl Grey, June 12,
1851, BPP 1428/1852, 35. See also Smith to Earl Grey, Feb. 18, 1851, BPP 1352/1851,
13; Graham 's Town Journal, Feb. 1, 1851; and Rev. George Brown, Personal Adventure
in South Africa (London: James Blackwood, 1855), 4-5.
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them. For the newspaper as for many English settlers, the War of 1850-53, marked the
final battle in "a contest between stern justice and mistaken philanthropy [that] has been
raging with more or less vehemence for upwards of thirty years."92
Conclusion
The War of 1850-53, like the War of 1812 for white American settlers in the
Upper Ohio Valley, proved to be a decisive victory for Eastern Cape colonists. Not
surprisingly such developments led some whites in southern Africa to draw comparisons
with North America. In the early 1850s, for instance, one official observed:
The history of the Cape is already written in that of America, the gradual
increase of the white race must eventually though slowly ensure the
disappearance of the Black. Providence vindicates this its unalterable law
by rendering all the philanthropic efforts that have been made to avert
such a destiny subservient to its fulfillment.93
The war led to massive dispossession among Xhosa and Kat River settlers. They either
were crammed on even smaller parcels of land or lost their land entirely. Nevertheless,
indigenous dispossession did not occur at a level that satisfied the land hunger of
members of the English settler elite. The intensity of African resistance led colonial I
officials to reassess their policy and the interests of the state. Smith's successor, George
Cathcart, appointed as the Governor of the Cape in 1852, overhauled for example the
system of direct rule over Africans that his predecessor had advocated. After the defeat of
the Ngqikas in 1853, he reinstated Sandile to his position as paramount chief. Cathcart
92 Graham's Town Journal, March 15, 1851. See also ibid., March 8, 1851.
93 Quoted in Galbraith, Reluctant Empire: British Policy on the South African Frontier
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963), 257-258.
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also advocated that in its policy decisions the colony had to pay greater attention to what
British officials called African "customary law" and "traditional authority."94 Thus unlike
in the Upper Ohio Valley, where the colonial racial order was increasingly shaped by
beliefs that embraced Native American removal and stereotypes of the "vanishing
Indian " Africans in the Eastern Cape continued to play a central role in the colonial
racial order, figuring either as a servant class of "drawers of water and hewers of wood"
or as a class of "independent producers for" the "markets" of the British empire.
Despite these differences, in both the Upper Ohio Valley and the Eastern Cape,
the state became the prime enforcer of an emerging colonial racial order. In both places,
these very different systems were shaped by local and world historical developments and
interests, but also by indigenous capacities in dealing with these issues. To the efforts by
indigenous groups to maintain their sovereignty and independence, we will now turn our
attention.
Davenport and Saunders, South Africa, 140.
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PART III
CHAPTER 4
THE OHIO INDIANS' REVOLUTION: A STRUGGLE FOR SOVEREIGNTY AND
INDEPENDENCE
Following Dunmore's War of 1 774, indigenous Americans continued to influence
the developments in the Upper Ohio Valley. As we have seen in chapter 2, they often did
this by getting involved in imperial power struggles between the newly emerging United
States and Great Britain. Native Americans in the region developed a variety of strategies
to deal with the rapid transformations they encountered in the last three decades of the
eighteenth and in the early nineteenth century. For instance, and as alluded to earlier,
groups like the Delaware Indians who settled around Coshocton on the Muskingum and
the Tuscarawas Rivers during the early years of the American Revolution, as well as
native leaders like Little Turtle of the Miami, Tarhe of the Wyandots, and Black Hoof of
the Shawnee in the years that followed the Treaty of Greenville of 1795, advocated
partial political and cultural accommodation with the United States. Others, like the Ohio
Confederacy in the 1780s and 1790s, and the Shawnee Chief Tecumseh and his half
brother the Shawnee Prophet Tenskwatawa in the early nineteenth century, advocated
territorial separation of Indians and Anglo-Americans. The groups who sought separation
also embraced militant resistance against the United States when it seemed unavoidable.
But no matter which particular strategy each of the above mentioned historical players
pursued, their ultimate goal was to maintain their sovereignty and autonomy.
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The Ohio Indians' Revolution, 1 775-1 7<K
The outbreak of the American Revolution marked not only the beginning of a war
of independence for white Americans, but also for Native Americans whose position was
increasingly challenged by white encroachments. With the mounting efforts by the
American state to create a colonial racial order north of the Ohio River, the Revolution
became the starting point for an Ohio Indian struggle for independence and sovereignty
that lasted into the nineteenth century. This section explores the variety of approaches
that Native Americans in the Upper Ohio Valley devised to obtain their goals. It first
considers the diverse responses and views that American Indians in the region had to the
outbreak of the Revolution. Secondly, it examines the strategies of accommodation with
the American colonies by the Delaware Indians around Coshocton and the Mequashake
Shawnee during the second half of the 1770s and the early 1780s. The final part looks at
efforts by the Ohio Confederacy to maintain the sovereignty of Native American peoples
north of the Ohio River and to curtail Anglo-American encroachments onto their
territory.
Ohio Indian Responses to the Outbreak of the Revolution
The beginning of the Revolutionary War between the Americans and the British
required tough decisions on the part of the Ohio Indians. Some heeded the advice of the
influential Delaware leader, Netawatwees, to remember the high casualties they had
suffered during the Seven Years War of the 1750s and 1760s between the French and the
British. Netawatwees argued that it was best to stay out of a conflict between two
"brothers." Due to increasing pressures on their territory, though, most Ohio Indians had
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eventually few options but to become directly involved in the conflict. As noted earlier, a
majority of Native Americans in the region assisted the British in the Revolution because
they posed less of a threat to their territory than did the Americans. Others, however,
sought closer ties with the Americans in hopes of preserving their homeland. Still others,
to avoid white encroachments and the pressures of the Revolutionary War, moved further
west.
1
Those Ohio Indians who sought at least partial accommodations with the former
colonies saw their strategy as a way to obtain territorial guarantees that would prohibit
white advances into Indian country without bloodshed. American officials' assurances to
Ohio Indians that they had "not the most Distant thought of Possessing any part of [their]
lands," certainly encouraged some indigenous leaders to envision a social order in which
American Indians would live separately from whites divided by the Ohio River.
Generally, the native groups that opted for closer diplomatic contacts with the United
States were located in the vicinity of American settlements. Of the 644 Indian
representatives who were initially willing to attend an American-sponsored treaty
conference at Fort Pitt in 1775, most belonged to the Delaware, Mequashake Shawnee,
and the Mingo nations in the eastern and southern parts of what is today the state of
Ohio.2
1
For the neutral stance of a number of Ohio Indians before the outbreak of the American
Revolution see for example Captain James Wood's diary, 1775, in The Revolution on the
Upper Ohio, 58. For Netawatwes speech see "Diarium von Lichtenau am Mushkingum
vom July 1776 bis 21 ten Juni 1777," in Herrenhutter Indianermission, 332-3.
On American assurances to the Indians that the Ohio will remain the final border see
John Walker to the Mingoes, Wyandots, Delawares, Shawnees, and Ottawas, Oct. 10,
1775, The Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 98-99. For the treaty conference in 1775 see
Col. George Morgan to the President of Congress, Nov. 8, 1775, in ibid., 216-217;
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A growing number of Native Americans north of the Ohio River were, however,
m the words of one American officer, angry and "complained of the Encroachments" by
Anglo-American colonists who "were now settling in Great Numbers in the Midst of
their Hunting Grounds on the Kentucke River." Moreover, and despite assurances by
American officials, backcountry settlers were crossing the Ohio in ever larger numbers
and "killed and drove off the region's game. 3 Many Ohio Indians had little faith that the
colonists would adhere to treaties and complained of the many mistreatments they had
received at the hands of whites. These factions saw little use in seeking accommodation
with the newly emerging United States. For more and more western Indian groups,
militant resistance was seen as the only viable way to stop the advance of white
colonization, maintain territorial separation, and sovereignty. The American Revolution
provided an opportunity to renew assaults on Kentucky and to regain territory lost during
Dunmore's War - land concessions to the Virginians that had been forcibly imposed on
many Ohio Indians. 4
Other Ohio Indians who wanted to avoid being caught up in the revolutionary
struggle, revived older migratory patterns by choosing to move westward to areas that
had not been affected by warfare. As the fighting on the Upper Ohio intensified by 1 779
and 1 780, for instance, a growing stream of Shawnee left the volatile region, moving
Edmund De Schweinitz, The Life and Times ofDavid Zeisberger (Philadelphia: J.B.
Lippincott & Co., 1870), 387.
3
Captain James Wood's Diary, 1775, in The Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 61.
4
Lieut. Gov. Henry Hamilton to Gen. Guy Carleton, Nov. 30, 1775, in ibid., 129-130;
Indian Speeches at Detroit, Jan. 2, 1779, in Frontier Advance, 191-3. See also Edward
Williams, "The Journal of Richard Butler, 1775," The Western Pennsylvania Historical
Magazine 46 (1963), 394-5.
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further south in the Ohio valley. In the years preceding the revolution this faction of some
1200 Shawnees eventually moved to Missouri where they took up lands under the
auspices of the Spanish government. 5
The Delaware*' and Mequashake Shawnee's Failed Strategy of Accommodation
with the United States during the American Revolution
As seen earlier, when the Revolution reached the Ohio region, the former
colonies' closest Native American neighbors seemed most interested in maintaining
friendly relations with the United States. The result was a strategy pursued by several
factions of Delawares in the Muskingum and Tuscarawas River Valleys and among the
Mequashake Shawnees on the lower Scioto. Cornstalk, an influential chief among the
Mequashake during the 1770s, had chosen to adhere to a position of neutrality after the
destructive experiences of his people during Dunmore's War. Members of the Delaware
Council at Coshocton on the other hand, had either remained neutral or, like White Eyes,
had assisted the Virginians during this conflict. Delaware leaders like White Eyes, and
later Netawatwees, also had proven to be supporters of the Moravian missionaries, who
had built their first towns in the Tuscarawas River Valley by 1772. They had pursued
these alliances in an effort to gain territorial guarantees for the Delaware from the crown
in England, and now wanted to get similar guarantees from the United States.6
5 On the westward migration of some Shawnees see Calloway, The American Revolution
in Indian Country, 1 69-70.
6
"Diarium von Schoenbrunn am Mushkingum vom 13ten September 1774 bis zu Ende
February 1775," Nov. 1,5, Dec. 19, 1774, in Herrenhutter Indianermission, 237-9;
"Diarium von Schoenbrunn am Muskingum vom Monat Marius April und May 1775,"
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The leaders who sought limited accommodation with the colonies were by no
means uncritical of, or blind to, Anglo-American encroachments on then lands. In early
November 1776, for example, Cornstalk delivered a speech to American officials
reminding them of Ohio Indian grievances:
When God created this World he gave this Island to the red people &
placed your younger Brethren the Shawnees here in the Center - Now we& they see your people seated on our Lands which all Nations esteem as
their & our heart - all our Lands are covered by the white people & we
are jealous that you still intend to make larger strides - We never sold you
our Lands which you now possess on the Ohio between the Great
Kenhawa & the Cherokee, & which you are settling without ever asking
our leave, or obtaining our consent - Foolish people have desired you to
do so, & you have taken their advice.
. . That was our hunting Country &
you have taken it from us. This is what sits heavy upon our Hearts & on
the Hearts of all Nations, and it is impossible for us to think as we ought to
do whilst we are thus oppress 'd with your [presence]. 7
Thus, Cornstalk condemned the loss of land in parts of what is today Kentucky, for which
Ohio Indians had never been compensated. In addition, he was concerned about potential
territorial losses in the future that could undermine native sovereignty.
Still, Ohio Indian leaders like Cornstalk pursued peaceful relations with the
Americans and applied diplomatic pressure to stop the advance of whites at the Ohio
river. "Now I stretch my Arm to you my wise Brethren of the United States met in
Council at Philadelphia," he told American officials. "I open my hand & pour into your
heart the cause of our discontent in hopes that you will take pity on us your younger
April 7, 1775, in ibid., 267; "Diarium von Schoenbrunn vom 1 Juni bis 7. September
1775," Sept. 5, 1775, in ibid., 285.
7
Speech of Cornstalk to Congress, Nov. 7, 1776, in Revolution and Confederation, ed.
Colin Calloway (Bethesda, Md.: University Publications of America, 1994), vol. 18 of
Early American Indian Documents: Laws and Treaties, gen. ed. Alden Vaughan, 147.
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Brethren, and send us a favorable Answer, that we may be eonvineed of.be sineerity of
your profession."8
The Delaware around Coshocton also wanted peaceful relations with the United
States. They argued that they held "the chain of friendship" between the Americans and
themselves "with both their hands." But in return they expected territorial guarantees
from the Continental Congress.9
The proponents of the position of non-aggression toward the Americans possessed
limited power at best, and faced strong internal and external pressures. As early as the
summer of 1775, the Mequashake leader Cornstalk reminded United States officials that
he had influence only over the Shawnee villages on the lower Scioto river, not over those
further to the north. Besides, Coshocton Delaware leaders and Moravian missionaries
repeatedly informed American officials about a growing number of Delaware "deserters"
who left the Delaware towns of the Muskingum and Tuscarawas River Valleys to move
to the vicinity of the British military post at Detroit. After returning from a hunting trip in
the fall of 1777, the Delaware chief Captain Pipe, who had until then attempted to remain
outside the conflict between the British and the Americans, had to pursue a group of
Frenchmen who fought alongside the British, and who had recruited about forty warriors
from his town. Though Pipe eventually caught up with the party and convinced most his
Speech of Cornstalk to Congress, Nov. 7, 1776, in Revolution and Confederation, 147.
9
For the Delaware Indians see John Heckewelder, A Narrative ofthe Mission ofthe
United Brethren Among the Delaware and Mohegan Indians, from its Commencement in
the Year 1740, to the Close ofthe Year 1808 (New York: Arno Press, 1971), quote 159;
and Delaware Chiefs to Congress, May 17, 1779, in Frontier Advance, 320-1.
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men to abandon the campaign, support for the Delaware council's position toward the
United States was declining among the Delaware rank and file. 10
Nevertheless, Coshocton Delaware leaders who advocated non-aggression had
little patience for American finger-pomting at violence committed by Delaware warriors
who fought against the United States. The Delaware leader Killbuck reminded American
officials that "we are told that there are in several of your states People you call Torries -
but as that does not make those particular States your Enemies, so we hope you will make
a proper Distinction between our Nation and Individuals - who, on Account of their
Conduct have become Outcasts from it." 11
Delaware-United States relations also generated disunity and power struggles at
the council of Coshocton. Proponents of friendly relations with the Americans were
frequently criticized by some members of the council for overstepping their authority as
in their contacts with the United States. Their critics felt that close ties to the thirteen
American states only made indigenous lands more vulnerable to United States
encroachment. A severe blow to Delaware unity at Coshocton occurred late in October of
1778. In reaction to the Treaty of Pittsburgh of the same year that established close ties
between the Delaware and the United States, Pipe along with a few hundred warriors
abandoned their towns in the area and joined the anti-American Ohio Indian villages on
the Sandusky. 12
10
For Cornstalk see Capt. William Russel to Col. William Fleming, June 12, 1775 in
Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 14-16. See also Zeisberger to Hand, Nov. 16, 1777, in
Frontier Defense, 165; and "Diarium von Lichtenau am Muskingum vom 15ten Martius
bis 6ten Julij 1778," April 2, 5, 1778, in Herrnhutter Indianermission, 439.
11
Delaware Chiefs to Congress, May 29, 1779, in Frontier Advance, 352.
148
An unnamed Coshocton Delaware religious leader and his supporters offered
internal opposition to a friendly stance toward the United States and the Moravian
missionaries. Late in 1776, this prophet advocated that the Delaware revitalize their
religion and rituals, and cleanse their society of white influences. He reiterated the
message of several Native American prophetic figures before him who had argued that
Christianity was a religion for whites and not for Indians. This prophet also argued that
Moravian missionaries should be driven off and that the Delaware should elect leaders
who were less inclined to accommodate the interests of the Moravians and Americans.
Furthermore he threatened to create an "apartes town," in which those who shared his
views could join together. 13
The message proclaimed by the Coshocton prophet reflected the sentiments held
by many Ohio Indians toward white influences, customs, and culture at the time of the
Revolution. In the 1 770s, for instance, the missionary David McClure observed that the
Shawnees "have always shown great opposition to Christianity." 14 A Moravian Indian
helper who traveled to preach to various Ohio Indians, was told by a group of Shawnee
On the disunity among the members of the Council at Coshocton see for example
"Diarium von Lichtenau am Muskingum vom 24ten September 1777 bis lOten Martius
1778," Dec. 19, 1777, in Herrnhutter Indianermission, 422-23. For Captain Pipe see
"Diarium von Lichtenau am Muskingum vom 19ten August bis Ende des Jahres 1778,"
Oct. 28, 1778, in ibid., 473. Zeisberger argued that Pipe by relocating to the Sandusky
displayed his pro-British attitudes. Historian Richard White contradicts this argument. He
writes that Pipe moved to distance himself from the treaty's pro-American position.
White, Middle Ground, 382-3.
13
"Diarium von Lichtenau am Muskingum vom July 1776 bis 21ten Juni 1777," Dec. 9,
1776, in Herrnhutter Indianermission, 347.Gregory Dowd does not discuss this prophet.
Dowd sees the Delaware around Coshocton as more unified in their position of
"neutrality" and "accommodation" toward the United States. See Dowd, Spirited
Resistance, 68-72.
14
For quote see McClure, Diary, 93.
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that they could not live like Moravian Indians or whites, but preferred their own way of
life, religion, dances, and ceremonies. The Moravian missionary David Zeisberger also
observed that numerous Delawares took a critical stance toward white people telling them
what to do. These Delaware shared a view with many other Ohio Indians, who believed
that God had created whites to live according to their ways, and Indians according to
theirs. They described the European "manner of living as wearisome and slavish," and
believed that the efforts of missionaries were part of a larger scheme by the United States
to "deprive" Native Americans "of their land and drive them within narrower confines." 15
Factions among the Ohio Indians that pursued friendly relations with the United
States faced tremendous external pressures from both anti-American Indian neighbi
and British officials, who frequently encouraged and put pressure on them to wage
against the Americans. They warned pro-American Delawares and Shawnees that they
should not listen to white missionaries and that the Americans wanted to betray them. As
noted above, such demands were effective, as more and more Coshocton Delaware and
Mequashake Shawnee joined the anti-American factions around Detroit that fought
alongside the British in hopes that doing so would reinforce their efforts to maintain
>ors
war
sovereignty. 16
15
For the quote see Zeisberger, "History," 121-2. See also "Diarium von Welhik
Thuppeck und Gnadenhuetten and der Mushkingum," Jan 19, Feb. 23, 28, 1773, in
Herrenhutter Indianermission, 130, 133-5; "Diarium von Schoenbrunn an der Ohio Juni
18ten October 1773, " in ibid., 153; "Kurzer Bericht von Bruder David Zeisbergers Reise
mit den Indianer Bruedern Isaac und Wilhelm zu den Shawanesen," in ibid., 168-9.
16
For pressures on neutral Delawares to get ready for war see for example "Diarium von
Lichtenau am Muskingum vom July 1776 bis 21 ten Juni 1777," Aug. 7, 11, 1776, in
Herrenhutter Indianermission, 330, 332-3; Zeisberger to Hand, July 29, 1777, in Frontier
Defense, 27-29; White Eyes to Col. Morgan, Sept. 23, 1777, in ibid., 100-1. For neutral
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The volatile situation created by the revolutionary struggle in the Upper Ohio
Valley left the Coshocton Delaware and their Mequashake Shawnee and Moravian Indian
allies in a bind. On the one hand, as we have seen earlier, they provided intelligence
about enemy activity to the United States. On the other, they had to provide hospitality to
pro-British Ohio Indians who used the towns on the Muskingum and the Tuscarawas as
resting points during their campaigns against Anglo-American settlements. In fact, a
frustrated David Zeisberger wrote that there was not a single day between August 8 and
October 6 in 1777, when anti-American warriors were not staying at the Moravian
mission towns. The Moravian Indian food supplies were especially strained when more
than 300 fighters put up their camp among the Christian Indians for more than fourteen
days in that year. 17
As several historians have pointed out, the search for accommodation with the
Americans among the Coshocton Delaware and the Mequashake Shawnee was weakened
by the Americans' failure to provide promised supplies and trade. 18 The lack of supplies
and trade led friendly Indians to grumble to American officials about the lack of goods
and ammunition. Due to their friendly stance toward the United States, several members
of the "Delaware Nation" complained to the Americans, they had "become poor &
naked." Yet the Americans in the Ohio Valley had a hard time feeding themselves, and
Indians that joined the British see for example Gov. Henry Hamilton to Sir Guy Carleton,
Apr. 25, 1778, in Frontier Defense, 282; Hamilton and allied Indians to the Delawares,
June 18, 1778, in Frontier Advance, 94-5.
1
7
"Diarium von Lichtenau am Muskingum vom 24ten September 1777 bis lOten Martius
1778," Dec. 31, 1777, in Herrenhutter Indianermission, 425; "Diarium von Lichtenau
vom 6ten August bis 23ten September 1777," Aug. 20, 1777, in ibid., 401.
18 On this issue see for example Dowd, A Spirited Resistance, 73-75; and Weslager, The
Delaware Indians, 311-312.
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were chronically short of provisions, clothes, and other resources. At times, their dire
conditions even forced United States officials to approach friendly Delawares and
Moravian Indians for supplies. 19
The British also habitually complained about the high costs of feeding their
indigenous allies, but they paid these costs because Ohio Indians played a central role in
Britain's military strategy in the region. Anti-American indigenous groups had come to
rely on British supplies as the protracted revolutionary warfare let to the destruction of
Native American crops and impeded hunting excursions. Yet despite United States
officials' portrayal of the Ohio Indians as pawns of the British, American Indians
functioned as equal partners in a war against a common enemy. They held the British
accountable for their obligations, such as providing military assistance and supplies in a
mutual effort to defeat the Anglo-Americans or at least to keep them south of the Ohio
River. "If you do neither one or the Other," the British were reminded by an Ohio Indian
speaker, "I shall begin to think you are as smooth Tongued as the Virginians."20
Edward Hand to Jasper Yeates, July 12, 1777, in Frontier Defense, 19-20; Brodhead to
Richard Peters, Dec. 7, 1780, in Frontier Retreat, 301-2; Major Frederick Vernon to
Brodhead, April 29, 1779, in Frontier Advance, 298; Speech of Delawares to Washington
and Congress, May 17, 1779, in ibid., 317-21; Killbuck to Mcintosh, Feb. 18, 1779, in
ibid., 231-2; Delaware Chiefs to Congress, May 29, 1779, in ibid.J35l-3; Brodhead to
Delawares, June 23, 1779, in ibid., 382-3; Gen. Lachlan Mcintosh's Speech to the
Delawares, Nov. 22, 1778, in ibid., 178-80; Maj. Frederick Vernon to Col. Daniel
Brodhead, Mar. 28, 1779, in ibid., 264-5.
20
For Ohio Indian quote see Indian Speeches at Detroit, Feb. 7, 1779, in Frontier
Advance, 218-20. Gen. Frederick Haldimand to Gen. Henry Clinton, Aug. 29, 1779,
Frontier Retreat, 50; See also Gen. Henry Hamilton to Guy Carleton, Aug. 8, 1778, in
Michigan Pioneer Historical Society: Collections and Researches, vols. 40 (Lansing: The
Michigan Historical Society, 1877-1929), 9: 459.
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more
The shrinking Delaware and Shawnee factions that pursued friendly relations with
the Americans found themselves in a less advantageous position with then allies.
Following repeated threats, incursions, and intimidations by anti-American factions, the
Delaware and Shawnee around Coshocton wanted United States officials to adhere
diligently to the promised alliance of "everlasting friendship." They encouraged
representatives of the United States to live up to their guarantees that "if any Nation
strikes you on our Account," we "will consider your quarrel as our own." They also
repeatedly demanded that the Americans should strike decisively against the British and
their Indian allies. Members at the council at Coshocton complained that other Indians
openly mocked them for their ties to the United States, which made empty threats about
sending a huge army to destroy Detroit and all its pro-British Indian allies. Americans
would have to strike soon, feared the council, or the Indian communities around
Coshocton would have to bear the repercussions. Yet, American revolutionary leaders,
preoccupied with battles elsewhere, again postponed and finally abandoned a plan for an
expedition against Detroit. 21
Despite the United States' inability to provide support, a pro-American faction
emerged among the Coshocton Indians under the leadership of Killbuck and White Eyes.
They served as scouts and provided Americans with intelligence. In the aftermath of the
Treaty of Fort Pitt, some of these Coshocton Indians also backed the American
Delaware and Mequochoke-Shawnee to Brodhead, Feb. 1 7, 1 780, in Frontier Retreat,
139; Delaware Chiefs to Brodhead, Apr. 23, 1780, in ibid., 172-3. On this issue see also
White Eyes to Col. Morgan, July 19, 1778, in Frontier Advance, 1 17-8; Killbuck to
Mcintosh and Morgan, Feb. 18, 1779, in ibid., 231-2; Killbuck to Mcintosh, March 15,
1779, in ibid., 254; Gen. Hand to the Delawares, Oct. 1, 1777, in Frontier Defense, 1 13-
4; Delaware Chiefs to Brodhead, Jan. 13, 1781, in ibid., 315-316.
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revolutionary war effort with fighters. 22 Killbuck's pro-American position, however, was
unpopular with the Council at Coshocton. He eventually lost his leading position, left the
Council, and settled with his remaining supporters in a location closer to the Moravian
missions. 23
Early in 1781, American inaction and internal and external pressures finally led a
majority in the council at Coshocton to abandon their friendly relations with the
Americans and to consider an alliance with the British. United States officials reacted
swiftly to these developments. Brodhead send an army of close to 300 regulars and
militia against the Indian villages on the Tuscarawas and the Muskingum Rivers.
Killbuck and those Delawares who wanted to pursue a pro-American strategy joined the
American forces in the attacks against the Delawares and Mequashake Shawnee in the
area. The punitive strike destroyed two villages, and killed at least sixteen native fighters
Over twenty Indians were taken captive. The remaining Indians fled. Killbuck and his
band "put themselves under the protection of the Americans" and returned with the
troops to Fort Pitt.
24
See John Heckewelder to Col. Daniel Brodhead, July 26, 1780, in Frontier Retreat,
23 1-2; Brodhead to Richard Peters, Dec. 7 1780, in ibid., 301-2. On Delaware scouts and
military assistance see for example Brodhead to Washington, May 3, 1779, in Frontier
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A crucial blow to Moravian efforts to stay out of the fighting was dealt by the
Americans during the Gnadenhuetten massacre. There, as discussed in chapter 2,
American militiamen slaughtered over ninety Moravian Indians. The carnage fueled
violence and strengthened beliefs in racial separation among a growing number ofNative
Americans m the Upper Ohio Valley. It also led to an intensification of ritualized torture
of white prisoners, especially among "the Delawares, who say they will shew no mercy to
any white man, as they would shew none to their friends and relations, the religious
Moravians."25 David Zeisberger observed that the Shawnee as well, were keen in
prosecuting militiamen who had participated in the Gnadenhuetten killings. "As soon as
it is known that any prisoner had part in that affair," the missionary wrote, "he is fortwith
bound, tortured, and burnt."26
The Ohio Confederacy and the Continuation of the Indians' Revolution, 1783-1795
When the British sued for peace with the Americans in January 1783, their Ohio
Indian allies were left surprised and outraged, as they had not been consulted on the
matter. They were further angered by the claims that their homelands now belonged to
the Americans, who contended that Britain had ceded the territory with the Treaty of
Paris. In contrast, many Ohio Indians argued that Britain could not forfeit their lands,
since they never had been defeated by either English or American troops. In their efforts
Brodhead's Coshocton expedition, in ibid., 376-81; Brodhead to Reed, May 22 1781, in
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25
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to curtail United States expansion, many of the Indian peoples in the Upper Ohio Valley
attempted to present a united front. The Native American confederacy that emerged out
of these exertions, consisted of a wide range of Indian nations. It found support among
factions of the Miamis, Shawnees, Wyandots, Delawares, Mingoes, Kickapoos, Weas,
and Piankeshaws. At times, the confederacy also received assistance from groups like the
Ojibwas, Ottawas, Potawatomis, and from pro-British Iroquois like Joseph Brant. The
Ohio Confederacy attempted the difficult task of uniting a wide array of Indian nations
from all over the area that Americans would later call the Northwest Territory. The
confederation of Ohio Indians maintained that the land north of the Ohio River was
communally owned by all American Indians that lived on it, and that it could only be
ceded by approval of all tribes. Furthermore, the Confederacy advocated the territorial
separation of Indian country and Anglo-American territory at the Ohio river. The
Confederacy therefore insisted on the maintenance of the 1768 Ft. Stanwix Treaty line.27
The British pullout enticed other American Indian groups in the region, to pursue
a friendly stance toward the United States. Native American communities in the region
like the Mequashake Shawnee who lived in close vicinity to American settlements, were
certainly aware of the pressures that the United States could exert on their towns and
villages, and were thus more likely to give into American territorial and diplomatic
demands. The Native American adherents to a strategy of accommodation with the
United States hoped that it would bring peace and territorial guarantees to Ohio Indian
peoples. Native Americans from outside of the region, like the Stockbridge Indian leader
27
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Hendrik Aupaumut from New England, also got involved in the tense situation north of
the Ohio River, and attempted to find diplomatic solutions to United States-Ohio Indian
relations.
28
These native diplomats fulfilled what they saw as a traditional role of
intercultural brokers who attempted to mediate between whites and Indians in the Upper
Ohio valley.
Native American responses to a series of treaties during the mid- 1780s, provide a
glimpse at Ohio Indians' strategies for dealing with Anglo-American expansion. Though
the Ohio Confederacy rejected the 1785 Fort Mcintosh and the 1786 Great Miami treaty,
discussed in chapter 2, a few leading chiefs gave into American pressures and agreed to
the loss of considerable tracts of land in return for a promise of peace and territorial
guarantees, which United States officials offered to provide only if the Indians signed
these treaties.
29
United States officials put especially strong pressures on about 200 Mequashake
Shawnee during treaty negotiations at the Great Miami River in January 1786. There, the
American government expected the Shawnee to confirm the Fort Mcintosh borders,
drawn up with several small factions of other Ohio Indian tribes. But even among the
friendly-minded Mequashake Shawnee, many warriors resented American pressures. At a
council meeting on January 27, the Mequashake "head warrior, Kickwaypalathey"
rejected American territorial demands. Like many other Ohio Indians, he argued that it
had been decided in previous treaties that the Ohio river was to be the final border
between Native Americans and whites. Following his speech, Kickwaypalathey handed a
28
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mixed wampum belt to United States officials, "Moating" that Americans had to decide
for "peace or war." In response, and in a gesture meant to offend, anger, and intimidate
the Mequashake, General Clark threw the wampum in the dirt and "set his foot on it."
Meanwhile, the commissioners uncompromisingly reasserted to the Shawnee that the
Americans owned the lands north of the Ohio river by "right of conquest." Clark and the
commissioners set an ultimatum to the Mequashake to sign the treaty or face war. Several
hours after this incident a group of Mequashake, including Kickwaypalathey, and the
well-known leader Moluntha returned. Moluntha declared that the Mequashake were
willing to comply with American demands. The Mequashake Shawnee had given into
United States' pressures, and Moluntha declared his willingness to sign the treaty, if the
Americans would only "have pity on women and children" and not pursue war. 30 Yet,
peace for the Mequashake was short-lived. As noted in chapter 2, Kentucky militia
attacked Moluntha' s village only several months after the treaty had been signed, killing
Moluntha and several Shawnee.
This massacre, along with other atrocities committed by Americans, fostered a
cautious attitude toward the United States even among those native groups that took a
more conciliatory position with the Americans and remained outside of the Ohio
Confederacy. During an encounter with a group of Shawnees, John Cleves Symmes, a
major land speculator in southwestern Ohio, observed that the Indians wished "to be on
friendly terms," and expressed a desire to trade. Nonetheless, the leader of the group also
cautiously inquired if the United States supported Symmes' settlement plans north of the
Ohio River. Symmes, in an atmosphere of cautious distrust, affirmed to the Shawnees
30
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that the United States did in fact support his efforts. To intimidate his Indian visitors, he
pointed to the American flag and the soldiers in his camp and "informed the chief, that
those were the warriors which the thirteen fires [the United States] kept in constant pay to
avenge their quarrel." At the same time, he reassured his Indian visitors of the United
States' peaceful intentions by pointing to the seal of his commission. The letterhead
depicted an eagle that "held a branch of a tree as an emblem of peace in one claw." Yet,
the Shawnee spokesman who observed "the seal with great attention," expressed his
distrust of American assurances of peaceful cooperation. He replied "that he could not
perceive any intimation of peace from the attitude the Eagle was in... To him the Eagle
appeared from her bearing a large whip in one claw, and such a number of arrows in the
other, and in full career of flight, to be wholly bent on war & mischief."31
Overall, a large majority of Native Americans rejected the treaties. Most Ohio
Indians saw the land cessions as illegitimate and believed that the treaties had been
negotiated through American pressures. Reports widely circulated among the indigenous
nations north of the Ohio river that the Americans "intended.
. . to kill them all" at treaty
negotiations "either by putting poison in the spirits" or by "communicating the small pox
with the blankets." Furthermore, Native Americans accused the United States of charging
them at treaty negotiations "with injuries they had done to the Americans; while they,
neither said a word, nor would hear any thing about injuries they had done to Indians."
According to Ohio Indians, the United States was attempting to do little more but to take
their land. They also charged whites with stealing horses, with robbing their hunting
camps, and with several killings. These encroachments, observed one American official,
31
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induced a growing number ofOhio Indians "to make a common cause ofwhat (hey
suppose their common grievances."32
Members of the Ohio Confederacy were aware of the ever-increasing influx of
Anglo-American colonizers who crossed north of the Ohio river into Indian country, saw
them as a threat to their sovereignty, and advocated action against them. White settlers,
so believed the Delaware chief Buckongahelas, acted not only in violation of earlier
agreements with the United States, but also intended "to drive" Native Americans "away
form the lands which the Master of Life" had given to them.
Shall we suffer such thieves and murderers always to be our neighbours! -
Let them go in this way, until they have extirpated us entirely, and have
the whole of our land! - Did not God create us as well as the white people!
- Did he not place us on this land, and give us strength and ability to
defend ourselves against any invader... What nation of Indians, will
tamely submit, to be driven from their lands by another nation!"
Buckongahelas call for militant resistance against colonial encroachments was heeded by
many. Native Americans from all over the Upper Ohio Valley retaliated against
American boats and attacked white settlements north as well as south of the Ohio river,
which many natives saw as the symbols of white invasion. 34
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Though the Ohio Confederacy frequently asserted its unity, it confronted many
obstacles. The confederation had to deal with its share of rivalries between different
groups and leaders. This infighting led some officials like Arthur St. Clair to boast that
the Ohio "confederacy if it exists at all, has not that efficiency which would enable the
heads of it to direct its force to a point in the security of which many of the members
would not feel themselves much interested when each had to fear for themselves
separately."35
American claims about disunity within the Ohio Confederacy were in part
overstatements by United States officials that had self-serving purposes. For one, by
rhetorically undermining the legitimacy of the Ohio Indian alliance, American officials
reassured themselves of the legality of the treaties of the 1780s - documents which the
Ohio Confederacy opposed. Furthermore, contentions about a weak Ohio Indian alliance
aided United States policy-makers in downplaying the alliance's military strength and
reinforced the official argument that northwestern Native American nations could be
relatively easily beaten. Yet the significant defeats of two major American military
missions by Ohio Indians in the early 1790s, which we have discussed in chapter 2,
proved that American self-assurance was wrong.
Members of the Ohio Confederacy frequently complained that American Indian
policy-makers treated their alliance with a lack of respect by not speaking with properly
1 A
For Indian violence see Symmes to Dayton, May 18-20, 1789 in Symmes, 78; Symmes
to Dayton, April 30, 1790, in ibid., 125-128; Putnam to Knox, January 8, 1791, in ASPIA,
1: 122.
35
St. Clair to Knox, September 14, 1788, in St. Clair Papers, 2: 88-89. See also St. Clair
to Knox, October 26, 1788, ibid., 2: 93-94; St. Clair to Knox, December 13, 1788, ibid.,
2: 106-107; St. Clair to Washington, May 2, 1788, m ASPIA, 1: 10.
161
constituted leaders, instead dealing with renegades who did not reflect the consensus of
Ohio Indian views. "You kindled your council fires where you thought proper," charged
their diplomats "without consulting us, at which you held separate treaties, and have
entirely neglected our plan of having a general conference with the different nations of
the confederacy." In their efforts to halt the American advance, the alliance of Ohio
Indians reiterated its willingness to find diplomatic solutions that all its members would
support. But it also asserted that such efforts would only be successful if Americans
would abstain from their attacks on Ohio Indians, and if they would undermine the
movement of land surveyors and white settlers north of the Ohio river.36
Despite frequent Native American attacks on Anglo-American settlements, the
brutal torture of some white prisoners, and the racially exclusive rhetoric often used by
members of the Confederacy, the separation that Ohio Indians advocated was not
absolute. Adopted European captives and metis of mixed European and Indian ancestry
could be found in many Ohio Indian societies. Some people of mixed and of European
origin even obtained leadership positions. The metis Jean Baptiste Richardville, for
example, acted as a chief in replacement of his uncle Pacane. Moreover, in the late
decades of the eighteenth century, French and British traders played an integral part in
Ohio Indian life. These merchants, alongside some black slaves, constituted, as Richard
White notes, a constant presence in Native American towns and villages on the Maumee
and the Auglaize river. In these integrated and multicultural communities, whites,
Indians, and sometimes blacks, together lived, worked, socialized, suffered, and feared
Speech of the United Indian Nations, November 28 and December 18, 1786, ASPIA, 1
8-9.
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Anglo-American attacks on their settlements. For members of the Ohio Confederacy
some mutually beneficial sharing of land and especially cross-cultural trade, played an
essential role. But the United States' scheme of colonization north of the Ohio river,
provided a direct challenge to Native American communities. 37
In the contest over how to shape a colonial racial order north of the Ohio river,
negotiation played an important role. Just as the Ohio confederacy generally tried to
defend its homelands through diplomatic efforts, federal policy-makers also attempted to
open up territory by non-violent means. As discussed in chapter 2, these efforts grew
partially out of a self-proclaimed benevolence toward Native Americans. But they were
also spurred by the fact that the United States had suffered two serious defeats at the
hands of the confederacy in the 1790s. Hence, alongside white diplomats, federal
officials sent several Native American representatives to negotiate with the Ohio Indian
alliance, believing that indigenous intermediaries might be useful in helping the United
States to gain lands north of the Ohio river by non-violent means. 38
Native American diplomats, however, did not necessarily feel obliged to cater to
United States interests. The Mahican Aupaumut who went on several peace missions to
Ohio, understood his attempts at mediation rather in traditional terms. By acting as an
intercultural broker, Aupaumut tried to impose continuity on a changing world. He
attempted, writes Alan Taylor, to revitalize the Mahicans' traditional role to serve as
intermediaries between warring factions. Furthermore, Aupaumut believed that his efforts
37
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served the interests of the Ohio Indians as much as those of the Americans. The warfare,
Aupaumut reminded Secretary of War Timothy P,ckering, was due to "the inhuman
practices of your people on the frontiers.
. . who have kindled the bad fire, and so raised
the evil smoke."39 Still, Aupaumut's efforts were largely unsuccessful.
Like Aupaumut, members of the Ohio Confederacy blamed frontier violence on
the United States' failed policies. They criticized American negotiators for failing to
provide gifts - an essential part of diplomatic discourse. Furthermore, Ohio Indians were
angered by copies of the Ft. Harmar treaty shown to them by United States diplomats,
which indicated that Ohio Indians had consented to major land cessions. After inquiring
who among Native American leaders had supported the treaty, the Miami chief Le Gris
argued that the signers "are only young men, who, without authority and instruction from
their chiefs, have concluded that treaty." For treaties to be valid, however, Le Gris
maintained, they had to be signed by all leaders of the confederacy.40
American Indian negotiators sent by the federal government fared scarcely better
in their efforts to convince members of the confederacy to lay down their arms and to
negotiate land cessions. In the fall of 1792, Iroquois diplomats from New York state,
acting on behalf of the United States, encouraged Ohio Indians to end their resistance and
to cooperate with American officials. Yet members of the Ohio Indian alliance believed
that mutually beneficial coexistence with the United States was impossible. One speaker
39
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exclaimed that "our only demand is the peaceable possession of a small part of our once
great country.... We can retreat no farther, because the country behind hardly affords
food for its present inhabitants; and we have therefore resolved to leave our bones in this
small place to which we are confined." Leaders of the Ohio Confederacy also were
concerned with the trustworthiness of the Iroquois, some of whom had actively supported
their alliance in the 1780s, but who largely stayed out of the fighting in the early 1790s.
The mistrust was probably also augmented by the history of often tense relations between
the Six Nations and the Indian peoples of the Upper Ohio Valley throughout the
eighteenth century, in which the Iroquois often declared political preeminence over their
neighbors to the west. Members of the Confederacy accused the Iroquois as liars who
spoke "from the outside of their "lips" and as pawns of the Americans. "[F]or
whenever" the Iroquois heard "the voice of the United States," they immediately took
their "packs and attend their councils."41
As discussed in chapter 2, the defeat of the Ohio confederacy at Fallen Timbers in
1794 resulted in the Treaty of Greenville of 1795. The treaty forced Native Americans to
cede all of what is today southern and eastern Ohio, as well as significant parts of eastern
Indiana. The land losses dramatically altered the lives of American Indians in Ohio,
Indiana, and Michigan, and dramatically undermined the position of Indians in the upper
Ohio region.
Even though, after their defeat by the Americans, the Ohio confederacy was in no
position to challenge the treaty, a few critical voices, like that of the Miami chief Little
Turtle, were raised during the negotiations. Little Turtle argued to American officials that
41 Speeches at the Buffalo Creek Council, Nov. 16, 1792, in ASPIA, 1: 323
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the treaty "takes in the greater and best part of your brothers' hunting grounds, therefore,
your younger brothers are of [the] opinion, [that] you take too much of their lands away."
At the conference, Little Turtle invoked the French-Indian relations of earlier decades - a
period frequently imagined by Native Americans in the Great Lakes region in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth century as a "Golden Age." "You know, brother, when
the French formerly possessed this country, we were but one people," explained Little
Turtle to American officials at the treaty conference. We "had but one fire between us;
and we now entertain the hope of enjoying the same happy relation with you, the United
States."
42
Mirroring Little Turtle's hope for a brighter future, the Wyandot chief Tarhe
reminded government representatives that they should "take care of all your little ones, an
impartial father equally regards all his children."43
By at least temporarily undermining Native American militant resistance, the
treaty of Greenville of 1795 signified the end of the American Revolution for Ohio
Indians. But the struggle to maintain their independence and sovereignty continued as
Native Americans attempted to influence their destiny through familiar patterns and
processes of accommodation and militant resistance. At the same time, the treaty marked
a dramatic turning point for American Indians north of the Ohio River, leaving them with
fewer means of influencing and contesting the transformations that occurred in the
region.
Treaty of Greenville, Aug. 7, 1795, Speech of Little Turtle, ASPIA, 1: 576-577.
Treaty of Greenville, Aug. 7, 1795, Speech of Tarhe, ASPIA, 1: 580.
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more
The Continuing Struggle for Sovereignty and Independence in the Pn.t.T,^, M
Greenville Upper Ohio Valley. 1795-1812
A massive stream of Anglo American migration north of the Ohio river followed
the treaty of Greenville. Helen Hornbeck Tanner argues that whereas, the white
population in the region consisted of only 5,000 people in 1796, it increased to 230,000
by 1810. In contrast, Tanner estimates the Indian population of the entire Great Lakes
region in 1768 at about 60,000." Such rapidly growing white population numbers
increased the pressures on Ohio Indian communities and led federal officials to take
Native American land for white settlement. Hence, as with so many other "permanent"
dividing lines between white and Indian country before, the Greenville line was soon
dismissed, and American officials obtained more indigenous land through various new
treaties. Such developments, warned some Native American leaders, could encourage
violent retaliation by young fighters, as well as by those Ohio Indians who "were
grumbling about the treaties," and were "threatening to drive the Americans back over
the Ohio." White encroachments on American Indian lands exacerbated the scarcity of
game and decreased the Indians' ability to feed themselves. This led to further land sales
by Ohio Indians who were increasingly forced to rely on United States annuity payments
and income generated by selling parts of their territory for their subsistence.45
Alcoholism, which was worsened by land losses, social upheaval, and poverty also rose
44
Population numbers are from Helen Hornbeck Tanner, ed., Atlas ofGreat Lakes Indian
History (Norman: University ofOklahoma Press, 1987), 66, 96, 101.
45
Little Turtle to Dearborn, January 7, 1802, M15, roll 1, 138-143, National Archives;
Harrison to William Hargrove, 12 November 1807, Harrison Papers, 1: 273; Edward
Tiffin to Governor Huntingdon, December 23, 1808, Edward Tiffin Papers, Ohio
Historical Society, Columbus.
167
to endemic levels among Native American communities north of the Ohio, and reinforced
the crisis in Indian country.46
In the face of all these challenges, Native Americans in the Northwest Territory
continued to contest white power and attempted to influence the region's emergent
colonial racial order. As in earlier years, significant numbers of Ohio Indians, most
noticeably under the leadership of Black Hoof, Tarhe, and Little Turtle, sought to affect
their circumstances by seeking some measure of accommodation and peaceful
coexistence with Americans. Others, following the leadership of Tecumseh and
Tenskwatawa, endeavored to shape their future by rejecting coexistence and by using
militant resistance. Yet, despite these major differences, the two groups had a common
objective. They trusted that their strategies would aid Ohio Indian communities in their
struggle for survival and sovereignty.
Accommodation and the Search for Sovereignty
Most Native Americans in the Northwest Territory who chose to accommodate
partially to Anglo-American culture and the federal policy of civilization did not see
themselves as having embraced a superior way of life. Many remained critical of Anglo-
American colonization. Their strategy of limited accommodation rather grew out of a
realization after the Battle of Fallen Timbers (1794) that militant resistance against the
United States was futile. Several indigenous leaders saw the adoption of certain white
46
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economic
ways as the best way to cope with their communities' deteriorating social and
situation. But it is important to underscore that accommodation was partial and occurred,
in many cases, on Native American terms. Thus, Ohio Indians clung eagerly to numerous
established traditions and to their sovereignty. Chiefs like Black Hoof and Little Turtle
lobbied for example for the opening of federal trading stations in Indian country,
underscoring the fact that many male Ohio Indians continued to be keen on making a
living by hunting.47
In their efforts to transform their villages and towns, Ohio Indian chiefs also
sought the support of missionaries. The Quaker William Kirk, for example, assisted the
Shawnee in Black Hoofs settlement of Wapakoneta in clearing land, setting up orchards,
growing vegetables, building more log cabins, and erecting fences. With Kirk's
assistance, the Shawnees also obtained new hogs and cattle, two yokes of oxen, and farm
implements. Kirk and the Shawnees began construction of a gristmill and a sawmill.
Black Hoof thanked President Madison in a letter on April 10, 1809, for sending "our
friends, the Quakers, to help us, and we find that they are good people and concerned for
our welfare and have done a great deal for us in instructing our young men in a good way
on how to use the tools we see in the hands of our white brothers."48
Ohio Indian leaders who sought partial accommodation saw benefits in the
presence of Kirk and wanted him to remain. When the federal government discharged the
47
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us" in an
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Quaker missionary in December of 1808 because it saw his efforts as too costly,
indigenous leaders protested his dismissal. The Shawnee at Wapakoneta "respectfully
submitted whether it would be a good policy."49 Tarhe the leader of the Wyandots on the
Upper Sandusky, wrote that Kirk had fallen victim to a character assassination. He
argued that false reports were spread about the missionary by certain white people who
"have always been trying to keep us in the dark by telling false stories about
effort "to keep us down." Tarhe described the Quakers as "good people" who
have wanted to cheat us or take our land from us." Tarhe believed that the missionaries
would enable Ohio Indians to "come in" to the Anglo American "way of living."50
But Kirk allegedly overspent his inadequate funds and repeatedly lobbied the
federal government for more support. After only a few months of work in several Ohio
Indian communities, his position was eliminated. Government officials declared his
mission as too costly and "without an adequate benefit to the Indians." The protests by
the Wapakoneta Shawnees and the Wyandots of Upper Sandusky over Kirk's dismissal
were largely ignored.
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Ohio Indians saw missionaries not only as instructors in manual arts and as
intercultural brokers, but also as potential allies in their struggle to maintain sovereignty
over their land. The Wyandots at Sandusky for example encouraged the Presbyterian
missionary, Joseph Badger, to remind Anglo-American officials that the United States
had to acknowledge the Wyandots' landownership. This official recognition, argued the
Wyandots, would be a prerequisite if the civilization program among them were to be a
success.
52
Like indigenous prophets who rejected white culture, the Ohio Indian leaders who
sought partial accommodation with the Americans were concerned about alcoholism in
their communities. These chiefs saw alcohol abuse as a direct challenge to their
communities' social fabric, successful change, and sovereignty. Little Turtle reminded
President Jefferson that "your children are not wanting in industry, but it is the
introduction of this fatal poison which keeps them poor. Your children have not the
command over themselves that you have, therefore, before anything can be done to
advantage, this evil must be remedied." In conversation with Quakers, Little Turtle
maintained that the devastation induced by liquor "causes our young people to say, 'We
had better be at war with the white people.' This liquor that they introduce into our
country is more to be feared than the gun or the tomahawk; there are more of us dead
since the Treaty of Greenville, than we lost by the years of the war before." In 1802, the
lobbying by Ohio Indian chiefs and missionaries, led to the passage of a federal law that
forbade the sale of alcohol to Native Americans. Yet no law alone could stop the sale of
Joseph Badger to Thomas Worthington, December 13, 1806, Thomas Worthington
Paper, Ohio Historical Society, Columbus.
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bootleg liquor. White and Native American traders alike would continue to make a profit
by selling alcohol, and Ohio Indlan leaders and missionaries soon resumed to lobby
American officials to enforce the law they had passed more effectively. 53
Competition and jealousies among the chiefs that had allied their interests to the
United States occurred frequently. In part these animosities emerged from old rivalries,
but developments in the post Treaty of Greenville years also helped to harshen Indians'
conditions. Several Ohio Indian leaders, for example, criticized the American
government for providing too much attention, and financial and material support, to Little
Turtle at their expense. Little Turtle had close connections with the Indian agent William
Wells, a former adoptee among the Miami and the chiefs son in law. This intimate
relationship led the Shawnee leaders Black Snake and Black Hoof to repeatedly complain
about Wells partiality in devising assistance to Ohio Indian communities, and eventually
aided in his demotion. 54
Indigenous rivalries were much more pronounced between those who sought
partial accommodation and those who were ideologically opposed to American culture
and territorial encroachments. Ohio Indian chiefs like Little Turtle, Black Hoof, and
Tarhe saw the Shawnee prophet Tenskwatawa, his half brother Tecumseh and their
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growing number of supporters, as a direct challenge to then position. These leaders I
repeatedly accused Tenskwatawa for making "use of bad medicine," and encouraged
United States officials to suppress militant factions. Militant factions also undermined the
power of pro-United States government chiefs since they provided an alternative to their
supporters. Furthermore, government chiefs also blamed the prophet and his followers for
the killing of their followers and livestock and for the murders of American settlers. 55
Tecumseh and Tenskwatawa, on the other hand, denounced the actions of those
chiefs who took a friendly position toward the United States. They attacked these leaders
for their support of several treaties that led to major land sales north of the Ohio River.
To Tecumseh, Tenskwatawa, and their supporters, such losses of territory challenged
Native Americans' sovereignty, way of life, and survival in the region. Hence, rival
leaders were accused of being chiefs in the service of the American government that had
become "Big Knives," and traitors to the interests of their people. 56
The crisis in intercultural relations in the Upper Ohio Valley, which peaked
during the War of 1812, posed a severe test to Native Americans who pursued strategies
of partial accommodation. In 181 1, prior to the Battle of Tippecanoe, pro-American
Shawnees, who mostly lived on the Auglaize River in northwestern Ohio in close vicinity
to numerous Anglo-American settlements, once again attempted to ease the fears of white
settlers, by assuring them that "your interest and ours [are] inseparable. We wish to live
Wells to Dearborn, May 28, 1807, M221, roll 9, 2854-62, National Archives; William
Kirk to Dearborn, 20 July, 1807, ibid., roll 8, 2874-8; Black Hoof and other leaders to the
President, 1808, ibid., roll 17, 5258.
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in peace
-
we have no more to say." Ohio Ind,an leaders who sought accommodation,
repeatedly pledged to officials that they had "no intercourse or connection with" the
Shawnee prophet Tenswatawa or with Tecumseh, whom they blamed as the "principal
cause of all the mischief that has been done." Several chiefs reaffirmed their alliance to
the United States, arguing that the British had "always left us in difficulties." Friendly
Ohio Indian leaders certainly preferred to stay outside of the fighting in an upcoming war
that seemed unavoidable. Yet, they were willing to assist the American war effort with
"information if we know of any mischief coming your way." After assuring American
officials of their friendship, these Ohio Indians, however, also encouraged United States
officials to provide more support and to allow the Quakers to return "to assist" them "as
soon as possible." Such aid would support Native Americans in their "civilization"
efforts, so that both whites and Indians would "be more united until we all land in heaven
together."
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With the outbreak of the War of 1812, Ohio Indians continued to reassure
Americans about their friendly disposition at various conferences. Yet United States
officials were especially disappointed about a meeting at Piqua in the summer of 1812,
which only a little more than 900 American Indians attended (of which 590 were Ohio
Shawnees (who resided closest to Piqua), 26 Ottawas, 24 Kickapoos, 124 Mingoes, and
160 Delawares). American representatives had expected 3000 participants. But several
disastrous defeats of United States troops by the British and their Native American allies
57 Shawnee chiefs in council at Fort Wayne, Nov. 18, 181 1, M221, roll 46, 997, National
Archives. See also Johnston to Eustis, Aug. 27, 1811, ibid., roll 38, 4726-7; Johnston to
Eustis, Aug. 29, 1811, ibid., roll 38, 4723-5; Little Turtle to Harrison, Jan. 25, 1812, in
ASPIA, 1: 805-6.
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diminished Ohio Indians' confidence in American military capabilities. The military
setbacks led to a heightened alert among pro-American Indian communities who were
increasingly concerned about their security. The Wyandots of Upper Sandusky did not
attend the conference as they feared retribution from the British and hostile Indians. They
also obtained military reinforcements from numerous other Ohio Indian towns and
villages. To address American fears and pressures, Ohio Indians attending the Piqua
conference pledged once again their friendship to the United States and exclaimed that
they were not interested in siding with the British. American Indian leaders at the treaty
also assured officials "that they even had restrained their young men and would continue
to do so." Despite the low attendance at the August conference, by the spring of 1814
American officials estimated that at least 3000 Ohio Indians, the majority of the
Shawnee, Delaware, Mingo, and Wyandot nations, had remained friendly with the United
States throughout the conflict. 58
Ohio Indians who sought accommodation with the United States also actively -
though sometimes reluctantly - supported the United States' war effort in the region.
Their contributions, argued the Indian agent John Johnston, had played a valuable role in
the United States' campaign against the British. As seen in chapter 2, despite the dangers
this brought to loyal Indians and their communities, both from enemies but also from
American allies, "loyal" Native Americans provided reconnaissance work for the United
States and gave frequent warnings about enemy operations. They also provided scouts.
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Furthermore, Ohio Indian fighters who joined American forees in their attacks against the
British and their Indian allies numbered in the hundreds. 59
Militant Resistance and the Search for Sovereignty
Attempting to contest and shape the colonial racial order in the Ohio region, other
Native American groups rejected Anglo American culture and employed violence to
oppose the advance of white colonization. Like indigenous groups in earlier decades, they
sought territorial and cultural separation from the United States, pursued an alliance with
the British, and during the War of 1 8 1 2, defended their homelands through militant
resistance. Determined to retain Indian sovereignty, this pan-Indian confederacy made
one last attempt to stop American advances north of the Ohio river
The major spiritual guide of this last pan-Indian confederacy in the Upper Ohio
Valley was the Shawnee Prophet, Tenskwatawa. He was the brother of Tecumseh,
formerly a minor chief of the Shawnees who became the major political and military
leader of the anti-American resistance. Much of Tenskwatawa' s early life is unknown to
us. An inadequate hunter and warrior, he held little status in Shawnee society.
Tenskwatawa, like so many other Ohio Indians, turned to alcohol and had the reputation
of an infamous drunk. One day, in 1805, he fell into a trance, from which he emerged
Johnston to John Armstrong, March 25, 1814, M221, roll 54, 8399, National Archives;
Johnston to Eustis, May 12, 1812, ibid, roll 46, 1064-6; Stickney to Armstrong, Nov. 21,
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saying that he had spoken to the Master of Life who had sent him to lead the Ohio
Indians on a path to redemption from their desperate situation.
The prophet told Ohio Indians that the Master of Life wanted them to abandon
white ways, give up metal implements and weapons, and put aside Anglo-American
clothing as polluting influences on their societies. The Master of Life also warned Ohio
Indians:
I am the father of the English, of the French of the Spaniards and of the
Indians, I created the first man, who was the common father of all these
people, as well as yourselves and it is through him, whom I have
awakened from his long sleep that I now address you. But the Americans I
did not make. They are not my children, but the children of the evil spirit.
They grew from the scum of the great water, when it was troubled by the
evil spirit.
.
.
They are numerous, but I hate them My children: You
must not speak of this talk to the whites. It must be hidden from them. I
am now on the earth, sent by the Great Spirit to instruct you. . . you must
come to see me, and be instructed. Those villages which do not listen to
this talk, and send me two deputies, will be cut off from the face of the
earth.
The prophet and his supporters believed that a strict separation of the Ohio Indian and the
Anglo American world, would lead to a restoration of the old order. It would entice the
Master of Life to "overturn the land," which Native Americans "alone shall inhabit."
Then the forests would again teem with game, the cornfields grow plenty, and the Ohio
Indians, they were told by Tenskwatawa, would be reunited with "your children or your
friends that have long been dead."61
The prophet condemned the strategies of Native American groups who attempted
to accommodate American culture and expansion, and he wanted to maintain the
traditional way of life. Ohio Indians who sought accommodation, he explained to
61
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Governor Lewis Cass of Michigan, "now live like you whites." Instead the prophet
believed that American Indian males should adhere to hunter and warrior ways.
Contesting missionary demands that native men should farm, Tenskwatawa argued that
women should "raise corn." He reminded Cass that "you [too] would think it hard to be
compelled to live as we do." The prophet continued, "we cannot live as you do... We
wish to live as our fathers have lived before us.
. . We cannot live with our brothers" at
Wapakoneta who "do not live as their forefathers used to live."62
Militant factions used violent means to challenge Native Americans who pursued
strategies of accommodation. In March 1806, the Moravian missionaries on the White
River in southeastern Indiana, reported several attacks on leaders in the surrounding
Delaware communities, which they believed had been singled out by the Shawnee
prophet for having supported the United States' civilization policy. The missionaries
reported the killing and burning at the stake of several friendly chiefs, and other
influential persons including the Moravian Indian helper and translator, Joshua. All had
been accused of witchcraft. When the intimidated Moravian missionaries approached the
Delaware council for advice on how they should pursue their mission, it was clear that
the Delaware leadership had been influenced by Tenskwatawa's nativist rhetoric. "In
olden times the Indians did not know how to live alright," the councilors told the
missionary Abraham Luckenbach, "but now we ourselves know how to live and need no
one to teach us. None of us will come to hear your Word, for you are white people and
Quoted in Sugden, Bluejacket, 238.
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we are Indians. You have another eolor than we.
. . your teaching is good for white
people but not for us."63
A wave of witchcraft persecutions also occurred among the Wyandot towns and
villages on the Sandusky in the spring of the same year. As R. David Edmunds points
out, some Shawnee, like the prophet, believed that land loss, alcoholism, and economic
deterioration were in part caused and reinforced by witchcraft.64 In the Sandusky villages,
Tenskwatawa "had named four" women who supported accommodation "in the nation as
witches, and condemned them to be executed." Tarhe, the influential pro-accommodation
chief among the Wyandots, challenged the prophet and his followers and disrupted their
efforts. Still, at times, Tarhe was not successful in counteracting Tenskwata's efforts to
gain support among the Wyandots. In the early summer of 1810, for example, Wyandots
loyal to the prophet succeeded in murdering the influential Leatherlips and two women,
whom the Presbyterian missionary Joseph Badger described as "the most respectable
people.
.
.
peaceable and industrious."65
While his brother Tenskwatawa emerged as the spiritual leader of the last Native
American militant resistance movement in the Ohio region, Tecumseh took on much of
the political initiative. Tecumseh worked to rebuild the Ohio Confederacy, which had
collapsed after Fallen Timbers. Like members of earlier Indian alliances, Tecumseh
See diary entries from March 13-26, 1806, "Diary of the Little Indian Congregation on
the White River for the Year 1806," in Lawrence Gipson, ed. The Moravian Indian
Mission on White River (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Bureau, 1938), 412-9.
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complained about Anglo American efforts to take over indigenous lands by creating
disunity among Native American nations.
The great spirit said he gave this great island to his red children. He placed
the whites on the other side of the big water, they were not contented with
their own but came to take ours from us. They have driven us from the
sea to the lakes we can go no farther. They have taken upon themselves to
say this tract belongs to the Miamis, this to the Delawares & so on, but the
Oreat Spirit intended it as the common property of all the Tribes, nor can
it be sold without the consent of all.
The Shawnee leader also objected to the sale of more Indian land, and blamed "village
chiefs" for failing "to manage the affairs of the Indians" by selling "common property."
During negotiations in the summer of 1810 at Vincennes, Indiana, he also warned Indiana
territory governor Harrison that he should hold no further treaties with Ohio Indian
leaders since Tecumseh "alone [was] the acknowledged chief of all the Indians." Like his
brother Tenskwatawa, Tecumseh believed that Indian country and American territory
should be separated. He told Harrison that he intended to disregard recent treaties
between United States officials and "government chiefs." Tecumseh wanted "the present
boundary line to continue." Should Americans "cross it," he assured Harrison "it will be
productive of bad consequences."66
Tecumseh and Tenskwatawa worked hard to build as broad an alliance as they
could. Their message appealed to several of the first people of Ohio and Indiana. But the
two brothers' efforts in recruiting supporters were generally more successful among
American Indian situated further to the north and west. Since these factions lived at a
greater distance from Anglo-American settlements than Ohio Indian groups, they were
Harrison to Eustis, August 6, 1810, in Harrison, 1: 456-9; Harrison to Eustis, August
22, 1806, in ibid., 1:459-69.
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likely to feel less threatened by United States' pressures. Tecumseh also had contacts
with factions among the Muskogee, the Choctaws, and several other southern tribes.
Finding support divided among indigenous Americans, Tecumseh sought assistance from
the British, whom he believed were interested in trading fur but who would not take
Indian land.67 This alliance, like previous British-Indian coalitions, writes historian Colin
Calloway, "was testimony to the threat posed by American expansionism and the benefits
to be derived from the fur trade, rather than to any friendship and mutual respect between
the British and the Indians."68 As Tecumseh rejected American annuity payments and
gifts, he saw the British as a useful source of supplies as well as collaborators in
impeding the United States' territorial advances.
Relations between the Ohio Indian confederacy and the British became even
closer after the Battle of Tippecanoe, in which American troops attacked members of the
pan-Native American alliance but failed to decisively defeat it. When the United States
started its offensive against the British and its indigenous allies on the northern frontier a
few months later, native troops played a crucial role in the defense of Canada. In the
summer of 1812, the Great Lake Indians under the leadership of Tecumseh played a
pivotal part in forcing back an American invasion. Fighters of Tecumseh's confederacy
also were present when Americans surrendered Detroit to the British. Tecumseh himself
lost his life on Canadian soil, when he was killed on October 5, 1813, at the Battle of
Johnston to Eustis, July 3, 1810, M221, roll 38, 4614, National Archives; Johnston to
Eustis, July 25, 1810, ibid., roll 38, 4621; Johnston to Eustis, Aug. 7, 1810, ibid., roll 38,
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Thames while attempting to aid the British in repudiating another American offensive.
With the death of Tecumseh ended the last effort by Ohio Indians to resist the territorial
advances of Anglo Americans by military means.
The final blow to the confederacy's aspirations to sovereignty came with the
Treaty of Ghent. On Christmas Eve, 1814, the British signed yet another peace treaty
with the United States without consulting their Native American allies. This treaty
marked the abandonment of the British effort to actively support a Native American
resistance effort in the Ohio region.
Conclusion
For Ohio Indians the War of 1812 left an important legacy. Regardless of which
side they supported during the conflict, their experiences during and after the War of
1812 were similar. During the war, most Native Americans in the region, whether friend
or foe to the United States, suffered from shortages of supplies as well as from the
destruction of their fields, houses, property, and livestock. In the years following the war,
the Ohio Indians' inability for militant resistance undermined their capabilities to
negotiate and contest the transformation of the region. Since a growing number of first
nations faced increasing debt, poverty, and scarcity of resources, American Indians in
Ohio and Indiana had to submit to more Anglo-American territorial demands. As
American officials pushed Ohio Indians to submit to removal in the years and decades
after the War of 1812, it became clear that the region's indigenous people were becoming
increasingly marginalized and unable to maintain their sovereignty in the region.
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CHAPTER 5
THIS LAND IS OUR LAND:" AFRICANS IN THE EASTERN CAPE AND THEIR
STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY
Like Native Americans in the Upper Ohio Valley, the local peoples of the Eastern
Cape continued their efforts to shape their region's transformation in the first half of the
nineteenth century. Africans pursued various strategies in their interactions with
colonialism, ranging from militant resistance to partial accommodation. But the lines
between tactics of accommodation with, and resistance to, the colonial state and white
expansion in the Eastern Cape were even less clear than in the Upper Ohio Valley.
Whereas so-called "government chiefs," like the Miami, Little Turtle, or the Shawnee,
Black Hoof, sought at least partial accommodation and lent military support to the United
States in the post-Treaty of Greenville years after 1795, only a few groups in the Eastern
Cape, like the Mfengu, followed such a strategy. The majority of western Xhosa factions
like the Ngqika, Ndlambe, or Gqunukhwebe pursued changing alliances either in support
of or in opposition to, the colony during the numerous wars that the Cape government
waged with the Xhosa during the first half of the nineteenth century. Ultimately, Africans
had one goal in mind; to maintain as much of their independence and autonomy as their
situation allowed.
Contested Grounds (Part I): Rivalry, Christianity, Frontier Policy, and Sovereignty
In the first three or four decades of the nineteenth century, various Xhosa factions,
as well as other Africans in the region, pursued a wide variety of strategies in their
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interactions with the Cape Colony in their efforts to maintain their independence,
sovereignty, and autonomy. Especially in the 1810s, when the leader of the Ngqika
faction, Ngqika, maintained a loose alliance with the colony, he also attempted to
establish stronger control over such neighboring groups as the Ndlambe, the
Gqunukhwebe, and other smaller factions. After the Ngqika lost part of their territory in
the aftermath of the War of 1818-19 through a dubious treaty, their relations with the
Cape government turned progressively more sour. Yet alliances with the colonial state
were not the only tactic Africans implemented to secure their position. This section looks
at how a small number of Africans in the Eastern Cape drew on or intended to use
Christianity and missionaries as allies in their struggle for sovereignty. The section
concludes by examining how the Cape Colony's "frontier policy" throughout the 1820s
and 1 830s angered a growing number of western Xhosa factions.
Nxele and Ntsikana: The Rivalry of the Ndlambe and Ngqika to the War of 1818-19
Throughout the 1810s, and as briefly mentioned in chapter 3, the Xhosa leader
Ngqika pursued a loose partnership with the Cape Colony. During the War of 181 1-12,
for example, colonial forces with the assistance of the Ngqika Xhosa defeated the
Ndlambe Xhosa and their allies, and removed them from the Zuurveld. After the war,
Cape officials declared Ngqika the paramount chief of the Xhosa, and held him
accountable for all acts committed against the colonists. Even though Ngqika's relations
with the colony were often ambiguous, these ties reinforced his increasing unpopularity
among many of the western Xhosa. Numerous western Xhosa who came to see Ngqika's
position as compromised, believed that his strategy of partial accommodation with the
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colony was wrong. The fact that the colonists reserved the right to retrieve allegedly
stolen cattle from Xhosa territory led to more tensions, and further undermined Ngqika's
authority. Many Xhosa, including several of Ngqika's subjects, came to see the Cape
Colony as a major threat.
The abduction of one ofNdlambe's wives by Ngqika also fueled tensions, leading
a growing number of minor western Xhosa chiefs and their supporters to defect and join
forces with Ndlambe. In October 1818, frictions among the Xhosa led to a clash at
Amalinde. Ngqika and his remaining allies were decisively defeated. But colonial forces,
as discussed in chapter 3, with the military assistance of the Ngqika, swiftly struck
against the Ndlambe Xhosa in December of 1818, despite Ndlambe's appeal that he and
his supporters were eager to remain at peace with the colony. The Cape military
reclaimed Ngqika's territory and captured 23,000 ofNdlambe's cattle, of which only
9,000 were given to the Ngqikas. Military authorities distributed the remaining cattle
among Dutch-speaking farmers or sold them to defray the costs of the expedition. The
loss of cattle left Ndlambe's people in dire straits and on the brink of starvation. As a
result, the Ndlambe staged a renewed attack on the Ngqika, raiding the colony to reclaim
their cattle as well. They also declared that the British military intervention had been an
intrusion in an internal dynastic quarrel and a violation of their sovereignty. In their
views, the colony had no right to attack them, especially as the Ndlambe had not violated
the borders of the colony. Cape military intervention had amounted to a declaration of
war.
1
1
Peires, The House ofPhalo, 58-63; Major Fraser to the Landrost of Uitenhage, Feb. 4,
1819, in RCC, XII: 134-136; Pringle, Narrative, 277-278; Switzer, Power and Resistance
in an African Society, 53. On the limitations of the power of chiefs and the fluidity of
factions among the Xhosa see for example Maclean, Compendium, 13, 24-25; Testimony
185
As with the territorial dispossessions that proceeded the War of 181 1-12 in the
Upper Ohio Valley, the crisis created by colonial encroachments on the Xhosa, including
the persistent raids by commandos, set the stage for the rise of prophets as important
leaders in Xhosa society. Nxele who became a prominent leader among the Ndlambes,
was the most influential Xhosa prophet in the early decades of the nineteenth century. He
had spent a considerable amount of time in Grahamstown, where he had been introduced
to European culture and Christianity. Yet as the popularity of Nxele's message increased,
the prophet abandoned the Christian elements in his message. Instead he embraced more
traditional customs such as dance, polygamy, the use of red ochre body paint, and he
demanded gifts in form of cattle. He also saw a spiritual component to the contest created
by European colonization. Nxele considered the Eastern Cape as a battlefield between the
god of the blacks, which he called Mdalidiphu, and Thixo, the god of the whites. He
preached that the whites had killed the son of the god of the blacks, likely a reference to
Jesus Christ, and had therefore, been expelled to the sea. From there the colonists had
returned in search for land, and the prophet believed that Mdalidiphu would push them
back again. Nxele's emphasis on the symbolic division of land and sea, representing the
Xhosa and the European, advocated a clear separation between the two groups.2
The message proclaimed by another prophet named Ntsikana, which mixed
Christian and Xhosa religious elements, stood in clear contrast to that of Nxele. Head of a
homestead in Ndlambe's chiefdom, Ntsikana's spiritual services were rejected by his
leader who favored Nxele, which led Ntsikana to join ranks with Ngqika. Ntsikana
of Tshuka, Cape ofGood Hope Report and Proceedings ofthe Government Commission
on Native Laws and Customs, 2 vols. (Cape Town: W. A. Richards and Sons, 1883), 1:
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articulated a pacifist message, urged his followers to embrace Christianity, and advocated
accommodation to colonial expansion. He also directly challenged Nxele's cosmology of
the battle among the good god of the blacks Mdalidiphu and the evil god of the whites
Thixo, which was in Nxele's views represented in the struggle between Xhosa and
colonists. Instead, Ntsikana argued that this contest did not exist and that all humankind
had one common god in Thixo. Ntsikana also embraced the Christian concept of the
divinity of Jesus Christ, Thixo's son. In a religious hymn, written by Ntsikana, he
depicted this god as a protector and unifier. "He is the one who brings together herds
which oppose each other. He is the leader who has led us. He is the great blanket which
we put on." Submission to god, the prophet believed, would bring peace. Before his death
in 1821, Ntsikana encouraged his followers to join Christian missions in Xhosaland, to
embrace European religion, farming, clothing, housing, and education. Even though
Ntsikana's message was never popular with a large number of Xhosa, historians and
religious scholars underscore the importance of his vision since it set the stage for the
spread of an African Christianity in the southern part of the continent. Thus, Nxele's and
Ntsikana's strategies became "models" for Africans in the Eastern Cape, aiding them in
conceptualizing their interactions with European colonization.3
Whereas Ntsikana pursued a strategy of accommodation, Nxele proclaimed
militant resistance against the colony. During the War of 1818-19, colonial officials
alleged that the prophet Nxele had encouraged the Ndlambes to commit small scale
attacks on the Cape and to plunder and destroy Christian missions in Xhosa territory.
Cape officials also argued that Nxele had ordered a frontal assault against Grahamstown
3
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on April 22, 1819. This was an unusual tactical maneuver for the Xhosa who preferred to
confront British and Cape forces in the thick of the bush. Xhosa confidence in the success
of their attack seemed to have been further boosted by Nxele's prediction that the
Xhosa's ancestors would arise from the dead to support the endeavor and that their
enemies' bullets would be turned to water. But the Xhosa were no match to the firepower
of Khoikhoi and British soldiers as well as that of the colonists, and failed to breach the
town's defensive lines. Of the over 6,000 fighters that joined in the attack, several
hundred were killed or wounded and the survivors fled toward the Kei River.4
In retaliation for the assault on Graham's Town, colonial forces and 600 Ngqika
fighters struck against the Ndlambes and their allies. This was one of a series of conflicts
in the Cape in which colonial forces conducted total warfare against Africans. The
invading army killed elderly persons, women, and children who had fallen behind the
fleeing Xhosa fighters. They bombarded bushes in which the Xhosa were hiding with
artillery, and killed or drove out thousands of Xhosa from the territory between the Fish
and the Keiskamma River. On August 15, Nxele surrendered to British troops to avoid
further violence. He was imprisoned on Robben Island, and drowned during an attempted
escape in 1820. After Nxele's surrender, colonial forces struck against the Gcaleka Xhosa
east of the Kei River, capturing 30,000 cattle, despite their paramount leader Hintsa's
assurances to colonial officials of his peaceful stance toward the Cape. Colonial officials
justified this attack by arguing that the Gcaleka harbored stolen cattle and had aided the
Ndlambes. 5
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Bathurst, May 22, 1819, in RCC, XII: 193-202.
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As mentioned earlier, the War of 1818-19 resulted in dramatic land losses for the
western Xhosa. Colonial forces pushed the Ndlambes and their allies east of the
Keiskamma River. Furthermore, and despite his assistance to the colony, Governor
Sommerset pressured Ngqika to also surrender his land between the Fish and the
Keiskamma River. The Cape authorities used this agreement with Ngqika as a
justification to dispossess all Xhosa in the area. Many western Xhosa were angered by
these territorial losses. Their leaders argued that their land was "neverceded," and that it
was "impossible it could have been ceded." Groups like the Ndlambes, the
Gqunukhwebe, and other smaller factions of the western Xhosa questioned the legality of
the treaty, reasserted their sovereignty, and challenged British claims. They maintained
that Ngqika "could give away no part of our territory without our consent."6 The
Gqunukhwebe chiefs Kama and Pato complained that their loss of land was "owing
probably to some blunder of the interpreters." Pato argued that "[i]fwe had known Gaika
[Ngqika] dared to give away any part of the country we would have opposed it." Instead
the Xhosa's understanding of the 1819 removals was that the territorial loss was not
permanent, and that they would be eventually allowed to reoccupy their land.7
5 Sommerset to the Earl of Bathurst, Sept. 24, 1819, in RCC, XII: 319-322. For the
Cape's campaign against the Xhosa see for example Maclennan, A Proper Degree of
Terror, 200-217
.
6 Quote see South African Commercial Advertizer, April 3, 1830. On this issue see also
Testimony of Stockenstrom, Aug. 14, 1835, BPP 538/1836, 46; W. Shaw to the Earl of
Aberdeen, April 7, 1835, in BPP 252/1835, 137-142.
7
South African Commercial Advertizer, April 10, 1830; Shaw to J. Gregory, April 6,
1826, BPP 50/1835, 177-178.
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Christianity and the African Struggle for Sovereignty
In their struggle to maintain sovereignty and autonomy, some Africans in the
Eastern Cape saw Christianity, missions, and missionaries as new strategic possibilities.
Missions, for example, provided Khoisans with limited access to land and a measure of
protection from abuse and violence by farmers. After an insurrection among the Khoikhoi
in the early nineteenth century, the LMS mission of Bethelsdorp became a refuge for
many Khoikhoi insurrectionists who would otherwise have suffered assassinations or ill-
treatment by farmers in revenge for their uprising. Elizabeth Elbourne points out,
however, that not all Khoisan conversions were solely instrumental. They rather took the
messages of Christianity "in accordance with their own needs and existing situations."8
Khoisan and other "converts" developed their assumptions about and interpretations of
Christianity independently of colonists. By adhering to pastoralist lifeways whenever
possible, Khoikhoi, attempted also to preserve their personal and communal identity.9
Yet, as elaborated on in chapter 3, in the 1820s and 1830s missions and other Khoisan
communities were also places with high rates of poverty, rising alcoholism, social
despair, and an increasing burden of debt - a fact that remained generally unaddressed in
humanitarian writings. 10
Africans within the colony frequently connected their social grievances to the loss
of land. "The loss of our country reduced us to poverty," asserted Valentyn Jacobs, a
Elbourne, Blood Ground, 174.
9
Elbourne, Blood Ground, 130-146, 156-159, 174, 236. On the Khoikhoi rebellion see
Susan Newton-King and V.C. Malherbe, The Khoikhoi Rebellion in the Eastern Cape,
1799-1803 (Rondebosch: Centre for African Studies, University of Cape Town, 1981).
10
Elbourne, Blood Ground, 260-262; Elphick and Malherbe, "Khoisan to 1828," in The
Shaping ofSouth African Society, 46; Keegan, Colonial South Africa, 117.
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Khoisan leader, in a public meeting, "then came the brandy and [that] made us work
whole year for a Cow or a Heiffer." Access to land was thus a major demand for
Khoisans who were increasingly frustrated with their situation. 11 "After the promulgation
of the 50th Ordinance we asked that the remainder of the land still in the Colony might be
granted to the Hottentots, but this was not acceded to," wrote a Khoikhoi commentator in
the South African Commercial Advertiser in 1834. "It is true, the Government has granted
the Hottentots a small parcel of land at Kat River, for which we are always grateful: but it
is calculated that the Hottentot nation counts 30,000 souls and there are only 5,000 at Kat
River." But even at Kat River, despite limited economic success and material
accumulation, non-white settlers received little of the promised government assistance.
James Read junior, James Read's son who was part Khoikhoi and like his father served as
a minister at Kat River, wrote:
To get implements of husbandry they had to dispose of their oxen and
horses. To support life they had to run into debt with a shopkeeper who
after enticing them to buy things on credit (no doubt in expectation of
getting a mortgage on their lands) but being foiled in this attempt, came
upon them with summons before they were either aware or prepared to
meet the demands.
Due to such developments and crammed on limited land with no hope for new territory,
Kat River settlers faced a steady economic decline, especially compared with white
colonists who by the 1840s and 1850s also increasingly desired the fertile lands of non-
whites.
13
ii Quote Elbourne, Blood Ground, 260.
12
South African Commercial Advertiser, June 25, 1834. See also South African
Commercial Advertiser, Feb. 20, 1830.
13 James Read Jun. to John Philip, Nov. 16, 1835, in Kitchingman Papers, 156-159,
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Khoisans, who were often of Christian background, also protested the eventually
unsuccessful Vagrancy Legislation of 1834, discussed in chapter 3. This law threatened
to compel non-whites to find "legal settlement," a master, or face the danger of being senl
to perform work on public projects. As several historians point out, the Vagrancy
Legislation of 1834 challenged traditional Khoisan modes of subsistence such as
pastoralism as well as hunting and gathering. The 1834 law especially targeted Khoisans
who eked out a living on unallocated crown lands, and attempted to compel them to join
the Cape's non-white labor force. Khoisan speakers made frequently remarked that
Vagrancy Legislation posed a clear threat to their "liberties" and "rights." It was not only
a danger to individual Khoikhoi, but it was an "oppression of the [Khoikhoi] 'nation'."
Other Khoikhoi speakers denounced the law as racially oppressive. Khoisan frustration
over colonial labor and land policy, and its dissonance with imperial humanitarian
rhetoric, would only grow in the following decades as the Cape passed harsher
apprenticeship and Masters and Servants laws. 14
In the 1 820s, several Xhosa chiefs looked at missionaries as potential allies in
their struggle to maintain political, economic, and social independence for their people -
relationships built on differing goals and objectives, mutual misunderstandings,
ambiguities, and discord. The aging Ndlambe, for instance, who gave missionaries
permission to settle in his territory in the mid- 1820s, considered the missionaries to be
potentially useful advisors and protectors.
I see indeed strange things to-day. I am old and unable to defend myself.
The Missionary is come to be my great Captain. My eye shall he be and
14
Elbourne, Blood Ground, 274-276; Crais, White Supremacy and Black Resistance, 147;
Keegan, Colonial South Africa, 120-122.
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my ear also. To-day does it appear that I have friends.
. . Never have we
been safe; but the umfundis [missionaries/teachers] shall be our bush. 15
Political reasons also motivated the influential Gqunukhwebe leader Pato to welcome the
presence of missionaries. In 1823, Pato told the missionary William Shaw that he should
serve him as a "bescherm bosh" - a "bush of defence from wind and rain." 16 Still, Pato
and Shaw clashed frequently over cultural differences. Pato, for example, left a marriage
ceremony "apparently in anger" after Shaw preached against polygamy. Furthermore,
leaders like Hintsa, the paramount chief of the Gcaleka Xhosa, or Ngqika, were
extremely reluctant to accept missions in their territory. After four years of missionary
work among the Xhosa, Shaw complained that he still was unable to baptize any of the
major leaders due to their resistance. Yet, missionaries had some success with minor
Xhosa leaders like Pato's brother Kama and Dyani Tshatshu a Ntinde. 17
Xhosa "conversion" to Christianity was a transitional process shaped by religious
syncretism, a development exemplified by the life and career of Soga. Soga was a
follower of Ntsikana who quickly abandoned the mission at Chumie after the prophet's
death, and built a thriving homestead by using irrigation and plow agriculture. There he
conducted his own version of Xhosa Christian services, performing only the hymns and
prayers of Ntsikana. Soga also practiced polygamy, allowed his followers to practice
ancestral rituals, and like other Xhosa leaders conferred with diviners. In addition, and
15
Kay, Travels and Researches, 73.
16 William Shaw, Memorials ofSouth Africa (New York: Negro University Press, 1970),
280-283.
17
William Shaw, The Journal of William Shaw, ed. W.D. Hammond-Tooke (Cape Town
Balkema, 1972), 72-86; 90-91.
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along with Dukwana, Ntsikana's son, and an evangelist leader at Chumie mission, he
vehemently opposed the Cape Colony's annexations of Xhosa lands. 18
Before the War of 1834-35, missionaries and white visitors often drew a
deceptively successful picture of developments at Xhosa missions and of the conversion
of Xhosa to Christianity. W.R. Thomson, a merchant and member of the English settler
elite in Graham's Town, for example, favorably described changes among the Xhosa
living on the Chumie mission and their improvements in "mode of life and advances
towards civilisation." He reported that the settlement had "30 houses.
. . constructed in
the European fashion." Thomson welcomed the fact that men built the mission's houses
and gardens, rather than women, as had been customary among the Xhosa. A few men
had "trained to the yoke and worked their own oxen." Male residents at Chumie had
obtained varying proficiencies in "ploughing, wagon driving, brick laying, sawing, with
hand or pit saws, planing, [and] thatching." The Inhabitants of Chumie also began to
"rear a few potatoes and culinary vegetables" along with "their usual crops," and some
had adopted European dress. 19 Yet such portrayals were drawn from a European
perspective, and often provided an incomplete representation of developments on Xhosa
missions.
Prior to the 1850s, missionaries had only limited success among the Xhosa.
Historian Colin Bundy writes that by 1850 only about 16,000, out of a total population of
perhaps 400,000, lived on mission stations. Moreover, many Xhosa "converts" joined the
18
Rev. W. Chalmers to Lt. Col. Smith, June 20, 1836, BPP 503/1837, 266; Janet
Hodgson, "Soga and Dukwana: The Christian Struggle for Liberation in mid- 19
th
Century
South Africa," Journal ofReligion in Africa XVI, 3 ( 1 986), 1 87-208.
19 W.R. Thomson to John Gregory, April 30, 1825, BPP 50/1835, 185-187; see also
Shaw, Journal, 68.
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anti-colonial resistance during the War of 1850-53. Clearly, the majority of Xhosa
remained skeptical toward Christianity. One Xhosa, for instance, told the missionary
Stephen Kay in 1825 that "I have lived long in the world, without God; therefore it is of
no use for me to change now."20 The attitudes ofmany Xhosa leaders toward
missionaries also changed. By the 1840s and 1850s, Xhosa leaders saw missionaries as
little other than threats to African sovereignty and agents of empire. During the War of
1 850-53, the Ngqika paramount chief Sandile, for example, expressed his frustration with
missionaries, whom he saw as challenging the social order he desired. "Are they not men
who at home have no people of their own, and they come here to take my people from
me?" Sandile exclaimed. "I will allow no more of them among my people. They only
take my people and give them to the Government. What brings white men over the sea? -
has not God put it between us and them?"21
The Xhosa and the Cape Colony's Frontier Policy
As mentioned earlier, in the first decades of the nineteenth century, numerous
western Xhosa grew increasingly frustrated with the Cape Colony's frontier policy. Many
of them especially perceived the removal ofMaqoma and his people from the Kat River
region in the late 1820s, discussed in more detail in chapter 3, as a challenge to their
sovereignty. It especially angered the Ngqika, to which Maqoma belonged, who angrily
Quote Kay, Travels and Researches, 36. See also Colin Bundy, Rise and Fall ofthe
South African Peasantry (Cape Town: David Philip, 1979), 40; Peires, House ofPhalo,
74-78.
21 Quote George Brown, Personal Adventure in South Africa (London: James
Blackwood, 1855), 154. See also Henry Calderwood, Caffres and Caffre Missions; with
Preliminary Chapters on the Cape Colony as a Fieldfor Emigration and Basis of
Military Operation (London: James Nisbet, 1858), 210.
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questioned the claim by Cape officials that their former leader Ngqika had ceded the Kat
River region as part of a treaty. The Ngqika also rejected claims by colonial
administrators that their removal was justified by their aggression against their northern
neighbors the Thembu, an attack which according to the Xhosa had been made in
response to Thembu cattle stealing. Furthermore, Maqoma protested the confiscation of
1,400 head of cattle. The Ngqika argued that they had been "friends" of the English and
had "assisted" them over the years, which made the removal and colonial cattle raids the
"most difficult thing" to understand.22
Cattle raids among the Xhosa by colonial patrols, allegedly in retaliation for
African livestock theft throughout the 1820s and 1830s, further fanned their anger.
Testifying in front of the Commission on Aborigines in 1835 in London, Andries
Stockenstrom reported that Xhosa frequently told him: "We do not care how many Xhosa
you shoot if they come into your country, and you catch them stealing." But they opposed
the territorial violations by commandos, claiming that "for every cow you take from our
country you make a thief."23 In 1823, a single military patrol led by Henry Sommerset, a
military officer and the governor's son, was rumored to have captured 7,000 cattle in
Xhosaland. Colonial patrols were at times accused of attacking innocent Xhosa - killing
women and children - and claiming cattle from villages for thefts committed by members
of different communities. Other observers suspected that several villages handed over
cattle to authorities for fear of being attacked by commandos. Some Xhosa attempted to
22 Xhosa to Gov. Sir B D'Urban, Dec. 31, 1834, BPP 503/1837, 49. See also South
African Commercial Advertiser, May 16, 1829.
23
Testimony Strockenstrom, Aug. 19, 1835, BPP 538/1836, 83. See also letter of H.
Huntley to the Commission of the Inquiry, Jan. 17, 1826, BPP 50/1835, 184-185.
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resist colonial efforts to take cattle by attacking military patrols. Others attempted to find
diplomatic solutions. Yet emissaries who tried to travel into the colony to discuss the
presence of patrols faced the danger of being shot at, as Xhosa were forbidden to cross
into the colony. On numerous occasions, the Xhosa did cooperate with commandos. In
April 1832, for example, a group of Xhosa aided a patrol in an attack on a faction from a
neighboring homestead, accused of having killed two soldiers.24
In the early 1830s, the situation escalated further, as a growing number of western
Xhosa came to see the encroachments by commandos as an intolerable violation of their
sovereignty. The Ngqika leader Maqoma, for instance, complained about the constant
intrusions of the patrol system on his people: "I am shot every day; my huts are set [on]
fire to[o], and I can only sleep with one eye open." He also grumbled that his people in
their mountain exile suffered from death and hunger.25 At a meeting with Stockenstrom
in 183 1 , Ngqika leaders assured the Cape official that they would try to maintain peace.
But they seemed certain "that the white man will not let us sit still, as long as we have a
foot of land or a gat cow."26 The influential Xhosa leader Tyhali protested that the Cape
government claimed that "we are at peace with you, but during that peace we have been
murdered, our chiefs have been killed, our people murdered. What sort of peace is that
Justus, The Wrongs ofthe Caffre Nation (London: James Duncan, 1837), 1 14-1 15,
1 17-121; Graham 's Town Journal, April 13, Aug. 17, Sept. 7, 1832. Lieut. W. H. Rogers
to Lt. Col. H. Sommerset, Jan. 13, 1826, BPP 252/1835, 145-146; Commissioners of
Inquiry to Lt. Col. Henry Somerset, Jan. 27, 1826, ibid., 146-147; Thomas Pringle to the
Commission of Inquiry, Jan. 12, 1826, BPP 50/1835, 183-184.
25 Testimony of Tshatshu, June 20, 1 836, BPP 538/1 836, 571 . See also South African
Commercial Advertiser, Dec. 7, 1833.
26 Stockenstrom, Autobiography, 1: 398-399.
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which has murdered 44 of our men."27 Late in 1834, the injuring of another Xhosa leader
by a military patrol became the final offence for many Ngqika Xhosa and their allies.
They were now unwilling to tolerate anymore the encroachments by colonial commandos
on their territory, reacted angrily to the annexations of their cattle, and responded with an
attack on the colony. The Cape military had "disturbed the peace of the land, and torn it
in pieces."
28
Contested Grounds (Part II): African Strategies of Partial Accommodation.
Resistance, and the Search for Sovereignty. 1835-1853
As discussed in chapter 3, Xhosa resistance during the War of 1834-35 was
especially strong among the Ngqika and Ndlambe. They attacked colonial settlements,
missions, farms, and wagons, and plundered sheep, cattle, and horses. Ngqika resistance
was further spurred by anger over the loss of the "Ceded Territory" - land, which
according to Cape officials, the Ngqika had conceded. Most Xhosa believed that they had
not agreed to the land cession. One Xhosa chief reported, for example, that the leader of
the anti-colonial struggle Maqoma, was extremely angry about the loss of land.
According to Stretch, "the subject always set him on fire," and that "he fought in hopes of
getting it back."
29
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Rev. W. Chalmers to D'Urban, Feb. 6, 1835, BPP 503/1837, 156.
28 Maqoma to D'Urban, Jan. i, 1835, BPP 503/1837, 48. See also Xhosa to Col.
Somerset and D'Urban, Dec. 31, 1834, ibid., 49-50; Chalmers to D'Urban, Feb. 6, 1835,
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29 Quotation in Stretch, Journal, 17. For Xhosa attacks against the colony see for example
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Militant resistance was not the only strategy pursued by Africans. Groups like the
Mfengu, who emerged as a politically independent faction of the Xhosa during the War
of 1834-35, pursued tactics of partial accommodation to European colonization with the
intention of gaining and, later, maintaining as much of their sovereignty as possible.
Overall, however, the line between militant resisters and those seeking accommodation
remained much more blurred. In the Eastern Cape most indigenous factions like the
Ndlambe, the Gqunukhwebe, and even the Kat River settlers woul4 support the colony in
some conflicts, yet refused their support in others.
The Creation of the Mfengu: The War of 1834-35 and its Aftermath
Colonial officials responded to the Ngqika and Ndlambe attacks that initiated the
War of 1834-35 with a relentless counter-offensive, leading the Ngqika and Ndlambe to
complain about the severity in which Cape forces conducted the conflict. The Xhosa
complained that the assaults had put them "in a dreadful state of alarm. We are hunted
both night and day. You bum houses and destroy our cornfields. What shall we live on
when this war is over?" Yet, Ngqika and Ndlambe resistance continued for several
months, and was based predominantly in the Amatola mountains, an area which colonial
forces found especially hard to subjugate.30
By April 1835, as noted earlier, the Cape military focused its campaign instead on
the Gcaleka Xhosa east of the Kei River. The Gcaleka lived in a much more flat and open
area, rendering them more vulnerable to military attacks. Governor D'Urban accused the
Gcaleka paramount Hintsa of "playing a double game" by harboring "plundered cattle in
30 Quotation in Stretch, Journal, 65
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his territory," and by actively supporting Ngqika and Ndlambe resistance. The Cape's
campaign eventually led to the capture, killing, and mutilation of Hintsa, and reparation
payments of 25,000 heads of cattle by the Gcaleka Xhosa to the colony. 31
The war against the Gcaleka also led to the so-called "liberation" - or perhaps,
more accurately, the creation - of the Mfengu people, a name believed to be derived from
the Xhosa word ukumfenguza (to seek service). Scholars widely disagree on the issue of
Mfengu identity formation. They believe though that the groups that later became known
as Mfengu, largely consisted of mostly northern migrants who attached themselves to the
Xhosa in the first decades of the nineteenth century. By the mid-1 830s, a growing
number of the so-called Mfengu settled at the Methodist mission at Butterworth under the
direction of the missionary John Ayliff. Ayliff seemed keen on promoting strife among
the Xhosa and the Mfengu. Under the missionary's auspices, the Mfengu were also
joined by a significant number of Xhosa who saw advantages in joining the Mfengu.
They now passed as Mfengu, since apparently few cultural and linguistic differences
existed between the Xhosa and the Mfengu. 32
Official colonial discourse in the Cape, due to the strong lobbying of Ayliff,
portrayed the Mfengu as a poor and oppressed people who needed the protection of the
British empire from the Xhosa. Also with the encouragement of Ayliff, numerous
Mfengu joined the campaign against the Gcaleka Xhosa and, after the war, an estimated
31 D'Urban to Lord Glenelg, March 19, 1835, BPP 279/1836, 10-11; Sarhili to D'Urban,
Dec. 11, 1835, BPP 503/1837, 15-16. See also Peires, House ofPhalo, 111-1 12; Lester,
Imperial Networks, 124-125.
32
See for example Peires, The House ofPhalo, 87-89, 110-111; Davenport and Saunders,
South Africa, 65; Lester, Imperial Networks, 89-94; Keegan, Colonial South Africa and
the Origins ofthe Racial Order, 145-147; Switzer, Power and Resistance, 58-60; Bundy,
Rise and Fall, 33-34.
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16,000 to 17,000 Mfengu moved west of the Kei River. In letters to the colonial office,
Governor D'Urban likened this "liberation" with "the great national act of negro
emancipation" - the abolition of slavery in the British Empire in the early 1830s. 33
Though the Secretary of State for colonial affairs in London, Lord Glenelg, felt "quite
unable to perceive the slightest accuracy in [D'Urban's] comparison," he responded to
thefait accompli that the Mfengu had entered "British protection," by suggesting that
they should be settled "on territory to the westward of the Keiskamma, from which the
Caffres were expelled," and used as a military buffer against the Xhosa.34
The Xhosa in contrast were outraged by these developments. Xhosa leaders
accused the Mfengu of ingratitude toward the people who had fed them in times of need.
Hintsa's son Sarhili also accused the Mfengu of having stolen 30,000 head of cattle from
the Xhosa when they joined the British.35 Moreover, Maqoma compared Xhosa-Mfengu
relations with those of the colonists and their Khoikhoi laborers, and protested that the
Xhosa had frequently returned runaway Khoikhoi laborers at the request of the colony,
whereas the colony now "detained" the Xhosa's laborers "who in the day of public
calamity rose up against us and carried off [our] cattle."36
For English accounts of the victimization of the Mfengu by the Xhosa see for example
D'Urban to the Earl of Aberdeen, June 19, 1835, BPP 279/1836, 16-17; John Ayliff and
Joseph Whiteside, History ofthe Abambo Generally Known as Fingos (Cape Town: C.
Struick, 1962); John Ayliff to the Editor of the Graham 's Town Journal, Aug. 17, 1835,
BPP 503/1837, 245-246; Smith, Autobiography, 2: 33.
34
Lord Glenelg to D'Urban, Dec. 26, 1835, BPP 279/1836, 70.
35
South African Commercial Advertiser, July 1 8, 1 835; Sarhili to D'Urban, Dec. 11,
1835, BPP 503/1837, 15-16. Peires argues that the Mfengu took 22,000 cattle from the
Xhosa. Peires, House ofPhalo, 110-111.
36 Quoted in Stretch, Journal, 126.
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For the Mfengu, on the other hand, the collaboration with the colony brought
certain advantages such as cattle as campaign plunder, access to land, potential British
military protection, and political sovereignty. The Mfengu seemed to believe that the
strategy of pursuing an alliance with the British seemed more beneficial than one with the
Xhosa. In subsequent decades the Mfengu emerged as strong military allies of the Cape,
and many Mfengu worked as agricultural laborers in the colony, while others became
independent agricultural producers.37
During the War of 1834-35, as in every conflict fought in the Cape in the first half
of the nineteenth century, the colony depended on the military assistance of African
allies. In this war, Khoisans, several smaller Xhosa factions, and the Mfengu supported
the suppression of anti-colonial resistance by the Ngqika and Ndlambe. As in previous
wars, Khoisan fighters played a central role in the Cape's military campaigns. After
aiding in the attacks against the Gcaleka, Mfengu fighters aided in the war against the
Ndlambe and Ngqika. Pato, Kama, and Kobe and their Gqunukhwebe, as well as
Tzatzoe's Ntinde, assisted the Cape, by protecting and escorting Europeans safely out of
Xhosa territory. They also provided scouts and troops for several campaigns. About 1200
Gqunukhwebe and 300 Mfengu combatants, for instance, assisted colonial forces in their
efforts to clear the mountainous range that reached from the Chumie to the Buffalo
river.
38
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Collaboration with colonial forces posed problems and risks for Africans.
Khoisan soldiers, for example, frequently faced poor treatment and degradation. Their
service, unlike that of white colonists, was often extended, leading Khoisan men to miss
the plowing or harvesting season. For this, they received little or no compensation. The
Kat River settlers, who also assisted the colony, faced several severe Xhosa attacks on
their territory causing severe destruction.39 Xhosa allies of the colony faced the risk of
desertion by their supporters. Seven hundred of Pato's men, for instance, abandoned their
leader to join the Ngqika and Ndlambe resistance. Anti-colonial factions also pressured
some Xhosa collaborators to flee to the colony.40
After months of conflict, Ngqika and Ndlambe resistance came to a halt in
September 1835. But as historian Jeffrey Peires emphasizes, these western Xhosa
factions "were not beaten," and had only surrendered with the understanding that they
remained "autonomous tributaries of the British."41 Thus, in their views, the western
Xhosa had retained their sovereignty from the colony.
The. Xhosa suffered tremendous losses during the war. According to Les Switzer,
no information exists on civilian casualties, but he estimates that about 4000 Xhosa
fighters died as a result of the conflict. Furthermore, colonial forces confiscated an
estimated 60,000 cattle, thousands of sheep, and hundreds of horses, and the Ngqika and
Stretch, Journal, 88-94. For attacks on Kat River settlement see for example A.B.
Armstrong to Lieut. Col. Smith, Jan. 12, 1835, BPP 503/1837, 84; Statement of Klaas
Plaatje (Khoikhoi), March 6, 1835, ibid., 88-89.
40
Statement of Klaas Plaatje (Khoikhoi), March 6, 1835, BPP 503/1837, 88-89;
Graham 's Town Journal, Jan. 2, 1835; W. Shaw to the Earl of Aberdeen, April 7, 1835,
BPP 252/1835, 141-142; Charles Brownlee, Reminiscences ofKafir Lives and History
(Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1977), 27-29.
41
Peires, House ofPhalo, 113.
203
Ndlambe had to contend themselves with a much smaller territory west of the
Keiskamma River.42 Colonial officials parceled up Xhosa land and removed them by
clearing and burning their villages. The Cape government moved over 70,000 Xhosa into
an area of approximately 7,000 square miles, where the population density was,
according to the South African Commercial Advertiser, "about Ten times greater than,
in the Colony itself."43 Colonial officials settled mostly British farmers and Mfengu on
the Ngqika's and Ndlambe's lands, and erected several forts in the region. Xhosa factions
if
like the Gqunukhwebe, who had assisted the British during the war, remained on their
homelands. Colonial officials encouraged these groups to switch to European modes of
agricultural production, and to keep "their tribes on the most friendly terms with the
colonists."
44
The Colonial Office's order to abandon Queen Adelaide Province, implemented
in 1836, spurred the Xhosa - especially the Ngqika and Ndlambe - to demand the
reinstitution of the pre-war situation in respect to their territorial and political
sovereignty. During a meeting with the newly appointed Lieutenant Governor Andries
Strockenstrom, the Xhosa emphasized their sovereign status, demanded the "restitution of
the country from which [they] had been expelled, and complained of the suppression of
the power of the Chiefs." The Xhosa also desired "the free exercise of their customs
connected with" what Europeans in the Cape termed "witchcraft" and the "eating up
system." Stockenstrom heeded these demands as he believed it impossible "to undermine
42
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in
the power of the" Xhosa leaders, while "at the same time" keeping "the nation
subjection and order, without a force far beyond what even now we have at our disposal."
Yet, even the potential threat of renewed African militant resistance did not lead the Cape
to heed to all of the Xhosa's demands. For instance, Ndlambe and Ngqika requests for the
removal of the Mfengu, white settlers, and of the military forts from their lands, as well
as the restoration of cattle taken by the Mfengu remained unsuccessful.45
The settlement ofMfengu on their lands severely angered the Xhosa. They
considered the Mfengu as competitors for a shrinking territorial basis and as thieves, and
they wanted their land and cattle returned. In the view of many Xhosa, the Mfengu were
"dogs fattening before their eyes upon the flocks of a chief [Hintsa] whose memory they
hold so dear."46
Yet, the tensions and rivalry between the Xhosa and Mfengu went beyond mere
rhetoric. In the aftermath of the War of 1834-35, several clashes over cattle occurred
between the Mfengu and Xhosa, and continued for years to come. In August 1837, for
example, a faction of several hundred Ndlambe under the leadership of Seyolo accused
the Mfengu in the Fort Peddie area of cattle theft. In an ensuing fight several Mfengu
were killed and an alleged 1,500 cattle taken. The tensions between the Xhosa and
Mfengu at the time were probably worsened by the drought that hit the region, hurting
especially the Ndlambes and Ngqikas on their diminished land base 47
45
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Treaties, Labor, Commandos and the Challenge to African Sovereignty and
Autonomy: The Changing Political and Economic World of Africans, 1834-47
As discussed in chapter 3, the drought in the Eastern Cape also coincided with an
increase in complaints by white settlers about Xhosa livestock raids against the colony.
According to colonists their losses ranged in the thousands of cattle and hundreds of
horses. At the same time, many Xhosa frequently cooperated with Cape authorities. On
several occasions Xhosa leaders aided in the persecution of thieves, or returned livestock
and horses to their owners. Xhosa chiefs also aided in the apprehension of deserters who
fled into Xhosaland.48
The harsh circumstances in the post War of 1834-35 years in the Eastern Cape,
led to the migration of an estimated 6,000 Africans into the Albany district alone. Here a
growing number worked as Merino sheep herders, aided as laborers in wool production,
or took up employment in other sectors of the Cape economy.49 Yet, whenever possible,
Africans remained interested in maintaining economic autonomy. Thus during periods of
"abundant crops" many Xhosa and Mfengu preferred to leave the colony behind to live
with their relations.50 African workers who continued to work in the colony often
responded to the changing economic realities, which increasingly undermined African
48 Hudson to Stretch, Aug. 25, 1842, BPP 424/1851, 137; Hudson to Stretch Nov. 16,
1842, ibid., 142-143; South African Commercial Advertiser, Dec. 23, 1837, March 24,
April 28, 1838.
49 Graham 's Town Journal, Jan. 13, 1842.
50 Graham 's Town Journal, March 28, 1844.
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political sovereignty and economic autonomy, by stealing livestock and by destroying
packed wool for the international market. 51
The changes in the treaty system in the first half of the 1840s, explored in more
detail in chapter 3, again permitted colonial patrols to encroach in Xhosa territory, to
pursue allegedly stolen livestock, or to confiscate cattle and horses as "compensations"
for theft. It provided a major challenge to Xhosa sovereignty. At a meeting in October
1840, during which Xhosa and colonial officials negotiated changes in the treaty system,
the Ngqika leader Tyhali complained that the Xhosa could not "put an end to stealing,
because we do not know of it." He argued, as Xhosa chiefs often did, that their authority
over their followers was limited, and that they had only inadequate power to influence the
actions and decisions of the rank and file.52 Furthermore, several leaders were angered
because they believed that they were already fully cooperating with the Cape authorities.
Less than two years after this meeting, for example, Maqoma angrily responded to the
repeated accusation about cattle stealing.
Why do you speak to me about the depredations in the colony? ... I am
not capable of answering such a word. . . I have thrown offmy authority. I
am a policeman. I fall on the spoor daily, and I have sent cattle and horses
to the colony that were stolen from it. The reason I do it is, that my name
shall not be used that we are the delinquents.53
As mentioned earlier, the arrival of governor Peregrine Maitland in 1844, led to further
renegotiations of treaties by the Cape government with the Ndlambe, the Ngqika, and the
Gqunukhwebe. This new set of treaties, pushed through by colonial administrators in
51
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1844 and 1845, permitted the colony to erect more forts, gave colonists more rights to
recover or be compensated for their livestock, removed African Christian converts from
chiefly authority, and demanded that Xhosa criminals be judged in the colony. To gain
some Xhosa leaders' support for the treaties, the Cape government promised them annual
salaries. Still, the changes seemed to anger many Xhosa.54
Throughout the 1840s, Xhosa leaders faced further government pressures that
undermined their positions. On January 18, 1846, right before the outbreak of a new
conflict between Africans and the colony, the conservative missionary Henry
Calderwood wrote that colonial intrusions had caused an extremely "deep and bitter"
feeling among the Xhosa.
The feelings of the nation seem now to be against all white men.
.
.
Amongst all the vexatious questions between the Colonial government and
the Caffres, the most vexatious is. . . the land question.
. . [They are] so
sensitive on this point that they cannot and will not consider any question
calmly when that is mixed up with it. . . the land question is a powerful
engine by which the war party can work upon the feelings of the more
peaceably inclined. .
.
[N]o argument will ever convince them that it is
either just or reasonable to take their land from them. 55
The Ngqika paramount Sandile and many other western Xhosa especially opposed the
construction of a military post at Block Drift as well as the encroachments by white
surveying parties and military, which they saw as a dangerous violation of the treaties
and Xhosa territorial and political sovereignty.56
See for example Switzer, Power and Resistance, 61; see also Graham 's Town Journal,
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were
Numerous Xhosa leaders and commoners also put pressures on chiefs who
seen as being too closely associated with the colonial state. According to government
officials, Xhosho, a son ofNgqika and brother of Sandile, was disposed by a councilor
for punishing cattle thieves among his people.57 Another minor chief, reported Lieutenant
Governor Colonel John Hare, faced threats from rival Xhosa who had become
"suspicious" of his "attachment to the Government." In response to these threats, this
chief invited the Cape Colony to build a fort on his strategically located land, and
declared his "loyalty" to the British government.58
The War of 1846-47 and the War of 1850-53
In 1 846, Xhosa and colonists in the Eastern Cape were once again on the edge of
war. For the western Xhosa the changed treaties and resulting encroachments of patrols
onto their territory intensified their hostility toward the colony. The arrest of a Xhosa
named Tsili, alluded to in chapter 3, further fanned the flames. Colonial authorities had
detained Tsili for stealing an axe, which resulted in a small skirmish between Tsili 's
friends and colonial guards. Tsili' s rescue by his friends led to the death of one Xhosa
and to the death of a Khoisan prisoner who, being handcuffed to Tsili, had his hand cut
off by Xhosa attackers and, as a result, bled to death. When challenged about the incident
by British officials, the Xhosa reminded them that the newly changed treaties only
allowed thefts of cattle and horses and not of axes to be prosecuted by colonial
authorities, and declared the arrest of Tsili a violation of the treaties. According to the
57
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Xhosa, the death of the Khoisan prisoner had also been atoned for since the attackers had
lost one of their men in the fight. Xhosa leaders also appealed to colonial officials not to
overreact to the confrontation. British administrators, however, frustrated with Xhosa'
s
accused livestock theft, reported incidents of harassment of some colonists and traders by
Africans and, spurred by the land hunger of settler interests, used the axe incident as a
justification to send a military expedition against the Ngqika stronghold in the Amatola
mountains. The Ngqika successfully intercepted this mission and the Cape's military
forces withdrew. Once again, a pre-emptive strike by the Cape colony triggered an
interracial conflict in the Eastern Cape.
59
Most western Xhosa joined the anti-colonial resistance of the Ngqika. For
instance, Pato and the Gqunukhwebe, allies of the Cape during the War of 1834-35, did
not side with the colony in this conflict, since in the years before the war, they had been
angered by the establishment of permanent Mfengu settlements on their land. Despite
repeated requests by Pato to remove Mfengu homes, colonial officials remained inactive
and evasive on the issue, a stance that the Gqunukhwebe interpreted as a violation of their
sovereignty and mistreatment by an ally. With the eruption of war, Pato ordered the
capture of Mfengu cattle and attacks on their settlements. The Gqunukhwebe also
attacked Fort Peddie, a military post to which many Mfengu had moved for security.
After failing to take the fort, in large part due to Mfengu resistance, Pato and his fighters
operated mostly out of the Keiskamma and Chalumna river areas, where they were
protected by thick bush. Here they continued small-scale attacks and resistance
59
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operations, and were the last Xhosa to surrender in December 1847.60 Siwani, the
paramount of the Ndlambe, and his followers also joined the resistance, until colonial
forces defeated the Ndlambe army in a surprise attack on the plains of the Gwangqa in
May 1846. 500 Xhosa died in this battle. This crushing defeat led the Ndlambe to
surrender, and to assist colonial forces by seizing and delivering stolen cattle from the
Xhosa resistance. Thus the Ndlambes themselves became the target for cattle raids by
militant western Xhosa. 61 The Ntinde leader Tshatshu who had testified in front of the
Select Committee in London in the 1830s, as well as Mapassa's Thembu faction also
joined the war against the colony, thus underscoring increasing African discontent with
colonial policies and territorial encroachments. The Xhosa felt "fully justified in all they
had done," wrote a private in the British forces stationed in the Cape. They believed that
"England had no more right to their country than they had to take England. It was merely
a question of might against right."62 Thus, only a few minor western Xhosa leaders, like
the Ndlambe Mqhayi and the Christian Gqunukhwebe Kama, sided with the colony at the
outset of the war.
During the first couple of months of the war, western Xhosa forces attacked far
into the colony up to the Sunday river, threatened Port Elizabeth, destroyed farms,
captured livestock, and plundered army wagon supply trains. Still, after an initially
ftU
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unsuccessful counter-offensive by the colony, the Cape Colony and the British empire
with their greater military resources eventually prevailed.63
Militant Xhosa especially targeted the African allies of the British such as the
abovementioned Mfengu. The Kat River settlers, who also aided the colony during the
War of 1846-47, had to endure a renewed wave of Xhosa attacks, and their settlement
faced severe destruction. The Xhosa burned fields, houses and pastures and numerous
cattle died "for the want of grass." During the war, the Kat River settlement had also
become a major "thoroughfare" for Xhosa with cattle stolen from the colony. To
undermine Xhosa raiding in their territory and in the colony, Kat River settlers attacked
Xhosa raiders crossing through the region, ofwhom "[s]everal had been shot and the
cattle recaptured."
64
As in previous wars, African allies contributed significantly to the Cape Colony's
military efforts. They provided intelligence, protected supply trains, tried to undermine
cattle raids, and aided in combat. George Berkeley, commander of the colonial troops
during the War of 1846-47, wrote about the military contributions of the Khoikhoi:
The only mode of effectually punishing the Kafirs is by taking their cattle,
for which the Hottentots are admirably calculated. . . They possess
wonderful power of vision, great celerity of foot and powers of endurance;
have experience in finding out the track of Kafirs and cattle, and, when
found, they never lose it till they come up with the enemy or their cattle;
and when they have taken the cattle they know how to drive and guard
them.65
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Yet Khoikhoi soldiers had fewer rights than colonists. They especially complained about
the government's failure to adequately provide for their families during their time of
service, and for having to serve longer periods and more frequently than colonists. An
estimated 1 ,200 Mfengu also enrolled in special levies commanded by white officers. For
their assistance they received promises of land, supplies, and plunder mostly in the form
of livestock. Furthermore, colonial officials recruited a Xhosa police force, widely used
for fighting in the Amatolas, to capture Ngqika cattle and to spy on enemy Xhosa. The
Mfengu and Khoikhoi soldiers, as well as the Xhosa police force, were praised for their
abilities in close range combat in the bush and forests, which dominated much of the
fighting in this conflict.
66
Several historians have observed that the War of 1846-47 marked a major event in
undermining the independence of western Xhosa in the Eastern Cape. As pointed out in
chapter 3, it strengthened white control and domination, and imposed the rule of military
officers, magistrates, and missionaries. The war led to tremendous suffering among the
western Xhosa, who lost cattle, crops, and land. In 1847, the newly appointed Governor
Harry Smith annexed the territory between the Fish and the Keiskamma River to the
Cape, and denied all the Xhosa who lived between the Keiskamma and the Kei River, an
area renamed British Kaffraria, legal title to their land. The western Xhosa, according to
Cape officials, had now come under British rule. Much of their territory was sold to
speculators among the English settler elite, many Xhosa were forcefully relocated, and
the remaining land available to them became overcrowded and overgrazed. A drought
further spurred economic depression and starvation among the Xhosa, and forced a
66 Moyer, "The Mfengu Self-Defence," 111-117; Ayliff and Whiteside, History, chapter
8; J. F. G. Campbell to Sommerset, Sept. 24, 1847, War ofthe Axe, 182.
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growing number to seek labor agreements with colonists. The Ngqika paramount Sandile
expressed Xhosa frustration with colonial encroachments on their land and sovereignty
when he exclaimed that "[t]he whole of the land of our forefathers is dotted [with] white
man's houses and white [surveyor] flags," and that he would "rather die for his country
than die without a cause."67
To add insult to injury, as discussed in chapter 3, Smith also attacked Xhosa
sovereignty by declaring himself the supreme chief of the Xhosa, by abolishing the treaty
system, by attacking "polygamy," "witchcraft," and the "eating up system," by
establishing military courts, by seeking to collect taxes from Africans, and by paying
annuity payments to Xhosa leaders. Smith also publicly humiliated several Xhosa chiefs.
In 1 847, for instance, colonial troops arrested Sandile despite assurances to the Ngqika
paramount that he had safe passage. A few months later, Sandile and other Xhosa leaders
were forced to kiss Smith's feet in a public meeting. Even Maqoma, who had for the most
part not participated in the fighting and spent most of the war in the colony close to Port
Elizabeth, was made to kneel in front of Smith, while the governor put his foot on
Maqoma's neck and verbally abused the Ngqika chief. Late in October of 1850, fearing
another arrest, Sandile refused to meet Smith, leading the Cape governor to dispose him
as the senior Xhosa chief in British Kaffraria, and to replace him with Commissioner
Charles Brownlee. Such humiliations, along with oppressive colonial policies, motivated
many Xhosa in their decision to try once again to militarily resist when Smith sent 650
soldiers into the Amatola Mountains in December 1850. At this point, a majority of the
67
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Xhosa laborers in the colony had already left white farms, and 365 of 400 Xhosa police
officers deserted to join the anti-colonial struggle, underscoring once again the anger and
disillusionment that many Africans felt about British colonization.68
The commitment by many Xhosa to military resistance to colonization also found
reflection again in religious developments. Like the prophet Nxele almost thirty years
earlier, a prophetic figure named Mlanjeni, who rose to prominence first among the
Ndlambe and later among the Ngqika between the War of 1846-47 and the War of 1850-
53, advocated separation between whites and Xhosa. He preached that if "all the people"
would "rigidly" adhere "to his words, the white men would melt away, or disappear."69
The Ngqika leader Sandile expanded on Mlanjeni's message and Xhosa sentiment about
British colonization and the willingness to resist white domination in January 1851 early
in the war:
God made a boundary by the sea, and you the White Men cross it to rob us
of our country. When the Son of God came into the world, you White Men
killed Him. It was not the Black Men who did that; and you White men are
now killing me. . . if you kill me my bones will fight, and my bones' bones
will fight. I will rise up and fight against the White Man for ever. 70
The prophet Mlanjeni attempted to influence the outcome of the war more directly.
Before the conflict, he gave pelargonium roots to Xhosa fighters and promised them that
the roots would provide protection against British bullets. This promise may have enticed
some Xhosa to risk frontal assaults on Fort Beaufort - a military experience that proved
68
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costly in human life. After the initial offensive assaults, western Xhosa resistance became
more defensive, focusing on the more strategically advantageous positions of the densely
wooded Amatola Mountains, the Waterkloof, and the Great Fish River Bush.71
As discussed earlier, the War of 1850-53 was an intensely brutal conflict. As in
the War of 1846 to 1847, the Xhosa used old, inferior guns whereas British regular troops
experimented with the latest rifle and rocket technology, and had seemingly unending
supplies. The colony relied heavily on British regulars and on non-white auxiliary forces,
made up of Mfengu, various Xhosa factions, and Khoikhoi. During the war, colonial
troops and their African allies followed their usual tactics of burning villages, capturing
cattle, and destroying crops. Even more so than in previous wars, colonial forces
committed atrocities against Africans, especially as the conflict remained at a stalemate.
By the time the war was over, an estimated 16,000 Xhosa and 1400 on the colonial side
were dead.
72
The anti-colonial resistance movement in the early 1850s was also the first
occasion since the War of 1799-1803 that Xhosa and Khoisan cooperated to a noticeable
degree against white expansion. But why did so many Kat River settlers, Khoikhoi, and
other non-whites choose to resist at this point?
In the years prior to the war, a growing feeling emerged among many Kat River
settlers and other non-whites in the Eastern Cape that British colonialism posed a threat
to their cultural and political sovereignty. Throughout the 1830s and 1840s, non-whites
faced a shrinking land basis in the Eastern Cape, a process encouraged by the colonial
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state. The Kat River settlement, for instance, had become a place where the Cape
government settled dispossessed non-whites from other parts of the colony, a policy
which led to the severe overcrowding of the community. In addition, the colonial state
allotted crown lands, areas in which many Khoisans had settled without formal title, to a
growing number of British settlers. Thus, outside of the overcrowded Kat River
settlement and some missions, most non-whites had few opportunities to obtain land. The
lack of property and minimal access to credit left them with few options but to join the
ranks of the colonial labor force. Kat River settlers were further angered by broken
government promises for aid in rebuilding their community after the severe destructions
of the War of 1834-35 and the War of 1846-47, even though up to 90% of the adult male
population of the settlement had served the colony during both conflicts, compared to a
mere 3% among the English and Dutch speaking population. The years after the War of
1846 to 1847, saw instead the taxing of successful Kat River timber businesses, the
appearance of a growing number of white surveyors and settlers on their land, and
colonists' and Xhosa police officers' abuse of non-white settlers. Furthermore, demands
by members of the English settler elite to open their community to white settlement and a
debate about the passage of vagrancy laws infuriated Kat River settlers and non-whites in
the Eastern Cape, who argued that they would not give up their lands and would not "be
made slaves" by the new laws.73
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Yet, as noted above, the War of 1850-53 can hardly be characterized as a war
between whites and non-whites. Despite major grievances at Kat River, 900 settlers along
with numerous other non-whites in the Eastern Cape fought on the side of the colony
during the war. Anti-colonial leaders among the Kat River settlers worked hard to
convince their pro-colonial peers to join the anti-colonial struggle, using rhetoric that
envisioned a sovereign Khoisan nation ready to overthrow the Cape government's
oppressive rule. One of the leaders of the insurrection, Speelman Kiewit, wrote to a Field
Cornet at Kat River:
Our circumstances as the Hottentot nation and other circumstances
connected therewith are now become very melancholy, and on this
account we have put our hands to a work from which we have wished to
retreat. We have done this without acquainting all of you who belong to
our nation, and in this we have acted very improperly (find ourselves very
guilty); but with this acknowledgement we take the liberty to acquaint
you, as our nation, that we have commenced war with the settlers
(meaning the English), and to call upon you as our nation to assists us.
Break the bands of the indecision, or come at once with all speed to assist
us in this great important matter. Time is important. It is a national cause,
and can you, as a nation, remain inactive. Arise courageously, and work
for your motherland and freedom. The cause is now begun; and will you
yet remain under the great oppression and slavery of the settlers without
resisting. Come immediately to our assistance. 74
For Kat River insurrectionists, land also played a major role in justifying the war. "This
land is our land;" exclaimed one fighter about the Cape, "but what portion of it is in the
possession of the Hottentots? Strangers inhabit it, while the real owners have only this
75
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Tensions existed however not only between different Kat River factions, but also
among Xhosa and Khoisan anti-colonial forces, who had very different views of
sovereignty. For instance, a Kat River insurrectionist reminded the Xhosa that they
should not "think that because we are with you against the settlers, we will submit to you;
we are ready to fight you at any day ifwe see that you wish to domineer over us."76
Khoisan forces also abducted the pro-colonial Xhosa leader Toise, an act which angered
the Gqunukhwebe and Ndlambe, and embarrassed especially the Ngqika paramount
Sandile who assured the Xhosa that he had nothing to do with Toise's seizure, and that
the Khoisan fought their own war. Such statements indicated a growing rift in the fragile
alliance between Ngqika and Khoikhoi, which undermined the effectiveness of their
resistance.77
As noted above, African allies played a crucial role in the defense and military
operations of the Cape Colony during the War of 1850-53. Among the Xhosa, the
Gqunukhwebe and a good number ofNdlambe saw advantages in allying themselves to
the colony in this conflict. Their decision in previous wars to fight against the Cape had
proven costly in life, territory, and cattle. By pursuing a strategy of military cooperation
this time, they hoped to secure plunder and, more importantly, territorial guarantees from
the colony, which would aid them in maintaining political and economic sovereignty.
They believed that militant resistance had ceased to be a viable option. Thus, Pato's
Gqunukhwebe aided in the securing of King William's Town and ensured the colony's
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ability to obtain supplies from the sea. Governor Smith, for example, observed that he
was "deeply indebted" to those leaders who escorted "my wagons with supplies,
slaughtered] cattle, carr[ied] my mails, assisted] me in every way in their power."
Xhosa allies also provided intelligence, helped the colony to keep up its lines of
communications, and provided active military support - such as Pato's Gqunukhwebe
who aided the Cape with "1400 fighting men."78 In addition, and as in previous conflicts
Khoisan and Mfengu forces played a crucial role in the offensive and defensive military
operations of the Cape.79
Conclusion
The War of 1850-53, much like the War of 1812 in the Upper Ohio Valley, broke
militant Xhosa resistance in the Eastern Cape. A crushing defeat of the Gcaleka Xhosa
under Sarhili, was followed by British efforts to force the Ngqika Xhosa into submission
in the Amatola mountains. Smith's replacement as governor, George Cathcart, finally
negotiated a peace with the Ngqika, and expelled them from the Amatolas. Public
executions of Kat River "rebels" and the removal of the non-white populations from the
Kat River settlement also followed the war. Cathcart gave these newly acquired lands to
white settlers and Mfengu. For most of the remaining non-whites in the Eastern Cape, the
aftermath of the war signified dramatic changes. Though British officials advocated the
;
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need to bolster "traditional authority" among Africans and to strengthen "customary
law," colonial policies nonetheless aided in increasingly undermining Xhosa sovereignty.
Furthermore, and though some non-whites became independent agricultural producers,
the changing economic realities forced a growing number of Africans into labor
arrangements with colonists. Thus, as a colonial racial order became entrenched in the
Eastern Cape, just as one had earlier in the Upper Ohio Valley, the ability of indigenous
peoples to maintain and imagine their independence, sovereignty, and autonomy became
increasingly restricted. More and more, these developments were shaped by the state and
its officials, who increasingly imposed their system of domination in each region.
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CONCLUSION
COMPARING THE ENTRENCHMENT OF TWO COLONIAL RACIAL ORDERS
The entrenchment of colonial, racialized orders in both the Upper Ohio Valley
and the Eastern Cape, created by the power of United States and British imperial
expansion, continued in the years that followed the War of 1812 and the War of 1850-3.
In both regions, Native Americans, Khoisans, and western Xhosa no longer had the
ability to militarily resist white claims to their homelands. Race consciousness and
ideologies of racial subjugation became even more intense among many government
officials and white settlers. These attitudes helped to shape the policies that aided in
strengthening systems of racial supremacy and exclusiveness.
It is important to reiterate though, that the systems that emerged in the two
regions differed dramatically. These differences were shaped by local and world
historical interests and developments as well as indigenous capacities. In the Upper Ohio
Valley, advocates of national expansion rejected not only native sovereignty, but also a
multiracial society that included Native Americans. They favored instead their removal.
In the Eastern Cape, on the other hand, local and imperial interests demanded the
incorporation of Africans on whose economic contribution the region depended.
Furthermore, and unlike in the Upper Ohio Valley, in the Eastern Cape it would take
much longer for stronger political ties between settlers and the imperial government to
emerge. Though certain governors like D'Urban or Smith had helped to maneuver the
imperial government to assist colonial settlers on several occasions, the British authorities
in London were often reluctant to provide the military and financial support demanded by
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the English settler elite in the Eastern Cape. Yet, as the British empire retreated from the
Cape and granted a degree of self-government to the colony in 1853 - a development
which gradually led to white rule in the region - Africans' economic and political options
and opportunities became more restricted.
The Colonial Racial Order in the Upper Ohio Valley
In the aftermath of the War of 1812, many Indians in the Upper Ohio Valley
continued to embrace the government's "civilization program" on their own terms.
Federal officials in the Department of War described the Wyandots, Senecas, and
Shawnees at Upper Sandusky, and Wapakoneta, along with the five "civilized" tribes of
the South, as groups that were "making gradual advances in industry and civilization." 1
Native Americans continued to actively lobby for support by the federal government and
missionaries. The Indian agent in Piqua Ohio, John Johnston, observed about the
"Indians under" his "charge" that
many of them are considerable farmers, there are several individuals who
milked the last summer 12 cows and before the war had many more. They
are fast renewing stock. I am introducing fall crops this season among the
Shawanoese and making arrangements for dispersing the population on
farms. A mill is now running at Wapaghkonetta which cost the Society of
Friends upwards of $1,600.
Progress Made In Civilizing the Indians: Communicated to the House of
Representatives, January 17, 1820, in ASPIA, 2: 200.
2
See for example Johnston to Crawford, May 4, 1815, Letters Received by the Secretary
of War, Registered Series, roll 63, 6469; George Graham to Johnston, April 27, 1816,
John Johnston Papers, Ohio Historical Society, Columbus.
3
Johnston to the Secretary of War, October 10, 1816, in Johnston, 95.
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Still, Native Americans in the Upper Ohio Valley continued to adhere to their
traditional settlement patterns, even though federal officials used every "exertion
to induce them to break up their villages and scatter over their reserves on
detached farms after the manner of whites."4
Settler-Indian relations also remained tense in the post war years. Ohio
Indians continued to complain about acts of violence, stolen horses, livestock,
timber theft, deforestation, encroachments by whites on their lands, and other
depredations. 5 The missionary Joseph Badger observed that Indians
were shamefully and cruelly treated in several instances by unprincipled
men.
. .
They generally bere with patience the insults and injuries they
often met with. They were often made drunk with whiskey and their
peltries taken at a very low rate.
. . and sometimes they were miserably
wronged out of valuable property."6
The Moravian missionary John Heckewelder also reported several violent acts, threats,
and thefts committed against the native inhabitants of the mission at Goshen.
Heckewelder argued that laws needed to be passed to protect Indians if missionary
establishments and the "policy of civilization" were to succeed. But the missionary also
realized that for as long as "the doctrine that the Indians are not susceptible of being
4
Johnston to Calhoun, January 1, 1819, in Johnston, 102.
5
John Johnston to Lewis Cass, August 24, 1831, National Archives, Letters Received by
the Office of Indian Affairs (M234), roll 601, 78; John McElvain to Elbert Herring, May
20, 1833, National Archives, Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs (M234),
roll 601,438-443.
6
Badger, Memoir, 133.
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civilized or becoming a civilized people" would remain popular among American settlers
and politicians, such support would not be granted.7
Official pressures on native lands and communities continued. Several treaties
throughout the 1810s, 1820s, 1830s, and 1840s led to further territorial losses and
eventually Indian removal. In 1818, at the Treaty of St. Mary in Ohio, for instance,
groups like the Wyandots, Delawares, Ottawas, Shawnees, Mingoes, and Chippewas
made major land cessions in the Upper Ohio Valley. 8 Native Americans' debts also led to
further indigenous land losses.9 Furthermore, a growing number of officials, land
speculators, and settlers in the region openly argued that Native American reservations
undermined "national improvement." 10 Federal officials were also eager to cut their
spending on "civilization programs" and were concerned about the cost in keeping "down
animosities which appear naturally to arise between the whites and the red man." 11
In the minds of many whites, the Indian had become a "problem" that needed to
be removed. American officials in the Upper Ohio Valley contemplated this idea at least
as early as the War of 1 8 12. They were too cautious to push for removal at that time, out
John Heckewelder to the President and Directors of the Society for Propagating the
Gospel among the Heathen, February 22, 1822, ASPIA, 2: 382-6.
8
For Treaty at St. Mary see ASPIA, 2: 166-71.
9
John Johnston to Secretary of War, October 18, 1824, National Archives, Letters
Received by the Office of Indian Affairs (M234), roll 601, 148; Delaware Indians to the
President of the United States, March 1, 1832, ibid., 148-9.
10
John Johnston to Ethan Brown, January 27, 1824, Ethan Brown Papers, Ohio Historical
Society, Columbus.
11
John McElvain to Secretary of War, February 2, 1831, National Archives, Letters
Received by the Office of Indians Affairs (M234), roll 601, 91.
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of fear that such a policy could antagonize Native American allies. 12 In the post war
years, however, Indian removal gradually became the main goal of federal policy-
makers. American administrators advocated it as a way to protect the Indians, a strategy
by "the National Government" to preserve "from total destruction this ill fated race of
people." 14
Native Americans in the Upper Ohio Valley frequently complained about the
American government's failure to support them and about the encroachments on their
lands. Native leaders from several Indian communities on the Auglaize River pointed out:
Brother, in the late war we have been faithful to the United States at every
call.
. .
It hath made us poor. The warriors, white or Indians, passing
through our country would kill and rob everything they could get,
particularly cattle and hogs. We were just getting in the way to live by the
help of our friends the Quakers, but the war took everything from us.
The Auglaize chiefs, who had supported the Americans during the War of 1812, also
complained that the British continued to supply their Indian allies, while the Americans
supplied little despite their promises. 15 Many Native Americans in the Upper Ohio Valley
also opposed removal. Johnston observed:
12
Cass and Harrison to Armstrong, July 17, 1814, National Archives, Letters Received
by the Secretary of War, Registered Series (M221), roll 62, 5556-60; ASPIA, 1: 826-32.
13 Duncan McArthur to William Crawford, April 6, 1816, in ASPIA, 2: 136-7; John
Johnston to Thomas Worthington, January 3, 1812, Thomas Worthington Papers, Ohio
Historical Society, Columbus.
14 John Johnston to Ethan Brown, July 31, 1821, Ethan Brown Papers, Ohio Historical
Society, Columbus. See also C. Calhoun to Henry Clay, January 17, 1820, in ASPIA, 2:
200-1; James Monroe to the Senate of the United States, January 27, 1825, in ASPIA, 2:
541-2.
15
Indian chiefs to Secretary of War, December 29, 1815, in Johnston, 88-9.
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I have never known the Indians ofmy Agency so favorably disposed for
improvement as they are at this time, they are becoming more convinced
daily that a retreat westward will not relieve them from the encroachments
of the Whites. The Black Hoof lately told me that he conceived they were
arrived at the point beyond which they could not go, that when they
looked over the Mississippi, they saw the White people moving there as
fast as in former times they spread themselves over Kentucky and Ohio. 16
The Shawnee and Delaware Indian communities in Ohio even lobbied to have their land
privatized, so that it could not be dispossessed. "We desire to have our land divided
among our people that it may not be taken from us.
. . we expect to get Deeds for our
lands.
.
.
as words without writing would have nor force." 17 This unsuccessful strategy,
the natives of these communities believed, would satisfy most American advocates of
removal, who wanted Ohio Indian sovereignty obliterated. These American priorities
were later reflected in the Removal Act of 1830.
Yet despite their resistance, many Indian nations in the Upper Ohio Valley, like
the Delawares, Ottawas, Mingoes, Shawnees, and Wyandots, had to face removal from
the late 1820s on to the 1840s. Few Native American reservations in Michigan and
Indiana, as well as several individuals and families, escaped removal. For many whites in
the region, the Indian had become a negligible presence - the last remnant of a "race" of
either "wild" or "noble savages" that had to make way to "progress."
16
Johnston to Calhoun, January 1, 1819, in Johnston, 102.
17 Shawnees and Delawares to Johnston, May 5, 1820, in Johnston, 104-105
227
The Colonial Racial Order in the Eastern Cape
A different but equally complex colonial racial order became entrenched in the
Eastern Cape after the War of 1850-3. A new governor, George Grey, replaced George
Cathcart in 1854. Like Cathcart, Grey, who had participated in the wars that had
repressed Maori independence in New Zealand, promised to work with "traditional"
African authorities. He also espoused the humanitarian and liberal economic ideals of his
generation. He argued that Britain had to
accept the duties and responsibilities of our position, that we should admit
that we cannot live in immediate contact with any race or portion of our
fellow men, whether civilized or uncivilized, neglecting and ignoring our
duties towards them, without suffering those evils which form the fitting
punishment of our neglect and indifference; that we should feel that if we
leave the natives beyond our border ignorant barbarians, shut out from all
community of interest with ourselves, they must always remain a race of
troublesome marauders, and that, feeling this, we should try to make them
a part of ourselves, with a common faith and common interests, useful
servants, consumers of our goods, contributors to our revenue; in short, a
source of strength and wealth for this colony, such as Providence designed
them to be.
We should, I think, use our time of strength, when our generosity
cannot be misunderstood, to instruct and civilize - to change inveterate
enemies into friends, alike from interest and increased knowledge -
destroyers of our stock and produce into consumers of our goods and
1 8
producers of our markets.
But it is important to reiterate that even though Grey advocated a sort of mutual
coexistence, like the humanitarians of earlier generations, he argued that Africans had to
assimilate to what he saw as a superior European way of life. He also promoted a
program to educate "the Natives, and training them to habits of industry" as a matter of
"national" policy.
19
18 Grey to Legislative Council and the House of Assembly, March 17, 1855, BPP
1969/1855,56-59.
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Despite his rhetoric of good intentions, Grey played a key role in damaging
western Xhosa society. Like Smith earlier, Grey undermined the chiefs' authority to raise
fees and fines from their subjects, a system that had been tolerated by the Cathcart
administration. Instead he paid salaries to Xhosa leaders, which increased their
dependency on the Cape government. The "Village System" - land allotments to
deliberately keep Xhosa communities small - was a further effort to weaken Xhosa
society and the power of the chiefs. Moreover, Grey actively pursued policies that would
push Xhosa into public works programs, as well as into poorly paid labor agreements
with colonists, by allocating Xhosa on poor lands and by taxing them.20 His plan to
educate the Xhosa in "habits of industry and honesty, of training them to various
domestic duties," was "to render them efficient servants, and thus making them a blessing
to the Colony and the inhabitants at large."21
The Xhosa cattle-killing, which followed a prophecy by a young Xhosa girl that
Xhosa society would be revitalized and the dead would be resurrected if all cattle and
crops would be destroyed, aided Grey in his plans to undermine western Xhosa society.
Between 1855 to 1858 the Xhosa population of "British Kaffraria" dropped from
approximately 105,000 to 37,500 due to mass starvation. As in other parts of the world,
and despite their ability to do so, the British and colonial authorities did little to alleviate
the plight of non-white people. Instead, they used the cattle killing as justification to
Graham 's Town Journal, May 26, 1855
20 On this issue see Peires, The Dead Will Arise, chapter 2; Keegan, Colonial South
Africa, 288; Crais, White Supremacy and Black Resistance, 199-203.
21 Graham 's Town Journal, May 26, 1855.
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strengthen their position in the region and for further territorial dispossession. With few
alternatives, over 20,000 of the western Xhosa survivors ended up as laborers in the
colony. Others were forced into monetary or labor tenancy agreements. During the
aftermath of the cattle killing, the Cape government also approved stricter pass laws to
undermine the mobility of African laborers and to protect the interests of white agrarian
producers. Furthermore, the cattle killing resulted in further weakening the power of
Xhosa leadership by sending many to prison on Robben Island.23
Despite such developments, the Eastern Cape region also witnessed the rise of
independent African peasants who participated in the colonial market economy. As
discussed in chapter 5, prior to the War of 1850-3, such processes had already occurred in
communities like the Kat River settlement, on several missions, and among the Mfengu.
As Colin Bundy shows, numerous pre-colonial pastoralist and cultivators in southern
Africa continued to participate in agricultural production for the market.24 Yet the
landholdings of many Africans in the Eastern Cape were too small and infertile to enable
them to become profitable agricultural producers. They were left with few alternatives to
becoming laborers or tenants. As Timothy Keegan points out, the emergence of an
African farmer class did not reflect the nineteenth century liberal economic beliefs
espoused by colonial administrators like Grey. Rather, it surfaced as a "compromise with
social and economic realities." Keegan writes that "the black elite could legitimately be
held up as a buffer against the increasingly dispossessed majority, and against the still
22 On a global perspective on this issue see Mike Davis, Late Victorian Holocausts: El
Nino Famines and the Making ofthe Third World (New York: Verso, 2001).
23
For Xhosa cattle killing see Peires, The Dead Will Arise.
24 Bundy, Rise and Fall ofthe South African Peasantry.
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quite menacing authority of the chiefs, who could not be eradicated with the finality that
the administrators might have wished."25
With "self rule" in 1853, the Cape also received a constitution that appeared at
least on paper non-racial in its franchise qualifications. Yet, as several historians argue,
the black vote posed little challenge to white dominance in the 1850s. As many Africans
faced economic and social pressures and dispossession, few owned the required 25
pounds in property or made the necessary 50 pounds in yearly income to be permitted to
vote. Cape parliament was also quick in undermining the rights of Africans. In 1856, it
passed a new Masters and Servants Act. Though the measure was not explicitly racial, the
law clearly targeted the non-white working class of the Colony, and enforced tougher
penalties for labor code violations such as desertion. In 1857, the Cape government
introduced stricter pass laws that impeded the mobility of African laborers.26 Moreover,
when by the 1 880s the black vote in the Cape became a noticeable factor, it was
undermined by several legislative and judicial measures. For instance, the legal efforts by
white settlers, successfully challenged the efforts of African leaders to register their
supporters in groups. Cape politicians also passed the 1887 Parliamentary Voters
Registration Act, which disenfranchised those voters who owned property under
communal tenure - a measure that hurt African voters. The 1892 Franchise Act, which
raised property qualifications and imposed literacy tests, was another law that effectively
25
Keegan, Colonial South Africa, 289-291
26 Maylam, South Africa 's Racial Past, 107-109; Crais, White Supremacy and Black
Resistance, 193-194; Keegan, Colonial South Africa, 244-246.
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took the vote from blacks.27 Thus, as Britain expanded into other parts of Africa, it
granted self-government and self-rule to the whites of the Cape. As with the United
States, where the federal government and white settler interests became increasingly
closely tied, the British government realized that members of the white elite in its
dominions were strong allies in the pursuit of empire. In the early twentieth century, this
realization would culminate in Britain's setting up of the Union of South Africa with an
all-white legislature.28
The Making of Two Colonial Racial Orders
In the late eighteenth and nineteenth century in the Upper Ohio Valley and the
South African Cape, systems of racial exclusiveness became entrenched through
increasingly close ties between settlers and the state. In both places, settlers, indigenous
groups, missionaries and humanitarians attempted to influence the emerging colonial
racial orders with varying success. Yet ultimately, it was the power of the state and its
officials with their ability to defeat indigenous groups militarily, to dispossess and move,
and to legislate, which ultimately shaped the two regions' colonial racial orders.
27 Maylam, South Africa 's Racial Past, 128.
28
Keegan, Colonial South Africa, 293.
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APPENDIX A
A NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY
In writing both South African and American history, terminology poses numerous
problems. Comparing the two areas further complicates this issue. Thus, I need to explain
briefly my own reservations with some of the terminology I use.
The "proper" naming of the two regions' indigenous groups of peoples proves a
challenge. For instance, the term "Indian" was given to the inhabitants of the so-called
"New World" by Columbus, who thought he had arrived somewhere in Asia. The
"American" component was added later when Europeans labeled the Western
Hemisphere for the Italian navigator Amerigo Vespucci. In the United States it has also
become fashionable to refer to indigenous people as "Native Americans" or "natives."
Yet even these terms have semantic problems. The word "native" generally specifies
anyone's place of origin. Furthermore, "Native" carries a negative connotation in English
imperialism as a term for colonized peoples. It is frequently affiliated with
"backwardness" and "ignorance," and has an especially negative meaning in South
Africa. Native Americans and Africans are in some ways also misnomers since there are
hundreds of different peoples living on the two continents. It is important to emphasize,
however, that despite all differences, the indigenous peoples of each continent shared
many common experiences throughout the colonial encounter. This is why at times I
group the various indigenous peoples in the Upper Ohio Valley together as Ohio Indians.
On occasion, I also refer to the diverse Khoisan and Xhosa speaking groups in the
Eastern Cape as Africans. I also use the term non-white to describe the indigenous
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Khoisan and slave laborers, who were brought to the Cape from other parts of Africa and
Asia. 1
The terminology regarding "white" South Africans and Americans also presents
problems. Frequently they are described as "settlers," which reinforces the erroneous idea
that American Indians or Africans were all nomadic people who did not settle, and who
therefore had less claim to the land in the minds of many whites. I often refer to white
American colonists as "Anglo-Americans," knowing full well that this usage includes
people who were not of English-speaking origin. Furthermore, I distinguish between the
Dutch-speaking Boer (who were often of either Dutch, French, or German origin) as well
as English colonists. I use the term Boer instead of Afrikaner because it was the most
commonly used term throughout the nineteenth century.
1
Despite the noteworthy cultural diversity among southern Africa's and North America's
indigenous societies, Africans and American Indians respectively also shared many
similar experiences through colonialism. For North America see for example Neal
Salisbury, "The Indians' Old World: Native Americans and the Coming of Europeans,"
The William and Mary Quarterly (July, 1996), 435-458; see also Nobles, American
Frontiers. For South Africa see for example Shula Marks, "Khoisan Resistance to the
Dutch in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," Journal ofAfrican History 13
(1963), 80.
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APPENDIX B
A NOTE ON SOURCES
Sources pose a problem for historians of colonialism. Many indigenous people,
for example, left only few, if any, written documents. Thus their voices and experiences
often appear through the filter of the colonizers in government documents, letters,
autobiographies, diaries, and travel accounts.
Historians need to approach their sources critically. They should evaluate not only
the factual information sources provide, but the factors and biases that motivated or
influenced the source's author to write it in the first place.
Finally, the historian is often a captive of the sources she or he works with. The
documents I used for this study primarily provided insights into the views of white and
indigenous elites, and gave little concerns to issues concerning the "rank and file" and
class in those societies. The gender transformation spurred by colonization that occurred
in Ohio Indian and Xhosa societies in the late eighteenth and nineteenth century, such as
in areas of indigenous farming, were not discussed in my sources either. I hope that in the
future historians will explore these questions, which were outside of the scope of my
study.
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APPENDIX C
MAPS
Map 1: The Ohio Country
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Map 2: The Eastern Cape (Source Timothy Keegan, Colonial South Africa, 130.)
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